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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the United States of America, our Chief Executive is not selected
by the people, he—or someday she—is elected by electors, through the
Electoral College system. 1 Under this system, electors, or special designees
appointed under state law, vote for their choice of President. 2 Each elector
may cast two votes, one for the President and one for the Vice President.3 In
most states, a winner take all system is used to select electors so that the
*
Mitchell W. Berger is a partner and founder of Berger Singerman, and he
serves as Co-Chair of the firm. Mr. Berger would like to thank Omar Perez and Stephen
Ayeni for their assistance in the drafting and editing this Article.
*
Zachary P. Hyman is an associate at Berger Singerman. He would like to
thank Jeremy Van Etten and Ashley Falcone for their assistance in the drafting of this Article.
Mr. Hyman especially thanks Jeremy Van Etten for his time and effort in creating the
appendix.
1.
What Is the Electoral College?, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN.:
U.S. ELECTORAL C., http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/about.html
(last visited May 1, 2019).
2.
Id.
3.
Id. Some states require electors to pledge that they will vote for the party
that appointed them. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 215, 227 (1952). Such a requirement is
constitutional. Id. at 231.
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political party that wins the majority of individual votes in that state gets to
appoint all of the electors that will vote for the President—though in Maine
and Nebraska electors are decided on a pro rata basis.4 With rare exception,
electors vote along party lines and in some states they are prohibited from
voting against the candidate who did not receive the majority of votes. 5
The number of electors in each state is based on the number of
representatives and senators allocated to it. 6 This is based on the population
of that state during the United States Census, and each state has a minimum
number of votes, regardless of its population. 7 There are a total of 538
Electoral College votes and a presidential candidate must receive 270
Electoral College votes to win the election.8 Thus, under the Electoral
College system, the President’s selection is not by a popular vote, but is
based on an antiquated system that dates back to the country’s founding. 9
Because the Electoral College system can result in inequity with respect to
the election of a President, between 1889 and 2004, 595 amendments were
proposed on the topic of Electoral College reform—which means that more
proposed constitutional amendments have been introduced regarding
Electoral College reform than on any other subject. 10
In 2016, President Donald J. Trump received 62,984,825 votes—
which is nearly three million votes less than his opponent, Hillary Clinton,

4.
Jonah Engel Bromwich, How Does the Electoral College Work?, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics/how-does-theelectoral-college-work.html; What Is the Electoral College?, supra note 1.
5.
See THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32611, THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE: HOW IT WORKS IN CONTEMPORARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 8 (2017).
In the 2016 election, seven electors voted for candidates other than those chosen by their
state’s voters in the popular election. Id. at 9. There have been a total of eight electors who
did not vote for the presidential candidate selected by their party prior to 2008. David
Strömberg, How the Electoral College Influences Campaigns and Policy: The Probability of
Being Florida, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 769, 772 n.7 (2008).
6.
What Is the Electoral College?, supra note 1.
7.
Bromwich, supra note 4.
8.
Id.; What Is the Electoral College?, supra note 1.
9.
What Is the Electoral College?, supra note 1.
10.
L. PAIGE WHITAKER & THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL30804, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF REFORM PROPOSALS 17
(2004). However, “no proposal to reform the [E]lectoral [C]ollege has been introduced since
the 107th Congress (2001–2003).” THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43824,
ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 20 (2017). “[T]he
candidate who got the most votes won every election from 1896 to 1996.” America’s
Electoral System Gives the Republicans Advantages over Democrats, ECONOMIST (July 12,
2018), http://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/07/12/americas-electoral-system-gives-therepublicans-advantages-over-democrats.
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who received 65,853,516 votes—yet won the election. 11 President Trump
won because he received 74 more votes from the Electoral College than his
opponent. 12 President Trump was elected, notwithstanding the will of the
majority of voting citizens.13 This result, in addition to the 2000 presidential
election, demonstrates why the Electoral College no longer serves a
legitimate purpose. 14 As a result of the most recent election, four proposals
to “replace the [E]lectoral [C]ollege with direct popular election” were
introduced, but no action beyond committee referral was taken on them. 15
Two resolutions proposing a constitutional amendment to establish a direct
popular vote have been introduced to date in the 115th Congress. 16 Such
efforts should be advanced, as the Electoral College cannot be reformed to
ensure one person, one vote, and, like an infected human appendix, it is a
vestige of the past that must be removed before it bursts. 17
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

The Articles of Confederation, the predecessor to the United States
Constitution, established an ineffective form of government. 18 As a result of
the inefficiencies of the Articles of Confederation, representatives of the
11.
Presidential
Results,
CNN:
POL.,
http://www.cnn.com/election/2016/results/president (last visited May 1, 2019).
12.
See Tom Kertscher, Despite Losing Popular Vote, Donald Trump Won in
Electoral Landslide, GOP’s Reince Priebus Says, POLITIFACT (Nov. 21, 2016, 5:00 AM),
http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2016/nov/21/reince-priebus/despite-losingpopular-vote-donald-trump-won-elect/#.
13.
Id. “Hillary Clinton’s lead of 2.1 percentage points was larger than those
enjoyed by the victorious John F. Kennedy in 1960, Richard Nixon in 1968, and Jimmy Carter
in 1976.” America’s Electoral System Gives the Republicans Advantages over Democrats,
supra note 10.
14.
See id. “[I]n 2000, Bush won by 271 to 266 electoral votes. The margin
was so close that all, and only, the [twenty-eight] states that voted for Bush were decisive in
the Electoral College.” Strömberg, supra note 5, at 786.
15.
NEALE, supra note 10, at 20.
16.
Id.; see also H.R.J. Res. 7, 116th Cong. (2019).
17.
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963); Victor Williams & Alison M.
MacDonald, Rethinking Article II, Section 1 and Its Twelfth Amendment Restatement:
Challenging Our Nation’s Malapportioned, Undemocratic Presidential Election Systems, 77
MARQ. L. REV. 201, 205 (1994); see also Jamelle Bouie, The Electoral College Is the Greatest
Threat
to
Our
Democracy,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
28,
2019),
http://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/opinion/the-electoral-college.html.
18.
See Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention, U.S CONST.
(Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.usconstitution.net/consttop_ccon.html. James Madison had a
few problems with the Articles of Confederation. Id. “The states were under no obligation to
pay their fair share of the national budget; they violated international treaties with abandon;
they ran roughshod over the authority of the Congress; and they violated each other’s rights
incessantly.” Id.
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states met during the Constitutional Convention to reconfigure the
framework of the United States National Government. 19
James Madison and other Virginian delegates met before the
Constitutional Convention to create the Virginia Plan, which mirrored the
then-existing form of government in Virginia.20 The Virginia Plan called for
“[a] bicameral legislature—two houses.” 21 Both house memberships would
be represented in proportion to each state’s population. 22 The lower house
would be elected by the people, via popular election, and the upper house
would be elected by the lower house. 23 The Virginia Plan also called for the
election of a National Executive through a vote of the members of the lower
house. 24
“The [Virginia] Plan corrected the inequality that the one state, one
vote [or equal state suffrage] notion inflicted upon the large states” by the
Articles of Confederation. 25 However, states could not agree on how to
apportion representation. 26 Smaller states wanted to maintain the status quo
and maintain the equal state suffrage rule of the Articles of Confederation. 27
Larger states viewed the equal state suffrage system as being “inherently
unfair, and were going to do everything they could to abolish it.” 28
19.
Id. “No one seemed to want to debate this issue because of the presence
in the Convention of George Washington, who everyone assumed would be the first [C]hief
[E]xecutive of the nation.” Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1145, 1151 (2002).
20.
Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention, supra note 18.
21.
Id.
22.
Id. In James Madison’s notes on debates in the Federal Convention of
1787, “the rights of suffrage in the [n]ational [l]egislature [were] to be proportioned to the
[q]uotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants.” H.R. Doc. No. 398, at 953
(1927).
23.
Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention, supra note 18.
24.
Finkelman, supra note 19, at 1151. Madison believed that the lower
house should be chosen by popular vote and should therefore have the power to determine the
President. Id. Madison believed that in order to establish a free government, the legislature,
executive, and judiciary powers should be both separately and independently exercised. Id. at
1154–55. He believed an Executive determined by the legislature would form a coalition that
“would be more immediately [and] certainly dangerous to public liberty.” 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 56–57 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966). However,
while he thought the people were the fittest, there would be difficulty in reaching a consensus
because “[t]he people generally could only know [and] vote for some [c]itizen whose merits
had rendered him an object of general attention [and] esteem.” Id. This led to his assertion
that a substitution of electors, in the form of the lower house chosen by popular vote, would be
the best solution. Id. at 57.
25.
Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention, supra note 18.
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
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On the other hand, smaller states, such as “New Jersey, New
Hampshire, Maryland, Delaware, Connecticut, and even New York, felt they
had to fear any attempt by the large states of Virginia, Pennsylvania, and
Massachusetts to take away equal [state] suffrage” between the states.29
More importantly, they “feared the Southern [S]tates because of the general
belief . . . that [those states] . . . would soon grow to Pennsylvanian-sized
populations,” and if slaves were counted that those populations would grow
even more quickly. 30
The disagreement over the terms of state representation in the Senate
was hotly contested and there were even “[t]hreats to dissolve the
Convention.” 31 Fortunately, Roger Sherman from Connecticut proposed the
Connecticut Compromise. 32 Sherman sided with the two-house national
legislature of the Virginia Plan but proposed “[t]hat the proportion of
suffrage in the [first] branch, [or House,] should be according to the
respective numbers of free inhabitants; and that in the second branch, or
Senate, each State should have one vote and no more.” 33 This quelled some
of the tension and led to an eventual agreement. 34 The small states were
steadfast in their stance on “equal suffrage in the Senate.” 35 However, slaveowning states were not willing to agree to such a system unless they could
maintain political power derived from slave ownership. 36 As Madison
observed: “It seemed now to be pretty well understood that the real
difference[s] . . . lay, not between the large [and] small [states], but between
the [Northern and Southern] States. The institution of slavery [and] its
consequences formed the line of discrimination.” 37
29.
Id.
30.
Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention, supra note 18.
31.
Id. “[T]he Delaware delegation [was] instructed to leave the Convention
if equal suffrage in the legislature was compromised.” Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
See Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention, supra note 18.
35.
Id.
36.
See id.
37.
Williams & MacDonald, supra note 17, at 208 (quoting JAMES MADISON,
NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 295 (1976)). “[M]any of the
largest slave holders in the United States were at the Convention.” Constitutional Topic: The
Constitutional Convention, supra note 18. At least a third of the Convention’s fifty-five
delegates owned slaves, including all of the delegates from Virginia and South Carolina.
DAVID O. STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787: THE MEN WHO INVENTED THE CONSTITUTION 68
(2007). “But [Madison] contended that the [s]tates were divided into different interests not by
their difference of size, but by other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly
from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or not having slaves.” Juan F.
Perea, Race and Constitutional Law Casebooks: Recognizing the Proslavery Constitution,
110 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1137 (2012) (quoting MADISON, supra, at 224). While the Electoral
College was intended to protect the interests of small states, only three out of the forty-five
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THE THREE-FIFTHS COMPROMISE

In the South, slavery would not only propel the South’s agricultural
economy, but would help fulfill aspirations of “achieving majority control in
the immediate[] foreseeable future.” 38 James Madison had become a
proponent of representation by population, with the inclusion of slaves, prior
to the Convention, and recommended that representation by population “is
recommended . . . to the [S]outhern [States] by their expected superiority.” 39
Nonetheless, Southern delegates feared that they would be divested of
representation as a result of slavery—which was the foundation of the
Southern economy. 40 To protect its interests, “[t]he South wanted their
slaves counted as whole persons [for purposes of allocating representatives],
but that would never happen.” 41
Ultimately, the states were able to reach a compromise on legislative
representation because of issues related to taxation. 42
During the
Convention, delegates proposed that federal tax would be based on the total
population of each state—inclusive of slaves. 43 Southern slave-states
strongly opposed this, as they felt there would be a crippling tax obligation if
slaves were to be counted for purposes of taxes. 44 Slave-owner—and future
beneficiary of the Electoral College 45—Thomas Jefferson maintained such
taxation would be inequitable as Southern States would be taxed “according
to their numbers and their wealth conjunctly, while the [N]orthern [States]
Presidents—Zachary Taylor of Louisiana, Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire, and Bill
Clinton of Arkansas—hailed from them. Akhil Reed Amar, Some Thoughts on the Electoral
College: Past, Present, and Future, 33 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 467, 468 (2007).
38.
GARRY WILLS, NEGRO PRESIDENT: JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER 58
(2003).

Id. at 54.

Under the Articles, the North outnumbered the South by eight states to
five . . . . Under the Constitution taking shape, . . . [t]he South had to fear an edge
given to the North, both in terms of the unit vote in the Senate and the popular vote
in the House, since [sixty] percent of the white population was in the North.
Counting slaves fully would have made the two regions roughly equal.

39.
Id. at 58.
40.
Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention, supra note 18.
41.
Id.
42.
WILLS, supra note 38, at 53.
43.
Id. at 51. “[T]he three-fifths count was first proposed, in an entirely
different context, as a measure of taxation under the Articles of Confederation, where
representation was not at issue.” Id. at 50–51.
44.
Id. at 51. “The [S]outhern [S]tates, which would be urgent for counting
slaves later on, when it would boost their representation, were opposed to counting them at all
when it boosted taxes. This was, they claimed, taxation without representation.” Id.
45.
See WILLS, supra note 38, at 2. Historians Garry Wills, Leonard L.
Richards, and William W. Freehling have written that had slaves not been counted at all,
Adams would have won the electoral vote. Id. at 234 n.2.
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would be taxed on numbers only.” 46 To alleviate the financial burden
associated with slave ownership, reach a compromise, and ensure that the
Southern slave-owning States maintained equal representation, Benjamin
Harrison proposed a one-half ratio so long as slaves were also counted for
purposes of determining representation in the House of Representatives. 47 In
response, several New England delegates proposed a higher three-fourths
ratio. 48 They eventually compromised on the three-fifths ratio proposed by
James Madison. 49
“Counting [slaves] at three-fifths [of a person] would give the South,
which had only [forty-one] percent of the white population, [forty-seven]
percent of the delegates in the House of Representatives.” 50 Indeed, after the
Electoral College was enacted, Pennsylvania, which had ten percent more
free persons than Virginia, had twenty percent fewer representative votes
than its southern counterpart. 51 The Three-Fifths Compromise also delayed
the prohibition of the slave trade in the United States, which guaranteed
Southern political influence through slave-based representation. 52
In exchange for this concession, the federal government’s power to
regulate foreign commerce would be strengthened by provisions that allowed
for taxation of slave trades in the international market.53 This provision only
justified a further increase in the Southern slave population. 54 With the
46.
Id. at 51–52. This is because slaves were viewed as property “comparable
to such property, held in the North, as cattle, horses, etc.” Id. at 51. The authors of this
Article write this piece in part to denounce the fact that the Electoral College was created as a
result of slavery to preserve the power of Southern slave owners. See id.
47.
WILLS, supra note 38, at 53.
48.
Id.

Id.

This was a compromise between the one-half count favored by the South and the
three-fourths favored by the North. It would count a slave’s productivity at [sixty]
percent of a free person’s, as opposed to the [fifty] percent favored by the South or
the [seventy-five] percent desired by the North. Madison split the difference with a
tilt in the South’s favor.

49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 54; see also DONALD ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 1765–1820, at 179–80 (1979).
51.
Akhil Reed Amar, The Troubling Reason the Electoral College Exists,
TIME: HIST. (Nov. 26, 2018, 1:16 PM), http://www.time.com/4558510/electoral-collegehistory-slavery/.
52.
Martin Kelly, What Does the Constitution Say About Slavery?,
THOUGHTCO.: ISSUES, http://www.thoughtco.com/what-does-constitution-say-about-slavery105417 (last updated Sept. 5, 2018); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; WILLS, supra note 38, at
54.
53.
See WILLS, supra note 38, at 50–51.
54.
See Table, VOYAGES: TRANS-ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE DATABASE,
http://www.slavevoyages.org/assessment/estimates (set row field for individual years, then set
columns field for flag, then set cells field for only disembarked, then select show hyperlink)
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assurance of slavery’s continued and strengthened existence, the South was
provided opportunities to improve their voting power in both Congress and
the Electoral College. 55 This enhanced power would ensure that if the issue
of slavery was revisited, they would undoubtedly have the requisite votes in
Congress and through the Electoral College, which influenced the selection
of the Executive, to preserve it. 56
IV.

ORIGINS OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

On May 25, 1787, James Wilson, a prominent Philadelphia lawyer
and representative from Philadelphia, suggested that the people elect a single
person to act as a National Executive, “giving most energy dispatch and
responsibility to the office.” 57 “The only powers [Wilson] conceived strictly
Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not—
appertaining to and—appointed by the [l]egislature.” 58 He further advocated
an election of the Executive by the people, based on a popular election. 59
However, Wilson’s proposal was not accepted by Southern delegates who
wanted the legislature to select the President.60 Among others, “Hugh
(last visited May 1, 2019); Kelly, supra note 52. During the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, there
was a noticeable increase in slaves who disembarked in the United States during this twentyyear period, beginning with 2,083 ships in 1787 and peaking at over 29,675 in the last year,
1807. Table, supra. In fact, from the inception of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, in 1525 to
1786, a year before the Three-Fifths Compromise, there had been 110,749 slaves who
disembarked in the United States. See id.; Kelly, supra note 52. Unsurprisingly, over the
twenty-year period of 1787–1807, this number increased to 130,961 slaves. Table, supra.
55.
See RETURN OF THE WHOLE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITHIN THE SEVERAL
DISTRICTS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1793); Results from the 1860 Census, CIV. WAR HOME
PAGE, www.civil-war.net/pages/1860_census.html (last visited May 1, 2019). The slavery
population had grown from 29,264, in 1790, to 3,950,528 in 1860—roughly a 13,500%
increase. RETURN OF THE WHOLE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITHIN THE SEVERAL DISTRICTS OF
THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 3; Results from the 1860 Census, supra. During this period,
“[i]n the [United States], on average, a slave mother gave birth to between nine and [ten]
children . . . . [Expectantly, by] 1860, ‘less than [ten] percent of the slave population was over
[fifty] and only 3.5 percent was over [sixty].’” Henry Louis Gates Jr., Slavery, by the
Numbers, ROOT (Feb. 10, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.theroot.com/slavery-by-the-numbers1790874492.
56.
See WILLS, supra note 38, at 50, 58.
57.
William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 901, 912, 947 (2008) (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 65 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)).
58.
Id. at 947 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
supra note 57, at 66).
59.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 24, at
56.
60.
Finkelman, supra note 19, at 1153–55. Hugh Williamson of North
Carolina asserted that if a popular election was done, there would be “distinguished characters
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Williamson of North Carolina openly calculated that direct election of the
[E]xecutive would place the South at a clear disadvantage. He reasoned that
because the South’s ‘slaves would have no suffrage’ in a presidential
election, the slave-free [N]orthern [S]tates would have a much greater voter
population in comparison.” 61 As a result, James Wilson “suggested that each
state be divided into ‘districts: [A]nd that the persons qualified to vote in
each district’ vote for ‘[m]embers for their respective [d]istricts to be electors
of the Executive Magistracy.’” 62 This did not obtain much support. 63
However, it laid the foundation for the creation of the Electoral College. 64
In response to Wilson, Charles Pinckney, a South Carolina
representative, claimed that a direct election of the President would result in
the largest states being able to select the President. 65 However, Pinckney’s
issue was not an issue of representation of small or large states: “The issue
here was not population, but the voting population. With about half of South
Carolina populated by slaves, Pinckney could not afford to support the direct
election of the [P]resident because that would [ultimately harm] his state.” 66
Similarly, James Madison, a slaveholder from Virginia, stated that “right of
suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States;
and the latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the

[such as President George Washington], who [were] known perhaps to almost every man.
This [would] not always be the case.” Id. at 1154 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 24, at 32). He thought that eventually people would “vote
for some man in their own [s]tate, and the largest [s]tate will be sure to succeed.” Id. (quoting
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 24, at 32).
61.
Williams & MacDonald, supra note 17, at 209 (quoting 3 JONATHAN
ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 296 (James McClellan &
M.E. Bradford eds., 2d ed. 1991)).
62.
Finkelman, supra note 19, at 1153 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 57, at 77).
63.
Id. at 1154. “Although a conservative on many issues, [on the question of
how to choose the National Executive, Wilson] proved to be a radical democrat, arguing for
an election by the people, citing the successful experience of the popular election of governors
in New York and Massachusetts . . . .” Id. at 1152 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 57, at 68).
64.
See id. at 1153.
65.
Finkelman, supra note 19, at 1154; Constitutional Topic:
The
Constitutional Convention, supra note 18. Pinckney submitted his proposal on May 29, 1787,
the same day Madison’s Virginia Plan was introduced. Constitutional Topic: The
Constitutional Convention, supra note 18. This position was made clear by Hugh Williamson,
of North Carolina, who was less articulate than Pinckney, when he noted that Southern slave
owners would always wish to vote on behalf of their slaves. Finkelman, supra note 19, at
1154.
66.
Id.
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Negroes.” 67 Ultimately, the concern over slave-derived political power
carried the day, and an election of the Executive by popular vote was
rejected by the Constitutional Convention, with only six or seven delegates
out of forty-two delegates speaking favorably on the issue. 68 This occurred
because, among other reasons, Southern States would not permit their slaves
to vote and be counted towards the election of the Executive, yet slave
owners wanted to exercise political influence through their ownership of
slaves. 69
Ultimately, the Convention agreed to permit the states to select
electors to vote for the Executive. 70 The number of electors allocated to each
state was based on the representation of Congress, provided slave owners
with more power, and had been previously agreed to by the Convention as a
fair mechanism to apportion representation. 71 The Electoral College was
formed, and as one delegate to the Virginia delegation would say, “seems
rather founded on accident than any principle of government I [have] ever
heard of.” 72
V.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OF 1800 AND THE FORMATION OF THE
MODERN ELECTORAL COLLEGE

In its original iteration, the candidate who received the most electoral
votes would become the President, and the candidate who received the
second most votes would become the Vice President, and each elector was
permitted to cast two votes, one for President, and one for Vice President. 73
If no candidate received a majority of votes, the decision of who to elect as
President would be left to the House of Representatives, with each state
casting a single vote in favor of their chosen candidate, and the majority of
votes for the House of Representatives would carry the day. 74
The 1796 election laid the foundation for the involvement of
political parties in the Electoral College. 75 Despite the fact that the
67.
Id. at 1154–55 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 24, at 57).
68.
See Joshua D. Hawley, The Transformative Twelfth Amendment, 55 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1501, 1515 (2014).
69.
Finkelman, supra note 19, at 1155.
70.
Id. at 1154–55.
71.
Id.
72.
Hawley, supra note 68, at 1520 (quoting 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION
516 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)).
73.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
74.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
75.
Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who’s Afraid of the Twelfth
Amendment?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 928–29 (2001). Federalists, led by Alexander
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Federalist candidate, John Adams, received a majority of votes, Federalist
electors did not garnish sufficient electoral votes for their intended vice
presidential candidate to become Vice President.76 As a result, Thomas
Jefferson, a Democratic-Republican and John Adams’ opponent in the
election, became the Vice President, and used the position to undermine
Adams’ authority. 77
After learning their lesson from the 1796 election, Federalists and
Republicans were prepared for the 1800 election, and electors from the
different political parties voted for their top two candidates based on party
lines to ensure that the Vice President would not be from a different political
party. 78 However, the electors did not contemplate the fact that unless the
intended presidential candidate received more votes than the vice presidential
candidate, there would be a run-off election in the House of
Representatives. 79 As a result, Aaron Burr and Thomas Jefferson, two
Republican candidates who received an equal number of electoral votes,
were forced to have a run-off election in the House of Representatives,
which—at the time—was comprised mainly of Federalists. 80
The House of Representatives met for thirty-six hours casting thirtyfive ballots, as Federalist congressmen refused to vote for Jefferson, who
they viewed as an enemy to the Republic, or Burr who they viewed with
equal disdain. 81
The process was viewed with such hostility that
Pennsylvania and Virginia’s governors made preliminary preparations to
mobilize their “states’ militia[s] in the event [that] congressional Federalists
Hamilton, favored a strong central government with the power to control commerce, while
Republicans favored a strong local government with a weak federal government. See id. at
929–30; Hawley, supra note 68, at 1524.
76.
Levinson & Young, supra note 75, at 928. At this time, American politics
was dominated by two political parties: The Republicans and the Federalists. Id.; Hawley,
supra note 68, at 1524, 1530.
77.
Hawley, supra note 68, at 1536; Levinson & Young, supra note 75, at
928–29.
78.
Hawley, supra note 68, at 1536; Levinson & Young, supra note 75, at
929.
79.
Levinson & Young, supra note 75, at 928–29. There are some historical
accounts which indicate that Thomas Jefferson, who presided over the counting of electoral
votes as the Vice President, manipulated the results of the Electoral College to improperly
count certain votes, avoiding a five-person run off. Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana,
Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the Presidency, 90 VA. L. REV. 551, 614–15 (2004).
80.
Hawley, supra note 68, at 1536–37. Federalists, on the other hand, were
more coordinated, and one Republican elector voted for John Jay, instead of Charles Pickney.
Levinson & Young, supra note 75, at 929 n.16. Republican electors, who were unaware of
how their contemporaries voted, wanted to avoid the results of the 1796 election and all voted
for both Burr and Jefferson. Id. at 1536.
81.
Hawley, supra note 68, at 1536–37; Williams & MacDonald, supra note
17, at 215.
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prevented the ascension of one of the Republican [Presidents].” 82 Before a
constitutional crisis could occur, the House of Representatives broke for a
weekend, and after a weekend of “fierce back room politicking and deal
making” the House returned for another vote and Jefferson was elected
President. 83
The Federalist congressmen’s conduct during the 1800 election
created significant concerns as to whether the legislature could usurp the will
of the people through the run-off process originally contemplated in the
Electoral College. 84 As a result, Congress began to discuss a meaningful
reform to the Electoral College, based on the Republican argument that “it
was the right of popular majorities to choose the President.” 85 To effectuate
such a policy, Republicans proposed that votes for the Vice President be cast
separately from those for the President, which consolidated presidential
authority in the executive branch and reduced the possibility of having
elections decided by Congress. 86 Federalists opposed this proposal because
they knew that “they were unlikely to be able to muster a majority of the
electors in the foreseeable future, [and therefore] did their best to preserve
the unholy possibility that they might be able to choose between their
opponents in the House.” 87 In furtherance of their position, Federalists
claimed that tying the Vice President’s duties to those of the President would
result in a Vice President being selected to curry political favor.88

82.
Hawley, supra note 68, at 1537.
83.
Williams & MacDonald, supra note 17, at 215. Historians believe that
Alexander Hamilton played a critical role in preventing Aaron Burr from being elected
President. See “Jefferson Is in Every View Less Dangerous than Burr”: Hamilton on the
LEHRMAN
INST.
AM.
HIST.:
HIST.
NOW,
Election
of
1800,
GILDER
http://www.gilderlehrman.org/content/jefferson-every-view-less-dangerous-burr-hamiltonelection-1800 (last visited May 1, 2019). Indeed, Hamilton is quoted as stating:
Mr. Jefferson, though too revolutionary in his notions, is yet a lover of
liberty and will be desirous of something like orderly Government — Mr. Burr
loves nothing but himself — thinks of nothing but his own aggrandizement — and
will be content with nothing short of permanent power [struck: and] in his own
hands — No compact, that he should make with any [struck: other] passion in his
[struck: own] breast except [struck: his] Ambition, could be relied upon by
himself — How then should we be able to rely upon any agreement with him? Mr.
Jefferson, I suspect will not dare much Mr. Burr will [inserted in margin: dare
every thing in the sanguine hope of effecting every thing — ].

Id. (alterations in original).
84.
Hawley, supra note 68, at 1540.
85.
Id. at 1543–44.
86.
Id. at 1550–51.
87.
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS
1801-1829, 41 (2001); Levinson & Young, supra note 75, at 930.
88.
See Hawley, supra note 68, at 1552.
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Ultimately, the argument that the President should be a man of the
people carried the day, and the Twelfth Amendment was enacted. 89 The
Twelfth Amendment provided, in relevant part, that each elector could cast
one vote for the President and one vote for the Vice President, and that if no
presidential candidate received the required majority, then the President
would be selected by the House of Representatives and the Vice President
would be selected by the Senate. 90
The Twelfth Amendment transformed the nature of the executive
branch and, thus, the importance of the Electoral College. 91 Because the
Twelfth Amendment eliminated the possibility of having a politically
independent Vice President, it consolidated power for the President by
making it difficult for the Vice President “to establish a compelling identity
apart from the party apparatus,” and prevented any person, aside from the
President, from being the leader of any major political faction within the
President’s party. 92 As a result, the Twelfth Amendment transformed the
way that a President would campaign and act. 93 Because the President’s
power was consolidated, he had the ability to promulgate policy without
interference from an opposition Cabinet. 94 Similarly, presidential elections
became a nationwide spectacle focused solely on the identity of the
presidential candidates, as opposed to the elections of 1796 and 1800, where
vice presidential candidates received some attention. 95
The political power vested in the President through the enactment of
the Twelfth Amendment was not contemplated by delegates at the
Convention, who envisioned an Executive with limited powers of enforcing
legislation of Congress. 96 Had the framers of the Twelfth Amendment
realized that the National Executive would have the independent role that
he—or she—enjoys today, they may not have compromised and agreed to
select the National Executive through the reformed Electoral College system
as proscribed by the Twelfth Amendment. 97
Despite the fact that the Twelfth Amendment was intended to give
the voting population an opportunity to participate in the presidential
election, prevent the trading of political favors for positions in the
President’s Cabinet, and prevent Congress from exercising power over the

XII.

89.
90.

Id. at 1550.
WHITAKER & NEALE, supra note 10, at 5; see also U.S. CONST. amend.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Hawley, supra note 68, at 1501.
Id. at 1560–61.
See id. at 1555.
See id. at 1552.
See id. at 1555.
Hawley, supra note 68, at 1506, 1514, 1528.
See id. at 1506, 1528.
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election of Presidents, it did not serve that purpose. 98 The 1824 election,
which was decided under the deadlock provisions of the Twelfth
Amendment, resulted in the very conduct that the Amendment sought to
prohibit. 99
In 1824, John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, and Henry Clay all
ran for President and, unlike modern third party candidates, Clay was able to
acquire enough votes to prevent Adams or Jackson from winning the
Electoral College outright, causing the election to go to the House of
Representatives. 100 During the run-off election, Clay, who was disqualified
from consideration as President in the run-off because he did not receive
sufficient votes to qualify, agreed to use his position and influence in the
House of Representatives to help Adams gain enough votes to be elected in
exchange for being appointed as the Secretary of State. 101
Other
representatives traded political favors for votes in the run-off election as well
and, as a result of back room politics, John Quincy Adams won the run-off
election of 1824 without receiving the majority of popular or electoral
votes. 102
VI.

THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT

Despite Congress’s prohibition of importation of slaves in 1808,
slavery continued to grow, increasing the political influence of Southern
States. 103 In 1812, slave states had 76 out of 143 members of the House of
Representatives—instead of the 59 they would have had, but for the ThreeFifths Compromise— and, in 1833, 98 out of 240 instead of 73. 104 In 1820,
slavery continued to expand geographically as the Missouri Compromise
permitted slavery in new territories, so long as they were located below the
Mason-Dixon Line. 105 As a result, Southern proslavery positions dominated
United States policy, and the well-being of Southern interests was preserved
98.
See id. at 1501, 1506–07.
99.
See Jeffery A. Jenkins & Brian A. Sala, The Spatial Theory of Voting and
the Presidential Election of 1824, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1157, 1158–59 (1998). Henry Clay only
won thirty-seven electoral votes. Id. at 1160. There is a dispute as to whether John Quincy
Adams actually offered Clay and other representatives a Cabinet position in exchange for
electoral votes. Id. at 1158; Jamie L. Carson & Erik J. Engstrom, Assessing the Electoral
Connection: Evidence from the Early United States, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 746, 748 (2005).
100.
Jenkins & Sala, supra note 99, at 1157–59. At that time, Jackson had the
majority of popular votes. Id. at 1160.
101.
Id. at 1158–59.
102.
Id. at 1157–58.
103.
See WILLS, supra note 38, at 6, 53.
104.
Id.
105.
See John Mackenzie, A Brief History of the Mason-Dixon Line, U. DEL.,
http://www1.udel.edu/johnmack/mason_dixon/ (last visited May 1, 2019).
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through the ability to vote on behalf of slaves, which was only possible
thanks to the Electoral College. 106
Prior to the American Civil War, Southern States gained a
disproportionate representational advantage, compared to Northern free
States. 107
Southern States had a disproportionate influence on the
presidency, the speakership of the House, and the Supreme Court in the
period prior to the Civil War. 108 In fact, “[f]or [thirty-two] of the
Constitution’s first [thirty-six] years, a white slave-holding Virginian
occupied the presidency.” 109
With slavery expanding, which resulted in an increase in the South’s
political power, President Abraham Lincoln and the Republican party 110 did
not have the political ability to not interfere with slavery. 111 Nonetheless,
President Lincoln’s election caused many Southern States to fear that they
would lose the ability to control the Electoral College to maintain their way
of life, and secession from the Union became the alternative. 112
106.
WILLS, supra note 38, at 5–6. “[O]n behalf of white settlers who wanted
to grow cotton on the Indians’ land, the federal government [empowered by President Andrew
Jackson’s Indian Removal Act] forced [the Natives] to leave their homelands and walk
thousands of miles to a specially designated Indian territory across the Mississippi River.”
Trail of Tears, HIST., http://www.history.com/topics/native-american-history/trail-of-tears
(last updated Aug. 29, 2018).
107.
WILLS, supra note 38, at 5–6, 53. In 1860, the free population of free
states was 18,807,386 in comparison to the 8,425,812 of the free population in slave-owning
states. See Results from the 1860 Census, supra note 55. Thanks to the Three-Fifths
Compromise, the slave states were able to increase their representation by 2.3 million, which
undoubtedly assisted their influence in the legislature, as only a simple majority is needed to
pass a bill—the first hurdle needed to clear in order to institute or uphold their fundamentally
flawed policies. See WILLS, supra note 38, at 5–6; The Legislative Process, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.gov/the-house-explained/the-legislative-process (last
visited May 1, 2019).
108.
WILLS, supra note 38, at 5–6.
109.
Akhil Reed Amar, The Electoral College, Unfair from Day One, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at A2.
110.
Louise Weinberg, Dredd Scott and the Crisis of 1860, 82 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 97, 109–10, 112 (2007). This is a different Republican party than President Jefferson’s
which transformed itself to the Democratic party. See id.; Alana Horowitz Satlin, Actually,
Lincoln Would Be Horrified by Today’s GOP, HUFFPOST: POL. (Feb. 15, 2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/lincoln-modern-gop
republicans_us_56bdea90e4b0b40245c61bb5.
111.
See Alexander Tabarrok & Lee Spector, Would the Borda Count Have
Avoided the Civil War?, 11 J. THEORETICAL POL. 261, 271–72 (1999). President Lincoln was
elected, in part, because he did not campaign against the abolition of slavery. Weinberg,
supra note 110, at 101. Instead, he took the position that he opposed the expansion of slavery
into new states. Id.
112.
Id. at 109–10. Notably, Article II of the Constitution of the Confederate
States of America preserved the Electoral College system of selecting the President of the
Confederacy. CONST. OF CONFEDERATE STS. of 1861, art. II, § 1. In 1861, Jefferson Davis
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Many Republicans believed that slavery was a primary cause of the
Civil War, and believed that for the Union to continue to exist, slavery had to
be eliminated. 113 As a result, and since the Democratic party—which was
comprised primarily of Southern slave owners—was weak in the remaining
Union States because of secession, the Republican party took control of both
houses of Congress in 1862 and drafted an anti-slavery amendment in
1864. 114 After General Robert E. Lee surrendered, 115 the Thirteenth
Amendment, which abolished slavery, was ratified. 116
It has been widely recognized that Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment gave Congress the power to enforce the Amendment by
prohibiting legislation relating to the “badges and incidents of slavery.” 117
The term incident referred to the inability to hold property, testify in court,
enforce the rights of the black man, exercise the right of freedom of speech,
or obtain an education. 118 Although the term badge had a varying meaning
before the Civil War, it generally referred to the skin color of a slave, as only
a man of color could be a slave. 119 By the 1860s, the Supreme Court began
using the terms to refer to a “broader set of political, civil, and legal
disadvantages imposed on slaves, former slaves, and free blacks.” 120
was elected as the President of the Confederacy, receiving 109 out of 109 Confederate
electoral votes. J. CONG. OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AM., S. DOC. NO. 234, at 12 (1904);
Jefferson Davis Elected Confederate President, HIST.: THIS DAY IN HIST.,
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/jefferson-davis-elected-confederate-president (last
updated Feb. 25, 2019).
113.
See Weinberg, supra note 110, at 98.
114.
See Robert Longley, The 13th Amendment: History and Impact,
THOUGHTCO. (Nov. 13, 2018) http://www.thoughtco.com/thirteenth-amendment-4164032;
Leonard M. Scruggs, Passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, TRIBUNEPAPERS (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.thetribunepapers.com/2014/01/10/passage-of-the-fourteenth-amendment/.
115.
Robert E. Lee Surrenders, HIST., http://www.history.com/this-day-inhistory/robert-e-lee-surrenders (last updated Feb. 20, 2018). On April 9, 1865,

Id.

Lee and Grant, both holding the highest rank in their respective armies,
had known each other slightly during the Mexican War and exchanged awkward
personal inquiries. Characteristically, Grant arrived in his muddy field uniform
while Lee had turned out in full dress attire, complete with sash and sword. Lee
asked for the terms, and Grant hurriedly wrote them out. All officers and men were
to be pardoned, and they [would] be sent home with their private property — most
important, the horses, which could be used for a late spring planting. Officers
would keep their side arms, and Lee’s starving men would be given Union rations.
Shushing a band that had begun to play in celebration, General Grant
told his officers, “The war is over. The Rebels are our countrymen again.”

116.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; Longley, supra note 114.
117.
Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery,
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561, 563 (2012); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
118.
McAward, supra note 117, at 572–73.
119.
Id. at 576.
120.
Id. at 578.
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The Electoral College was not successfully challenged as a badge of
slavery. 121 A plausible constitutional challenge based upon the Thirteenth
Amendment may not have been mounted because the Electoral College grew
out of a political compromise to allow Southern slave owners to maintain
political power derived from slave ownership. 122 Constitutional legal
challenges based upon the freshly adopted Thirteenth Amendment after a
devastating and divisive civil war did not occur. 123 It is possible that the
constitutionality of the Electoral College was not contested because the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to remedy the issues created by it, and
because of “skepticism [as to] whether the Thirteenth Amendment itself, in
the absence of congressional legislation,” could be enforced. 124
VII.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Eliminating slavery had the effect of eliminating the provision that
counted each slave as three-fifths a person for purposes of allocating taxes
and representation. 125 As a result, the former slave states gained fifteen seats
in Congress. 126 However, giving black citizens the right to vote did not
protect them from the imposition of badges of slavery, as the Constitution
did not apply to the states at the time. 127
After President Lincoln was assassinated and Andrew Johnson
became President, many Republicans were concerned that President Johnson
would not ensure that slavery was abolished.128 In the eyes of Republican
leadership, President Johnson was more concerned with keeping the country
together than with ending slavery. 129 To ensure that slavery would be
eliminated before Congress would be flooded by former Confederate States’

121.
See id. at 577–78; Amar, supra note 37, at 471.
122.
Amar, supra note 37, at 470; Christopher F. Petrella, Slavery, Democracy,
and the Racialized Roots of the Electoral College, BLACK PERSPECTIVES (Nov. 14, 2016),
http://www.aaihs.org/slavery-democracy-and-the-racialized-roots-of-the-electoral-college/;
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
123.
See Longley, supra note 114.
124.
William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment:
Defining Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1329 (2007); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; Akhil Reed Amar, Becoming Lawyers in the Shadow of Brown,
40 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 7 (2000).
125.
Scruggs, supra note 114; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
126.
See Scruggs, supra note 114.
127.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; Scruggs, supra note 114.
128.
See Allen Pusey, The 14th Amendment Is Ratified, 102 A.B.A. J. 72, 72
(2016).
129.
See id.
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representatives, Republicans would take any steps needed to fully abolish
slavery, and sought to enact the Fourteenth Amendment. 130
The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to ensure that Southern
States would abolish the institution of slavery even if President Johnson and
others were not willing to act.131 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited any state from making or enforcing any law which abridges the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States or “den[ies] to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 132 Section 1
was added in order to block state legislation that would attempt to implement
other forms of servitude in order to replace slavery, such as Black Codes.133
To further protect against state interference with black votes in the
presidential election, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
[s]tates according to their respective numbers, counting the whole
number of persons in each [s]tate, excluding Indians not taxed.
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors
for President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of
a [s]tate, or the members of the [l]egislature thereof, is denied to
any of the male inhabitants of such [s]tate, being twenty-one years
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such [s]tate. 134

This provision would reduce a state’s representation in Congress and
the Electoral College if the state deprived any adult male citizen of his right
to vote. 135 Supporters of Section 2 argued that language was necessary to

130.
See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
131.
See 14th Amendment, HIST., http://www.history.com/topics/blackhistory/fourteenth-amendment (last updated Aug. 21, 2018); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
132.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 14th Amendment, supra note 131.
133.
14th Amendment, supra note 131; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
134.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; 14th Amendment, supra note 131.
135.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; 14th Amendment, supra note 131.
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allow black men an avenue to effectuate reform and preserve their rights. 136
It did not apply to women or convicted felons. 137
The Southern States, except for Tennessee, rejected the Fourteenth
Amendment. 138 However, readmission into the Union—and, thus, the
eventual elimination of the Northern military presence in the South—was
conditioned on ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
establishment of state constitutions that Congress deemed acceptable. 139
Because ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was a condition to being
readmitted into the Union, Southern States reluctantly agreed to ratify it,
while openly refusing to comply with it.140 The South’s refusal to abide by
the Fourteenth Amendment made it clear that Section 2 would not be
enforced against the former slave holding states, as Northern representatives
quickly realized that Southern States “and their enactment of black codes . . .
made the condition of the freedmen more deplorable than slavery itself[,]” by
criminalizing conduct to limited voting rights and causing former slaves to
incur debts they could not pay, thereby forcing them into indentured
servitude. 141 Moreover, if Section 2 was enforced upon enactment, Northern
States would have lost significant power because they, like their Southern
counterparts, did not permit black citizens to vote. 142

136.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; Michael Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth
Amendment: Recalling What the Court Forgot, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 911, 958 (2008).
“Thaddeus Stevens told his colleagues this was the most important provision in the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Curtis, supra, at 958.
137.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon
Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 305 (2004); Curtis, supra note 136, at 958.
Significant disenfranchisement of black voters occurred as a result of being convicted of
crimes. Chin, supra, at 305.
138.
Michael Kent Curtis, The Klan, the Congress, and the Court:
Congressional Enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the State Action
Syllogism, a Brief Historical Overview, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1381, 1397 (2009).
139.
Id.
140.
Id.; Chin, supra note 137, at 261.
141.
Chin, supra note 137, at 269 (quoting GEORGE W. JULIAN, POLITICAL
RECOLLECTIONS: 1840 TO 1872 304 (Jansen, McClurg & Co. ed., 1884)); see also Curtis,
supra note 136, at 1387; Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Mass Incarceration of AfricanAmerican Males: A Return to Institutionalized Slavery, Oppression, and Disenfranchisement
of Constitutional Rights, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 599, 599–600 (2007). These black codes
subjected former slaves to harsher sentencing laws than whites, prohibited voting, restricted
travel, and provided lesser educational opportunities for newly freed slaves. Curtis, supra
note 136, at 917; Weatherspoon, supra, at 599–600.
142.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; Curtis, supra note 136, at 917.
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To avoid losing political capital as a result of the failure to grant
blacks the right to vote, Northern representatives relied on the enactment of
the Fifteenth Amendment, which effectively abolished Section 2.143 Indeed,
Courts hold and commentators agree that “instead of prohibiting
race-based voting restrictions, Section 2 merely established a price
for such restrictions.” By contrast, the Fifteenth Amendment
categorically prohibits . . . states from discriminating on the basis
of race; it “has always been treated as self-executing and has
repeatedly been construed, without further legislative
specification, to invalidate state voting qualifications or procedures
which are discriminatory on their face or in practice.” . . . As the
Supreme Court explained in United States v. Reese, 144 before
[enactment of] the Fifteenth Amendment, “[i]t was as much within
the power of a state to exclude citizens of the United States from
voting on [the] account of race, as it was on account of age,
property or education. Now it is not.” 145

As a practical matter, enforcement of Section 2 was rendered
impossible by the Fifteenth Amendment. 146 Once a plaintiff established that
he was deprived of his right to vote by a state’s legislature, the Fifteenth
Amendment mandated that his rights be restored, eliminating the possibility
of a state suffering the consequences built into Section 2. 147
If Section 2 were enforced there would have been severe farreaching consequences such as a state losing representation in Congress, as
well as losing electoral votes for the President. 148 However, Section 2 was
never enforced. 149 Polls taken to determine whether people were losing the
right to vote were inaccurate. 150 As a result, it was impossible to determine
143.
Chin, supra note 137, at 274–75; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2;
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
144.
92 U.S. 214 (1876).
145.
Chin, supra note 137, at 274–75 (alteration in original) (first quoting
Henry L. Chambers, Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51 EMORY L.J.
1397, 1418 (2002); then quoting Reese, 92 U.S. at 217–18).
146.
Id. at 272. States, without specifically mentioning race, imposed onerous
requirements onto voters, such as a requirement that a voter pass a literacy test, to prevent
former slaves from voting. Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Right to Vote and Judicial Enforcement
of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 108, 108–09 (1960).
147.
Chin, supra note 137, at 263.
148.
Chambers, supra note 145, at 1417; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
2.
149.
Bonfield, supra note 146, at 113; Curtis, supra note 138, at 916.
150.
George David Zuckerman, A Consideration of the History and Present
Status of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 111 (1961). In
1871, Congress attempted to determine the number of disenfranchised voters, and determined
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the amount of voters that were being disenfranchised. 151 Based on the
holding of Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 individuals were also precluded from
seeking to enforce Section 2 because courts could not address issues related
to the allocation of representatives among several states because such issues
fell within the exclusive purview of the legislature, notwithstanding the plain
language of Section 2. 153
There was no need to enforce Section 2 until 1876, when the North
ended its occupation of the South as part of the agreement to resolve the
1876 Tilden-Hayes presidential election in the House of Representatives, as
the occupying Union army ensured that African Americans were permitted to
exercise their rights. 154 However, once Northern occupation ended, the
South was able to deny blacks the rights the Fourteenth Amendment was
meant to guarantee. 155 Southern States enacted laws, such as poll taxes and
literacy tests, which were intended to prevent blacks from voting, and were
very successful in suppressing the vote, such that in 1954, in Alabama, there
were no registered black voters in nine rural counties with a large black
population. 156
Even until today, African Americans are disproportionately denied
the right to vote because of state laws that prohibit prisoners, parolees, and
ex-felons from voting. 157 These laws, as applied, have caused the
incarceration of a significant number of African American voters and
resulted in their disenfranchisement. 158 Nonetheless, the laws are upheld
under the Fifteenth Amendment because the laws at issue do not discriminate
against a person based on their race, without regard to the fact that they were
accused of violating the law due to their race or other related issues. 159 Had
such laws been analyzed under the context of Section 2, a different result
that in “Southern States, except Texas, the number of adult male citizens who were
disenfranchised amounted to less than 0.5[%].” Id. at 111–12.
151.
See id. at 111. The 42nd Congress attempted to produce a census
reporting the number of disenfranchised citizens and the passage of a statute authorizing
enforcement of Section 2 in the future. Id. at 116. However, the census was deemed to be
inaccurate and the Congress chose to ignore it. Id. Since that time no other Congress has
attempted to produce a census reporting the number of disenfranchised citizens in the states.
Zuckerman, supra note 150, at 116.
152.
152 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1945).
153.
Id. at 238; Zuckerman, supra note 150, at 130–31.
154.
Zuckerman, supra note 150, at 116–17; Compromise of 1877, HIST.,
http://www.history.com/topics/us-presidents/compromise-of-1877 (last updated Aug. 21,
2018).
155.
Zuckerman, supra note 150, at 117; Compromise of 1877, supra note 154.
156.
Zuckerman, supra note 150, at 117, 124.
157.
Chin, supra note 137, at 261–62.
158.
See id. at 261–62, 312.
159.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV; Chin, supra note 137, at 262–63.
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may have occurred, as the Fourteenth Amendment reduces electoral and
congressional representation based on the disenfranchisement of votes,
regardless of the cause. 160 Unfortunately, the Electoral College was used as
a mechanism that deprives citizens of equal protection and disenfranchises
voters without consequence as a result of the Fifteenth Amendment. 161
VIII. WHY IS THE ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR THE
STATES BUT CONSTITUTIONAL IN CONNECTION WITH THE ELECTION OF THE
PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT?
The Supreme Court of the United States’ decisions in Reynolds v.
Sims, Gray v. Sanders, 163 and Bush v. Gore 164 highlight the constitutional
infirmity of the Electoral College. 165 In the Reynolds and Gray decisions, the
Supreme Court ruled that state law which provides for an Electoral College
style of voting to choose a state’s Executive was unconstitutional, even
though the Electoral College is still in existence today. 166
In Gray, the Supreme Court struck down a unit voting system used
by Georgia for all statewide offices. 167 In that system, a governor or senator
would win a unit in any county in which they won a majority. 168 Whoever
won the most units would win their election. 169 The Court found that the
foregoing system was unconstitutional because votes for a losing candidate
in a particular county were not counted. 170 The Court held the electoral style
voting system violated Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
gave an unfair weight to votes for the winning candidate in a particular
county. 171
Georgia argued that its voting system was similar to the Electoral
College for the presidency. 172 However, the Supreme Court rejected that
162

160.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; Chin, supra note 137, at 259–60, 263.
161.
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 377 n.8 (1963); Michael J. O’Sullivan,
Artificial Unit Voting and the Electoral College, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2421, 2435–36 (1992);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
162.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
163.
372 U.S. 368 (1963).
164.
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
165.
See id. at 104; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 587; Gray, 372 U.S. at 378.
166.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 585–87; Gray, 372 U.S. at 381; see also Jeffrey W.
Ladewig, One Person, One Vote, 435 Seats: Interstate Malapportionment and Constitutional
Requirements, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1138 (2011); O’Sullivan, supra note 161, at 2435–36.
167.
Gray, 372 U.S. at 381.
168.
Id. at 371.
169.
Id. at 372.
170.
See id. at 379–81.
171.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
172.
See Gray, 372 U.S. at 370–71.
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argument and noted that, because the Electoral College was established by
Article II of the Constitution, it was entitled to special protection,
distinguishing it from Georgia’s Electoral College system. 173
It is
counterintuitive to think the Constitution requires Georgia to disperse its
gubernatorial votes equally among the members of the governor’s natural
constituency, but it does not require the Electoral College to disperse
electoral votes as equally as possible among the members of the President’s
natural constituency. 174 Nonetheless, and despite the fact that Georgia’s
system was nearly identical to the Electoral College, the Court found that it
was constitutionally required to uphold one system but not the other. 175
Similarly, in Reynolds, the Supreme Court once again used the Equal
Protection Clause to impose the one person, one vote doctrine on state
legislatures. 176 The Court reiterated:
To the extent that a citizen’s right to vote is debased, he is that
much less a citizen. The fact that an individual lives here or there
is not a legitimate reason for overweighting or diluting the efficacy
of his vote. The complexions of societies and civilizations change,
often with amazing rapidity. A nation once primarily rural in
character becomes predominantly urban. Representation schemes
once fair and equitable become archaic and outdated. But the
basic principle of representative government remains, and must
remain, unchanged—the weight of a citizen’s vote cannot be made
to depend on where he lives. Population is, of necessity, the
starting point for consideration and the controlling criterion for
judgment in legislative apportionment controversies. 177

In both Reynolds and Gray, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that an Electoral College system of voting for state officials was
unconstitutional because it violated the one person, one vote doctrine of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 178
Like in Reynolds and Gray, in Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court
found that Florida’s system of selecting electors violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 179 In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court addressed whether
the Equal Protection Clause prevented a recount of the Florida vote during
173.
See id. at 376–78; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
174.
See Gray, 372 U.S. at 388 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
175.
Id. at 376–78.
176.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964); Ladewig, supra note 166, at 1136.
177.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567.
178.
Id. at 586–87; see also Gray, 372 U.S. at 381.
179.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109–10 (2000); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586–87;
Gray, 372 U.S. at 376–78.
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the 2000 presidential election. 180 Under the circumstances presented by the
facts in Bush v. Gore, Florida election law mandated a recount in the
counties for state electors who were elected under Florida state election
laws. 181
The Supreme Court found that, because Florida’s procedure for
recounting votes for their electors was not being uniformly conducted, it
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 182
Despite the fact that each county had a different ballot and different voting
machines, the Supreme Court found that the recount procedures utilized by
the Florida Legislature did not provide “the minimum procedures necessary
to protect the fundamental right of each voter” to have his vote counted in
the same manner as other similarly situated voters. 183 Thus, the Supreme
Court found that, where different counties are being treated differently with
respect to the re-tabulation of individual votes in connection with the
selection of electors, there was an equal protection violation.184 In making
its determination, the Supreme Court ignored the fact that different voters in
different states, using different voting mechanisms, had already been
subjected to equal protection violations—such as the violation described in
Reynolds. 185
As further evidence of the constitutional infirmity of the Electoral
College, a coalition led by David Boies, of Boies Schiller Flexner and the
League of Latin American Citizens, have filed lawsuits in Massachusetts,
California, South Carolina, and Texas, challenging the system enacted by
those states to select their electors. 186 The concern expressed in the lawsuit
is exacerbated by the fact that in 2020, a significant number of immigrants
may not be part of the census, further diminishing the voting power of more
urban states. 187 Although the foregoing lawsuits may have the effect of
modifying how the Electoral College is implemented on a state by state
180.
Bush, 531 U.S. at 110.
181.
Id.; Mitchell W. Berger & Candice D. Tobin, Election 2000: The Law of
Tied Presidential Elections, 26 NOVA L. REV. 647, 675–76 (2002).
182.
Bush, 531 U.S. at 110.
183.
Id. at 109.
184.
Id. at 109–10.
185.
See id. at 105, 109; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 540–41 (1964).
186.
Legal Team Led by LULAC and David Boies File Lawsuits Challenging
Winner-Take-All Approach to Selecting Electors in Presidential Elections, LULAC,
http://www.lulac.org/news/pr/LULAC_File_Lawsuits_Challenging_Winner-TakeAll_Approach/ (last visited May 1, 2019); Bill Whalen, Go Ahead and Change the Electoral
College, but There’s Still a Trump Presidency, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2018, 7:52 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/billwhalen/2018/08/12/go-ahead-and-the-change-the-electoralcollege-but-theres-still-a-trump-presidency/.
187.
Paul Hond, Ballot Breakdown, COLUM. MAG., Fall 2018, at 28, 35.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol43/iss2/1

40

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 43, Issue 2

2019]

THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

135

basis, it is unclear as to whether they will cause a change in how the
Electoral College system is operated nationally in light of Bush v. Gore.188
Other proposed solutions to the winner-take-all system of the Electoral
College, such as agreements among states to select electors based on who
wins the majority of the popular vote, are also unlikely to result in a national
change in the Electoral College either. 189
IX.

IS THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE BIASED?

The Electoral College gives some states a disproportional level of
representation in the presidential election. 190 To illustrate, in 2016, “[i]n
Wyoming, one electoral vote represented 72,000 ballots cast by actual
citizens,” while in California, the same electoral vote represented 270,000
actual votes, “giving a Wyoming citizen nearly four times more power than a
California citizen in allocating votes from the Electoral College.”191
By way of example, as a result of the Electoral College, “Donald
Trump won Pennsylvania and Florida by a combined margin of about
200,000 votes to earn 49 electoral votes. Hillary Clinton, meanwhile, won
188.
See Bush, 531 U.S. at 109; Legal Team Led by LULAC and David Boies
File Lawsuits Challenging Winner-Take-All Approach to Selecting Electors in Presidential
Elections, supra note 186. Bush v. Gore provided, in relevant part, that it was not to be
considered binding precedent. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109. “Our consideration is limited to the
present circumstances.” Id.
189.
See Ethan J. Leib & Eli J. Mark, Democratic Principle and Electoral
College Reform, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 105, 105–06 (2007). “In 2007
Maryland passed the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, . . . a law that obliges the
state’s . . . electors to vote for the winner of the nationwide popular vote . . . so long as states
representing an overall majority of the [E]lectoral [C]ollege have approved an identical bill.”
America’s Electoral System Gives the Republicans Advantages over Democrats, supra note
10. To date, twelve democratic states and the District of Columbia have adopted the bill.
Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE INC.,
http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/state-status (last visited May 1, 2019). The bill also
passed both legislative chambers in New Mexico and Delaware. Id. Further, in Michigan, a
bipartisan group of senators introduced Senate Bill 1117, joining the compact. See S.B. 1117,
99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2018).
190.
See id.
In 1988, for example, the combined . . . population, 3,119,000, of the seven least
populous jurisdictions of Alaska, Delaware, the District of Columbia, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming carried the same voting strength in
the Electoral College [twenty-one] Electoral votes as the 9,614,000 persons . . . in
the State of Florida.

WILLIAM C. KIMBERLING, NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE 1, 11 (1992).
191.
William H. Chafe, One Person, One Vote Is a Myth, NEWS & OBSERVER:
OP-ED (Dec. 21, 2016, 10:40 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/oped/article122328279.html.
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Massachusetts by almost a million votes but earned only 11 electoral
votes.” 192 Similarly, “Clinton won California by over 3 million votes,
netting 55 electoral votes. [President] Trump’s combined popular vote
margin in Pennsylvania, Florida, Michigan, and Wisconsin was under
250,000, but those victories netted him 75 electoral votes.” 193
The Electoral College favors Republican candidates—candidates
who are generally favored by rural, less populated regions, giving them a
head start in the election process. 194 There are eleven states where the
“support for the [Republican party] outstrips support for the Democratic
party by at least [ten] percent. These states have [sixty-five] percent more
representation in the Electoral College than . . . if . . . votes were distributed
evenly.” 195 The existence of a Republican bias in the Electoral College is
further supported by the fact that the past two Republican Presidents, George
W. Bush and Donald J. Trump, lost the popular election by five hundred
thousand and almost three million votes respectively, but were elected
President thanks to the Electoral College. 196 Indeed, in 2000,
[H]ad there not been a two-seat bonus for senatorial seats, even
with a [President] Bush victory in Florida, a 435 seat Electoral
College—without D.C.—would have elected Gore by a margin of
224–211 (51.9%), while a 436 seat Electoral College—with
D.C.—would have elected Gore by a margin of 225–211
192.
Robert Speel, Three Common Arguments for Preserving the Electoral
College — and Why They’re Wrong, CONVERSATION (Nov. 14, 2016, 9:55 PM),
http://www.theconversation.com/three-common-arguments-for-preserving-the-electoralcollege-and-why-theyre-wrong-68546.
193.
Sean Darling-Hammond, The Electoral College Is Even More Biased than
You Think.
But Democrats Can Beat It., NATION (Jan. 19, 2017),
http://www.thenation.com/article/the-electoral-college-is-even-more-biased-than-you-thinkheres-how-democrats-can-beat-it/.
194.
See American Democracy’s Built-In Bias, ECONOMIST (London), July 14,
2018, at 16. “Places where people live close together vote Democratic, places where they live
farther apart vote Republican, . . . [and] nearly half the variance in the county-level vote
shares in the presidential election of 2016 could be explained solely by their number of voters
per square kilome[ter].” The Minority Majority, ECONOMIST, July 14, 2018, at 21, 22.
Candidates from the Republican party have 191 projected electoral votes from Southern and
other conservative-leaning States without even having to campaign in those states. Nate
Silver, Why a Plan to Circumvent the Electoral College Is Probably Doomed,
POL.
(Apr.
17,
2014,
5:49
PM),
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT:
http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-a-plan-to-circumvent-the-electoral-college-isprobably-doomed/.
195.
Darling-Hammond, supra note 193.
196.
See id.; Drew Desilver, Trump’s Victory Another Example of How
Electoral College Wins Are Bigger than Popular Vote Ones, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 20, 2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/12/20/why-electoral-college-landslides-areeasier-to-win-than-popular-vote-ones/.
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(51.6%)—which was used to argue that that the Electoral College
now has a—small—built-in bias toward the Republicans based
solely on greater Republican strength in the smaller states. 197

Since 1977, Republicans have appointed ten United States Supreme
Court Justices compared to four which were appointed by Democrats, yet
without the Electoral College, there would be eight Democratic Supreme
Court appointees compared to only six Republican ones. 198 Because these
judges are appointed by politicians, the Electoral College “embeds this rural
bias in the courts as well.” 199
In addition, Southern States, the majority of which have voted for a
Republican President since 2000, receive significantly more benefits than
their Northern counterparts. 200

197.
Bernard Grofman & Scott L. Feld, Thinking About the Political Impacts of
the Electoral College, 123 PUB. CHOICE 1, 3 (2005).
198.
Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789–Present, FED.
JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advancedsearch (last visited May 1,
2019); see also American Democracy’s Built-In Bias, supra note 194. The Republican party
will soon be appointing an eleventh Supreme Court Justice. See American Democracy’s
Built-In Bias, supra note 194.
199.
Id.
200.
See id.; Toni Monkovic, 50 Years of Electoral College Maps: How the
U.S. Turned Red and Blue, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Aug. 22, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/upshot/50-years-of-electoral-college-maps-how-the-usturned-red-and-blue.html. Part of the favoritism could be caused by the fact that as of the
census of 2010, “the five most rural states wielded about [fifty percent] more electoral votes,
and three times as many senators, per resident as the five most urban ones did.” America’s
Electoral System Gives the Republicans Advantages over Democrats, supra note 10.
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As set forth in the tables above, Southern States received
approximately $25,441,931,402 more in federal aid than they paid in
taxes. 201 Western and Midwestern States, which are similarly more rural
than the Northeastern States, received $6,881,823,032 and $5,584,135,059
more than they paid in taxes respectively, as well. 202 Thus, in the South,
citizens received, in 2016, on an average per capita basis $4,425 per year
more than they paid in taxes, which is nearly double what citizens in Western
States received, $2,789, on average per capita and nearly ten times what
citizens in the Northeast, $516, and Midwest, $569, received on average on a
per capita basis, in 2016, in exchange for the taxes they paid. 203 This means
that the federal government pays approximately $6,982,535,112 on average
201.
202.
203.

See infra app. A.
See infra app. A.
See infra app. A.
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to Southern States per elector, while spending $5,480,817,164 per elector in
the Northeastern States, and $5,124,592,838 per elector in the Midwest. 204
The politicized nature of the Electoral College has further decreased
equal political activity and participation amongst states. 205 If a candidate is
likely to win in one state, then that candidate will not spend much time there,
enabling him to spend time in swing states, or states where the population
demographics are diverse, creating uncertainty with respect to how that
state’s electors will vote. 206 In fact, in 2012, the swing states—Ohio, New
Hampshire, Colorado, Florida, Virginia, Nevada, Iowa, Wisconsin, and
Pennsylvania—“collectively had a 98.6 percent chance of determining the
Electoral College winner in 2012,” making these nine states seventy times
more powerful with respect to the presidential election “than the other [fortyone], which collectively had a 1.4 percent chance of determining the winner
combined.” 207 As a result, candidates spend more time in those states. 208
Data from the 2016 campaign shows that:
[Fifty-three] percent of campaign events for [President] Trump,
Hillary Clinton, Mike Pence, and Tim Kaine in the two months
before the November election were in only four states: Florida,
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Ohio. During that time, 87
percent of campaign visits by the four candidates were in [twelve]
battleground states, and none of the four candidates ever went to
[twenty-seven] states, which includes almost all of rural
America. 209

Not only do swing states receive more attention in campaigns, but
they also receive significantly more funding. 210 In fact, the gross average
federal spending in the swing states is $6,517,873,233 per electoral vote
compared to $5,659,705,613 per electoral vote in non-swing states. 211
Despite the fact that the Electoral College has caused significant disparate
treatment amongst the states, it is still being used today. 212

204.
See infra app. A.
205.
See Strömberg, supra note 5, at 786.
206.
Id. at 781, 786. For example, in 2000, California was forecasted to have a
fifty-two percent democratic vote share and a fifty-five percent democratic vote share in 2004.
Id. at 781. As a result, much less attention was given to California in 2000 than in 2004. Id.
207.
Silver, supra note 194.
208.
See Strömberg, supra note 5, at 790.
209.
Speel, supra note 192.
210.
See Strömberg, supra note 5, at 786, 798; infra app. A.
211.
See infra app. A.
212.
Darling-Hammond, supra note 193.
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CONCLUSION

Like an infected appendix, the Electoral College serves no legitimate
purpose and must be removed. 213 It was originally intended to create a
federal government, which included Southern slaveholding States by
allowing slave owners to have a disproportionate say in the Electoral College
compared to those permitted to vote, in exchange for the right to tax them
based on their slaves. 214
The compromise was carried over from
congressional representatives and is now being used to allow rural, lesspopulated states to have a disproportionate say in the election of the
Executive. 215 Those states already exercise a sufficient veto over the more
populated states by way of the unequal representation in the Senate, and in
some instances, the House of Representatives. 216 If the Executive continues
to consistently fall into the hands of the candidate receiving less votes than
their opponent, as has been the case in 2000 and 2016, and those casting less
votes continue to disproportionately receive greater say in judicial
appointments, the majority should take action to eliminate the Electoral
College in the Twenty-First Century, considering the significant impact that
the Electoral College has on federal spending, as well.217
The best mechanism to remedy the problem caused by the Electoral
College is the enactment of a constitutional amendment eliminating the
Electoral College and replacing it with a direct election of the Executive. 218
Direct election would ensure that the Executive is a person of the people,
consistent with the values of a modern democracy. 219 Moreover, the
historical justifications of the Electoral College—the need to protect small
states’ interests or, originally, the interests of slave owners in rural states—
no longer exist; slavery and its vestiges were supposed to be abolished
through the Thirteenth Amendment, which was to be enforced through the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 220 Although the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments should have ensured that there is not a
disproportionate treatment of people in connection with the Electoral
College, those amendments, because of our post-civil war history, never fully
213.
Amar, supra note 109; Silver, supra note 194.
214.
See WILLS, supra note 38, at 6.
215.
Darling-Hammond, supra note 193.
216.
Id.
217.
See id.; Desilver, supra note 196.
218.
See Amar, supra note 109.
219.
Id.
220.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; Amar, supra note 37, at 471; Carter, supra
note 124, at 1347–48; Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention, supra note 18;
Finkelman, supra note 19, at 1154–56; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST.
amend. XV.
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accomplished their purpose. 221 The rural land mass and small states with less
population will still exercise a sufficient check over the majority through the
Senate. 222
The Electoral College should be eliminated. 223 The time to excise
the infected appendix is now. 224

221.
Carter, supra note 124, at 1368 n.210; Finkelman, supra note 19, at 1156;
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XV. One interesting alternative is
to use a ranked-choice voting system, where “voters list candidates in order of preference.
After a first count, the candidate with the least support is eliminated, and his or her [voters]
are reallocated to those voters’ second choice. This continues until someone has a majority.”
American Democracy’s Built-In Bias, supra note 194.
222.
See The Small-State Advantage in the United States Senate, N.Y. TIMES:
POL.
(Mar.
10,
2013),
http://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/11/us/politics/small-stateadvantage.html.
223.
See Tyler Lewis, Why We Should Abolish the Electoral College,
HUFFPOST (Jan. 12, 2016, 4:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tyler-lewis/why-weshould-abolish-the_1_b_8961256.html. “Although he has vacillated on the institution,
[President] Trump continues to say that he supports a national popular vote over the Electoral
College process.” Robert M. Alexander, We Could Be Headed for Another Electoral College
Mess, CNN (Jan. 10, 2019, 7:47 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2019/01/10/opinions/we-couldbe-headed-for-another-electoral-college-mess-alexander/index.html.
224.
See Lewis, supra note 223; Silver, supra note 194. In the 2009 Dunwody
Lecture, Akhil Reed Amar spoke at the prestigious University of Florida and expressed his
hope that “the Dunwody Lecturer of 2019 . . . [would] be able to say to [his or her] audience,
with truth in [his or her] voice and a smile on [his or her] lips, that the right to vote has made
great strides in the new millennium.” Akhil Reed Amar, Bush, Gore, Florida, and the
Constitution, 61 FLA. L. REV. 945, 968 (2009).
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Appendix A – Electoral College Model

Swing
State

Census
Region

U.S.
State

Non-swing

South

AL

33,881,189,324

6,967

5

Non-swing

West

AK

3,489,076,519

4,703

11

Non-swing

West

AZ

29,124,597,576

4,202

13

Non-swing

South

AR

13,852,243,174

4,636

12

Non-swing

West

CA

(6,359,640,090)

(162)

39

Swing

West

CO

2,404,289,383

434

35

Non-swing

Northeast

CT

(7,739,471,054)

(2,164)

48

Non-swing

South

DE

499,543,573

525

33

Non-swing

South

D.C.

37,553,107,729

55,130

X

Swing

South

FL

60,660,393,037

3,943

22

Non-swing

South

GA

26,712,213,596

2,591

24

Non-swing

West

HI

9,619,388,984

6,734

6

Non-swing

West

ID

6,677,694,565

3,967

16

Non-swing

Midwest

IL

(16,761,147,441)

(1,309)

43

Non-swing

Midwest

IN

13,610,322,910

2,052

28

Swing

Midwest

IA

3,026,815,364

966

31

Non-swing

Midwest

KS

1,451,182,678

499

34

Non-swing

South

KY

27,900,047,223

6,288

8

Non-swing

South

LA

14,572,253,433

3,113

21

Non-swing

Northeast

ME

7,816,056,654

5,870

9

Non-swing

South

MD

39,515,351,186

6,568

7

Non-swing

Northeast

MA

(12,563,198,372)

(1,844)

45

Non-swing

Midwest

MI

25,848,002,229

2,603

23

Non-swing

Midwest

MN

(7,600,361,450)

(1,377)

44

Non-swing

South

MS

21,766,950,868

7,283

3

Non-swing

Midwest

MO

25,183,266,825

4,133

14

Non-swing

West

MT

3,669,092,613

3,519

18

Non-swing

Midwest

NE

(995,851,610)

(522)

41

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol43/iss2/1

Federal
Spending

Fed. Spending
Per Capita

Rank
Per Capita

48

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 43, Issue 2

2019]

APPENDIX

143

Appendix A – Electoral College Model

Population

Electoral
Votes (EV)

Votes/1M
Population

Gross Fed
Spending

Gross Fed
Spending/Person

Gross Fed
Spending/EV

4,863,300

9

1.85

65,983,068,864

13,568

7,331,452,096

741,894

3

4.04

11,157,856,782

15,040

3,719,285,594

6,931,071

11

1.59

78,229,597,927

11,287

7,111,781,630

2,988,248

6

2.01

33,924,912,852

11,353

5,654,152,142

39,250,017

55

1.40

407,006,802,740

10,370

7,400,123,686

5,540,545

9

1.62

57,551,189,375

10,387

6,394,576,597

3,576,452

7

1.96

49,669,485,830

13,888

7,095,640,833

952,065

3

3.15

10,679,952,890

11,218

3,559,984,297

681,170

3

4.40

48,990,201,991

71,921

16,330,067,330

20,612,439

29

1.41

235,914,265,299

11,445

8,134,974,665

10,310,371

16

1.55

106,960,628,616

10,374

6,685,039,288

1,428,557

4

2.80

21,000,160,331

14,700

5,250,040,083

1,683,140

4

2.38

17,234,269,332

10,239

4,308,567,333

12,801,539

20

1.56

120,239,483,639

9,393

6,011,974,182

6,633,053

11

1.66

65,306,761,478

9,846

5,936,978,316

3,134,693

6

1.91

29,063,858,276

9,272

4,843,976,379

2,907,289

6

2.06

27,705,171,964

9,530

4,617,528,661

4,436,974

8

1.80

57,088,361,766

12,867

7,136,045,221

4,681,666

8

1.71

50,569,747,712

10,802

6,321,218,564

1,331,479

4

3.00

17,297,790,512

12,991

4,324,447,628

6,016,447

10

1.66

104,966,019,555

17,447

10,496,601,955

6,811,779

11

1.61

80,366,233,804

11,798

7,306,021,255

9,928,300

16

1.61

107,485,248,203

10,826

6,717,828,013

5,519,952

10

1.81

51,846,731,659

9,393

5,184,673,166

2,988,726

6

2.01

38,374,253,268

12,840

6,395,708,878

6,093,000

10

1.64

73,604,892,841

12,086

7,364,089,284

1,042,520

3

2.88

11,351,822,748

10,889

3,783,940,916

1,907,116

5

2.62

17,219,642,103

9,029

3,443,928,421

Published by NSUWorks, 2019

49

Nova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 1

144

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Appendix A – Electoral College Model

Swing
State

Census
Region

U.S.
State

Swing

West

NV

4,454,455,602

1,515

30

Swing

Northeast

NH

(855,204,488)

(641)

42

Non-swing

Northeast

NJ

(27,509,105,476)

(3,076)

50

Non-swing

West

NM

20,172,131,492

9,693

1

Non-swing

Northeast

NY

(40,871,429,785)

(2,070)

47

Non-swing

South

NC

32,293,429,847

3,183

20

Non-swing

Midwest

ND

(1,795,452,676)

(2,369)

49

Swing

Midwest

OH

23,144,198,358

1,993

29

Non-swing

South

OK

13,639,334,449

3,476

19

Non-swing

West

OR

9,850,959,730

2,407

25

Swing

Northeast

PA

27,319,492,370

2,137

27

Non-swing

Northeast

RI

2,532,067,609

2,397

26

Non-swing

South

SC

26,463,810,527

5,271

10

Non-swing

Midwest

SD

(170,389,496)

(197)

40

Non-swing

South

TN

23,463,810,527

3,528

17

Non-swing

South

TX

(1,771,144,694)

(64)

38

Non-swing

West

UT

965,144,473

316

37

Non-swing

Northeast

VT

2,522,204,333

4,038

15

Swing

South

VA

60,587,009,281

7,203

4

Non-swing

West

WA

6,551,639,674

899

32

Non-swing

South

WV

13,348,485,458

7,290

2

Swing

Midwest

WI

2,069,035,012

358

36

Non-swing

West

WY

(1,155,131,107)

(1,973)

46

Total Spending
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Population

Electoral
Votes

Votes/1M
Population

2,940,058

6

2.04

1,334,795

4

8,944,469

Gross Fed
Spending/Person

Gross Fed
Spending/EV

28,482,677,176

9,688

4,747,112,863

3.00

14,283,701,422

10,701

3,570,925,355

14

1.57

88,987,259,328

9,949

6,356,232,809

2,081,015

5

2.40

33,037,900,799

15,876

6,607,580,160

19,745,289

29

1.47

214,124,006,387

10,844

7,383,586,427

10,146,788

15

1.48

108,619,980,655

10,705

7,241,332,044

757,952

3

3.96

7,199,445,717

9,499

2,399,815,239

11,614,373

18

1.55

119,955,556,555

10,328

6,664,197,586

3,923,465

7

1.78

43,814,699,106

11,167

6,259,242,729

4,093,465

7

1.71

43,036,724,519

10,514

6,148,103,503

12,784,227

20

1.56

150,141,568,554

11,744

7,507,078,428

1,056,426

4

3.79

12,707,098,112

12,028

3,176,774,528

4,961,119

9

1.81

58,436,605,411

11,779

6,492,956,157

865,454

3

3.47

8,781,546,721

10,147

2,927,182,240

6,651,194

11

1.65

74,144,673,351

11,148

6,740,424,850

27,862,596

38

1.36

264,266,982,768

9,485

6,954,394,283

3,051,217

6

1.97

22,691,867,727

7,437

3,781,977,955

624,594

3

4.80

7,819,941,645

12,520

2,606,647,215

8,411,808

13

1.55

148,395,970,439

17,641

11,415,074,649

7,288,000

12

1.65

83,785,682,678

11,496

6,982,140,223

1,831,102

5

2.73

24,509,800,398

13,385

4,901,960,080

5,778,708

10

1.73

53,829,425,727

9,315

5,382,942,573

585,501

3

5.12

5,791,585,048

9,892

1,930,529,349

Total Gross Spending
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INTRODUCTION

If you knew that President Donald J. Trump (“President Trump”)
could have pardoned himself after a criminal indictment at the conclusion of
Robert S. Mueller’s (“Mueller”) investigation—in which it could have been
*
Nicolo A. Lozano earned his bachelor’s degree in Operations
Management and Business Law, Ethics, and Decision-Making at Indiana University’s Kelley
School of Business. He is currently a Juris Doctor candidate for May 2020 at Nova
Southeastern University, Shepard Broad College of Law. Nicolo would like to thank his
family and friends for their support and encouragement throughout law school. He would like
to give a special thanks to Lauren Voke for her encouragement in completing this Comment.
Nicolo would also like to thank William Cornelius for inspiring him to write about the topic in
this Comment. Lastly, he would like to give a very special thanks to the executive and
editorial board members of Nova Law Review, Volume 43, and his colleagues for all the time
and hard work spent on refining and improving this Comment.
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found that President Trump conspired with Russia to win the 2016
presidential election and he could have obstructed justice by interfering with
Mueller’s investigation into Russian interference—would you still have
voted for him? 1 The outright threat to exploit an apparent loophole in our
criminal justice system by President Trump has a plethora of legal scholars
in a frenzy. 2 On June 4, 2018, President Trump tweeted from his
@realDonaldTrump Twitter account that he has the absolute right to pardon
himself from any criminal conduct, which was presumably directed to
Mueller and his team. 3
According to President Trump, it does not matter if Mueller indicts
him over his alleged involvement in Russia’s meddling into the 2016
presidential election because he can simply use his pardon power on
himself. 4 Mueller began an investigation into President Trump and his
alleged collusion with Russia in the meddling into the 2016 presidential
election in which President Trump beat Hillary Clinton for President of the
United States. 5
Politics and personal opinions aside, President Trump has a legally
sound argument in using his pardon power on himself. 6 United States
1.
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 4, 2018, 5:35
AM), http://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1003616210922147841; see also Kaitlyn
Schallhorn, Trump and the Russia Investigation: What to Know, FOX NEWS: POL. (Oct. 10,
2018),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-and-the-russia-investigation-what-to-know.
On April 18, 2019, Mueller’s redacted report was released to the public by the United States
Justice Department on the findings of Mueller’s investigation into Russian interference in the
2016 presidential election. Emily Tillett, Here’s Who Has Been Charged in the Mueller
Probe, CBS NEWS (Apr. 18, 2019, 8:41 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mueller-reportwho-has-been-charged-in-special-counsel-robert-mueller-russia-probe-2019-04-18/.
While
Mueller found connections between the Trump Campaign and Russia, Mueller ultimately
concluded—in the first volume of his report—that the Trump campaign did not conspire or
coordinate with Russia during the 2016 campaign in its election interference activities.
ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE
2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, VOLUME I, 1–2 (2019). In Volume II of his report, Mueller did
not reach a conclusion on whether President Trump obstructed justice in the course of
Mueller’s investigation. ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, VOLUME II, 2 (2019).
2.
See Kaitlyn Schallhorn, Can Trump Self-Pardon? Legal Experts Weigh
in, FOX NEWS: POL. (June 4, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/can-trump-self-pardonlegal-experts-weigh-in.
3.
@realDonaldTrump, supra note 1.
4.
See id.; Schallhorn, supra note 2.
5.
Schallhorn, supra note 2; see also Schallhorn, supra note 1.
6.
See Robert Nida & Rebecca L. Spiro, The President as His Own Judge
and Jury: A Legal Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 197,
222 (1999); Salvador Rizzo, Can the President Be Indicted or Subpoenaed?, WASH. POST:
FACT
CHECKER,
(May
22,
2018),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/factchecker/wp/2018/05/22/can-the-president-be-indicted-or-subpoenaed/.
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Presidents enjoy plenary pardon power. 7 Although no sitting United States
President has ever exercised his pardon power on himself, previous
Presidents have had their legal team research the plausibility behind such
action. 8 However, President Trump did not exercise his pardon power on
himself prior to Mueller ending the investigation into his alleged culpability
in the Russian meddling scandal during the 2016 presidential election. 9
Legal scholars differ on the Justice Department’s ability to bring
forth a criminal indictment against a sitting President. 10
Some
commentators, such as Rudolph Giuliani, argue that President Trump is
immune from criminal prosecution while in office. 11
While other
commentators believe no man is above the law—not even President
Trump—and a sitting President is amenable to criminal prosecution.12 Such
legal conflict is a natural byproduct on the lack of guidance from the
Supreme Court of the United States because a sitting President has never
been criminally indicted.13
While foreign powers have indirectly influenced a United States
presidential election, 14 Russia’s meddling into the 2016 presidential election
and the extended invitation to find Hilary Clinton’s deleted e-mails by
7.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Rizzo, supra note 6.
8.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 199; see also Rizzo, supra note 6. “The
Constitution is silent, however, as to whether the President may grant himself a pardon from
prosecution and, if so, when such a pardon may be issued. In the over 20,000 instances that
Presidents have used this exclusive power, no President has used this power to pardon
himself.” Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 199.
9.
See Ashley Parker & Joel Achenbach, Giuliani Defends Trump’s Power,
WASH. POST, June 4, 2018, at A4. Giuliani said, “[President Trump] has no intention of
pardoning himself . . . .” Id.
10.
See Schallhorn, supra note 2.
11.
Rizzo, supra note 6. “All [Mueller and his team] get to do is write a
report . . . [t]hey can’t indict. At least they acknowledged that to us after some battling.” Id.
12.
Norman Eisen & Elizabeth Holtzman, Donald Trump Should Not Assume
He’s Above the Law. A Sitting President Can Be Indicted., USA TODAY, (May 24, 2018, 4:23
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/05/24/donald-trump-not-above-lawsitting-president-can-indicted-column/634725002/.
“Those options, while obviously
unpalatable to the president, are consistent with a basic principle of our democracy: No
person is above the law.” Id.
13.
Keith King, Indicting the President: Can a Sitting President Be
Criminally Indicted?, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 417, 422–23 (2001). Former President Richard
Nixon’s (“President Nixon”) assertion that he is criminally immune went unanswered as the
case never reached the Supreme Court. Id. at 422. Executive criminal immunity “has never
been addressed by any court.” Id. at 423.
14.
Josh Zeitz, Foreign Governments Have Been Tampering with U.S.
MAG.
(July
27,
2016),
Elections
for
Decades,
POLITICO:
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/russia-dnc-hack-donald-trump-foreigngovernments-hacking-vietnam-richard-nixon-214111.
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presidential candidate Trump is unprecedented.15 No sitting President has
faced the accusations President Trump faces today. 16 Unfortunately,
President Trump’s conduct on the campaign trail had become the basis of
Mueller’s investigation into his alleged involvement with the Russian
meddling. 17
Whether or not a President can use his pardon power on himself has
not been addressed by the Supreme Court. 18 The Court has not directly
addressed the amenability of a President to a criminal indictment. 19 This
Comment will discuss the constitutionality of President Trump’s suggested
self-pardon ability. 20
Further, this Comment will discuss the
constitutionality of indicting the President. 21 Lastly, this Comment will
discuss the danger of President Trump using his pardon power on himself. 22
II.

PRESIDENT TRUMP’S ABILITY TO SELF-PARDON

Article II of the United States Constitution is the foundation for the
powers of the executive branch and the President. 23 According to Section
Two of Article II, President Trump “shall have Power to grant Reprieves and
Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment.” 24
Generally, President Trump enjoys plenary power to grant pardons
and reprieves. 25 Although the Supreme Court has never decided the
constitutionality of a presidential self-pardon, the Court has issued decisions
15.
Id.
16.
See Peter Baker & Juliet Eilperin, Clinton Impeached, WASH. POST, Dec.
20, 1998, at A1; The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson (1868) President of the United States,
U.S.
SENATE:
ART.
&
HIST.,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Impeachment_Johnson.htm
(last visited May 1, 2019).
17.
Schallhorn, supra note 1.
18.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 220.
19.
A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. O.L.C. 222, 260 (2000).
20.
See discussion infra Part II.
21.
See discussion infra Part III.
22.
See discussion infra Part IV.
23.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
24.
Id.
25.
See Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 221. “[T]he Court has defined the
presidential pardon power as unconditional, except for impeachment.” Id. “The Constitution
does not say what sort of pardon; but the term being generic necessarily includes every species
of pardon . . . .” Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 351 (1866). “To the executive alone is
intrusted the power of pardon; and it is granted without limit.” United States v. Klein, 80 U.S.
128, 147 (1871).
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on the power of a presidential pardon. 26 In those decisions, the Court put
few limitations on pardoning, which closely follows the text of the
Constitution and the intent of the Framers (“Framers”). 27
While President Trump pardoning himself would be an
unprecedented use of his pardon power, the idea of issuing a self-pardon is
not unprecedented. 28 Under the Nixon and Bush administrations, the
Presidents’ legal counsel researched the feasibility of such action.29 Just as
President Trump’s legal team concluded that such ability to pardon himself is
constitutional, former Presidents Nixon and George H. W. Bush’s
(“President Bush”) legal teams reached the same conclusion.30
Although seemingly abusive and unprecedented, President Trump’s
tweet on his ability to self-pardon does have some constitutional support as it
is not expressly prohibited with the only limitation coming in cases of
impeachment. 31 Moreover, the Court has not limited the President’s ability
to issue pardons. 32 Therefore, President Trump should have the ability to
pardon himself because: (i) the Court has not limited such power, (ii) the
only constitutional limitation on pardoning is in cases of impeachment, and
(iii) Congress lacks constitutional authority to alter President Trump’s ability
to pardon. 33
A.

Framers’ Drafting of the Presidential Pardon Power

Although bestowing upon the President a plenary pardon power akin
to the King of England seemingly is contradictory to the Framers’ intent of
creating a system of checks and balances, there is evidence that the Framers
intended for such plenary power. 34 When taking into account the debates on
the presidential pardon power during the 1787 Constitutional Convention, it
is evident that the Framers intentionally left the only restriction on pardoning
26.
See Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 220–21.
27.
See id.
28.
See id.; Zeitz, supra note 14.
29.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 212–16.
30.
Id.; Schallhorn, supra note 2.
31.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 217; Schallhorn, supra note 2.
32.
See Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 220–21.
33.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 106
(1925); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 351
(1866); Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 206–07. The pardon power was adopted with little
limitation similar to the King of England’s power, and the Court thwarted “Congress from
interfering with the discretion of the President to issue pardons.” Nida & Spiro, supra note 6,
at 206.
34.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 516 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C.
Hamilton ed., 1864).
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for cases of impeachment as all other motions failed and none others were
passed. 35
During the 1787 Constitutional Convention, various ideas on who
would possess pardon power in the United States government were
debated. 36 Although such discussion was not extensive, the pardon power
and its limitations were formed after some debate. 37 For example, Roger
Sherman and other Framers believed the pardon power should be given to
the legislative branch, while some others argued that the pardon power
should be bestowed on a combination of the legislative and executive
branches. 38 Ultimately, however, the power was given to the executive
branch as some feared the legislative branch would become too powerful
with the ability to create laws and grant reprieves for individuals breaking
those laws. 39
Once the pardon power was given to the executive branch, the
discussion on such power revolved around the limitations to pardon. 40 Some
advocates argued for a limitation on pardoning an individual only after a
conviction of the crime. 41 However, it failed because the majority of the
Framers agreed that “a pardon before conviction might be necessary” in
some instances. 42 Others motioned to exclude the President’s pardon power
in cases of treason since the President could secretly hide his involvement
with the crime by pardoning his accomplices. 43 However, this motion failed
to garner the majority’s support because the majority believed pardoning to
be a necessity in government and placing limits upon it to be inherently
35.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 205–06.
36.
Id. at 205.
37.
Brian C. Kalt, Note, Pardon Me? The Constitutional Case Against
Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 786 (1996). “There was little debate on the
pardon power—only a few verbal exchanges and a couple of motions.” Id.
38.
Id.; Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 205. “Some advocates, including
Roger Sherman, proposed a plan that placed the pardon power with the Senate . . . [o]ne factor
considered . . . placed the pardon power in a variety of models, including in the legislature, the
executive, or a combination of the two.” Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 205.
39.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 205–06.
40.
Id. “With little further discussion, the power was assigned to the
executive branch, and the discussion then turned to what limitations would be placed in the
provision.” Id. at 205.
41.
William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional
History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 501–02 (1977). Luther Martin motioned to include the
words after conviction in the pardon clause but was persuaded to remove his motion by James
Wilson, as Wilson argued that a pardon could be used to get testimony against accomplices.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. at 502; Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 206; Kalt, supra note 37, at 786.
Edmund Rudolph argued treason should be excluded as the President himself could be guilty.
Kalt, supra note 37, at 786.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol43/iss2/1

62

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 43, Issue 2

2019] CAN PRESIDENT TRUMP BECOME HIS OWN JUDGE AND JURY?

157

dangerous. 44 Ultimately, the only motion passed in amending the President’s
pardon power was the inclusion of “except in cases of impeachment” at the
end of the clause. 45
Further, Alexander Hamilton explained such power should resemble
the King of England’s pardon power as it is necessary to justice because it is
an act of mercy by the government on its citizens. 46 Hamilton supported this
argument by pointing out that the Governor of New York has more pardon
power because he can pardon in cases of impeachment, yet the President of
the United States cannot. 47 If the Governor of New York can have absolute
discretion in pardoning an individual, then why is it that the President should
not enjoy the same power—except in cases of impeachment—as the
President is the leader of a nation of states? 48 Clearly, if the Framers
believed the President’s pardon power should have been limited in more
circumstances, then they would have ratified more limitations.49
Therefore, while some Framers believed the President’s pardon
power should not extend to treason cases, a sound argument can be made that
the Framers intended for impeachment to be the only restriction on
pardoning; the majority of the Framers believed the President should have
the ability to pardon in all cases, except those of impeachment, and the only
other limitation argued for was cases involving treason. 50
While elements of President Trump’s presidency are exercised in a
manner the Framers could not have envisioned back in 1776, the Framers did
have considerable foresight and implemented constitutional provisions that
have stood the test of time. 51 Further, the concept of a self-pardon has not
44.
See Duker, supra note 41, at 502; Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 206.
James Iredell argued that we should lean to strengthening our Executive than weakening our
Executive by placing too many limitations on its power. Duker, supra note 41, at 502.
45.
See Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 217. “The language that was
ultimately placed in the Constitution prohibited only the pardoning of an impeachment . . . .”
Id. at 206.
46.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 553–54 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C.
Hamilton ed., 1864); see also Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 206, 217–18.
47.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 34, at 516 (Alexander Hamilton).
48.
Id.
49.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 217; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69,
supra note 34, at 516 (Alexander Hamilton).
50.
Kalt, supra note 37, at 786–87; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra
note 34, at 516 (Alexander Hamilton).
51.
See
Constitution
of
the
United
States,
U.S.
SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm. “Written in 1787, ratified in
1788, and in operation since 1789, the United States Constitution is the world’s longest
surviving written charter of government.” Id.; see also Andrew Friedman, Can Constitutional
Drafters See the Future? No, and It’s Time We Stop Pretending They Can, 46 SW. L. REV. 29,
30 (2016); Schallhorn, supra note 2.
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been brought about by an advancement in technology unavailable to the
Framers in the 18th century. 52 Thus, the omission on a President’s ability to
self-pardon must carry weight in analyzing the text of the Constitution and
the explicit limitations the Framers placed on the power because, if the
Framers feared Presidents would begin pardoning themselves, then the
Framers would have at the very least debated the issue. 53
B.

Prior Considerations of Self-Pardon

President Trump’s belief in his ability to self-pardon is not
unprecedented. 54 President Nixon and President Bush considered using their
pardoning power on themselves to avoid potential criminal liability for their
actions. 55 President Nixon contemplated his ability to self-pardon following
the Watergate scandal. 56 Meanwhile, President Bush considered selfpardoning during the Iran-Contra arms scandal. 57
1.

President Nixon’s Consideration of Self-Pardon

On June 17, 1972, “[f]ive men [were] arrested after breaking into the
Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate complex in
Washington, D.C.” 58 After an investigation into the break-in, President
Nixon’s connection to the crime and subsequent attempt to cover it up

52.
Friedman, supra note 51, at 30; Kalt, supra note 37, at 786–87. While
Framers did not directly address a self-pardon concept, the Framers were nonetheless
concerned with the presidential self-dealing in cases of treason, which may involve himself
and his ability to pardon his cohorts. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 206. Thus, the idea of a
self-pardon has been around since the formation of our Constitution and not brought about by
some technological advancement. Kalt, supra note 37, at 786–87; see also Friedman, supra
note 51, at 30.
53.
See Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 206; Kalt, supra note 37, at 790–93.
“While not addressing self-pardons directly,” pardons were nonetheless available to protect
treasonous accomplices. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 206.
54.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 212 (noting that President Nixon and
President Bush considered using a self-pardon); see also Kalt, supra note 37, at 799–800
(detailing President Nixon’s and President Bush’s consideration of a self-pardon); Jennifer
Rubin, How Democrats Should Address Trump’s Self-Pardon Claim, WASH. POST: OPINION
(June 5, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2018/06/05/howdemocrats-should-address-trumps-self-pardon-claim/.
55.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 212.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Watergate
Fast
Facts,
CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/23/us/watergate-fast-facts/index.html (last updated Jan. 14,
2019, 2:29 PM).
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became clear. 59 Fearing removal from office and a potential criminal
indictment, President Nixon ordered his legal team to look into his options
out of the scandal and presidency as President Nixon believed he would not
survive impeachment proceedings. 60
President Nixon was presented with a handful of options and among
them was the option of a self-pardon. 61 In a memorandum authored by
Special Counsel James St. Clair, St. Clair advocated for the legality of
President Nixon’s ability to pardon himself. 62 Further, while former
Solicitor General Robert Bork believed a President is immune from criminal
prosecution in office, Bork nonetheless acknowledged “a President could
pardon himself for any acts committed . . . during his term.” 63 Such internal
support of President Nixon’s ability to self-pardon led the President to
believe he could exercise his pardon power on himself. 64 Ultimately,
President Nixon chose against a self-pardon and resigned only to be
subsequently pardoned by his successor, President Gerald Ford. 65
2.

President Bush’s Consideration of Self-Pardon

Following President Nixon’s consideration of self-pardon, President
Bush and his legal team considered the same action after the Iran-Contra
scandal became national news. 66 In November 1986, an illegal plan to free
hostages held in Lebanon was revealed. 67 President Bush and his team
organized a deal to “sell [weapons] to Iran through Israel” in exchange for
freeing United States hostages. 68 The proceeds from the sale would then be
used for military action in Nicaragua to combat the rising threat of

59.
See id. “June 25–29, 1973 — Dean testifies before the Senate Select
Committee about the White House, and [President] Nixon’s involvement in the Watergate
break-in and cover-up.” Id.
60.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 212–13.
61.
Id. “[President] Nixon also was asked to consider pardoning himself and
resigning or pardoning all Watergate defendants and himself before resigning.” Id.
62.
Id. at 212–13.
63.
Id. at 213.
64.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 213. President Ford, Vice President under
President Nixon, explained President Nixon’s consideration and belief that he could selfpardon was based upon the legal advice given to him from his legal team. Id. President
Nixon’s lawyers concluded a self-pardon was constitutional. King, supra note 13, at 433.
65.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 213–14.
66.
Id. at 214–15; see also Kalt, supra note 37, at 799.
67.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 214.
68.
Id.
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communism in Central America. 69 Ultimately, the illegal plan was revealed
and spurred an investigation into the Bush presidency. 70
Independent counsel Lawrence Walsh was in charge of investigating
and bringing forth any criminal indictments in connection with the scandal. 71
Walsh began turning up the heat on President Bush’s administration by
getting one conviction, three guilty pleas, and two more set to be tried. 72
However, as President Bush neared the end of his presidency, with no
possibility of reelection and with a month to go before the trials of the two
indicted were set to begin, President Bush granted pardons to six of his
alleged partners in the scandal. 73 President Bush’s pardons reversed the
penalty of the conviction, prevented Walsh from pursuing the rest of
President Bush’s alleged partners, and effectively shut down the
investigation altogether. 74 Some believe President Bush effectively issued a
self-pardon by relieving the six alleged partners because it prevented
President Bush from testifying during the trials and shut down Walsh’s
investigation. 75 However, President Bush gave his reasoning for the pardons
by stating they were politically motivated to prevent the criminalization of
policy differences in the upcoming trials. 76
While President Bush ultimately decided to issue pardons to only his
alleged partners in the scandal, President Bush’s team did consider a selfpardon. 77 Some suggested President Bush’s reasoning in omitting his name
69.
Id. at 214 n.123.
70.
See id. at 214–15.
71.
Id. at 214. “In the midst of the Iran-Contra crisis, Independent Counsel
Lawrence Walsh brought forth grand jury indictments against some of President Bush’s aides,
who were alleged to have contributed to the breaking of laws regarding the scandal.” Nida &
Spiro, supra note 6, at 214.
72.
See id. at 215.
73.
Id. at 214–15; see also Kalt, supra note 37, at 799; Peter Applebome, Loss
of Democratic Vote Imperils Bush in South, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, at A28. While Walsh
claimed the pardons were “an act of friendship or an act of self-protection,” President Bush
explained his reasoning behind pardoning his aides by stating:
The prosecutions of individuals I am pardoning represent what I believe
is a profoundly troubling development in the political and legal climate of our
country: [T]he criminalization of policy differences. These differences should be
addressed in the political arena, without the Damocles sword of criminality hanging
over the heads of some of the combatants. The proper target is the President, not
his subordinates; the proper forum is the voting booth, not the courtroom.

Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 215 (quoting Grant of Executive Clemency, 57 Fed. Reg.
62,145, 62,146 (Dec. 30, 1992)).
74.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 214–15; Kalt, supra note 37, at 799.
75.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 214–15.
76.
Id. at 215.
77.
Id. at 216. President Bush also considered invoking the Twenty-fifth
Amendment to allow Vice President Quayle to pardon President Bush. Id. at 216; see also
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
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from the six pardons was because of his concern for his image and legacy. 78
While President Bush may deny his actions were in effect a self-pardon, his
pardoning of his six partners did constructively issue a self-pardon for his
actions because it stopped Walsh’s investigation into the scandal.79
Moreover, President Bush’s pardons were not challenged or reversed by
either the legislative or judicial branches as being an abuse of a President’s
pardon power. 80 Thus, the acquiescence of the government—by choosing
not to pursue President Bush for effectively pardoning himself—could
support the conclusion that a self-pardon is constitutional. 81
C.

The Supreme Court of the United States and Presidential Pardons

While the Supreme Court of the United States has not specifically
decided the constitutionality behind a self-pardon, the Court has issued
various decisions on the President’s ability to pardon. 82 In United States v.
Wilson, 83 Chief Justice Marshall defined the presidential pardon power by
stating:
A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though
official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual
78.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 216.
79.
See id. at 214–16.
80.
See id.; Kalt, supra note 37, at 799–800. Although President Bush did not
pardon himself, he was still under investigation and could have been indicted following his
exit from office. Kalt, supra note 37, at 799–800. Ultimately, he was not indicted for misuse
of pardon power, nor were the pardons reversed. Id.
81.
See Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 200–01; but see Kalt, supra note 37, at
799–800. Kalt argues that President Bush’s pardons were effectively not a self-pardon, but in
effect, President Bush’s pardons shut down the investigation into the scandal. Kalt, supra
note 37, at 799; Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 214. Furthermore, once President Bush left
office months later, Walsh chose not to indict President Bush. Kalt, supra note 37, at 780.
Also, as Kalt recognizes, those pardoned by President Bush could have still been forced to
testify against President Bush, if President Bush was ultimately indicted once out of office,
which could have led to President Bush facing conviction. Id. at 799–800. While Kalt
believes such actions were political and not constitutional, the acquiescence of Walsh and the
government in allowing President Bush to effectively shut down the investigation into his
alleged criminal conduct is a constructive self-pardon as he decided to take sole action that
would prevent Walsh from continuing to investigate his alleged criminal conduct. Id.
82.
See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925); United States v. Klein,
80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 351 (1866); United States v. Wilson,
32 U.S. 150, 160–62 (1833).
83.
32 U.S. 150 (1833).
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for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially
to the court. 84

The Court went on to explain that pardons may be reviewed by a
court, however, such review is limited and the court cannot judge the
character of the pardon. 85 So long as the pardon is executed, delivered, and
accepted properly, the President could argue the pardon is valid as an
executive order. 86
About three decades later, in Ex parte Garland, 87 the Court again
discussed the President’s ability to pardon. 88 The Court issued an opinion
that upheld and reaffirmed a strict textual argument of Section Two of
Article II of the Constitution. 89 The Court stated that besides the express
impeachment prohibition on pardons, “the power is unlimited. It extends to
every offence and is intended to relieve the party who may have committed
it.” 90 Furthermore, the Court continued its analysis on the President’s pardon
power by stating: “This power of the President is not subject to legislative
control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from
its exercise any class of offenders.” 91 This strict interpretation of the
President’s pardon power falls in line with the text of Article II, and the
Framers’ intent to make such power similar to the King of England, whereby
the President may issue it upon anyone for any crime—except cases of
impeachment. 92 The decision in Ex parte Garland was upheld in United
States v. Klein, 93 as the Court prevented Congress from enacting laws that
would control the President’s pardoning power. 94
In Ex parte Grossman, 95 the Court discussed what result would
likely occur should a President abuse his pardon power. 96 The Court stated

84.
Id. at 160–61.
85.
Id.; Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 220.
86.
Wilson, 32 U.S. at 161.
87.
71 U.S. 333 (1866).
88.
Id. at 380.
89.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
90.
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 373.
91.
Id. at 380.
92.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 341, 373.
93.
80 U.S. 128 (1871).
94.
Id. at 148; Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 333. “Now it is clear that the
legislature cannot change the effect of such a pardon any more than the executive can change
a law.” Klein, 80 U.S. at 148.
95.
267 U.S. 87 (1925).
96.
See id. at 121.
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that the likely result would be impeachment. 97 In Grossman, the Court
opined on the President’s ability to pardon criminal contempt and the
problems that may occur in successive pardoning of a particular offense. 98
The Court realized the problems courts may face in carrying out their duties
if the President consistently pardons, but the Court believed that the proper
recourse in addressing the abusive President is not limiting such pardons, but
rather impeachment. 99
Thus, President Trump has the ability to make a strong precedential
argument for his ability to pardon himself because the Court has consistently
upheld a strong presidential pardon power. 100 The Court has prevented
Congress from interfering with such power and has used strong language that
proves such power is plenary. 101 While no self-pardon case has come before
the Court—based upon the historical interpretation of the Court’s analysis of
the President’s power to pardon—the Court has consistently taken a strict
textual position in stating that the only exception to the power is
impeachment. 102
III.

PRESIDENT TRUMP’S AMENABILITY TO INDICTMENT

Special Counsel Mueller has indicted twelve Russians for allegedly
meddling in the 2016 presidential election, 103 and some within the White
House believe Mueller could be targeting President Trump, as well, in
connection with the meddling. 104 However, a sitting United States President
has never been indicted before. 105 Some legal scholars and commentators

97.
Id. at 106. An abuse of the pardon power by the president will likely
result in an impeachment rather than the Court narrowing and restraining the construction of
the general powers of the Constitution. Id. at 121.
98.
Id. at 106, 121.
99.
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. at 121.
100.
See Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 221. While the Court has never
addressed a self-pardon directly, strong precedent leans toward the Court refusing to narrow
the Constitution. Id.
101.
See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866).
102.
See id.; Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 221.
103.
Mark Mazzetti & Katie Benner, 12 Russian Agents Charged in Drive to
Upset ‘16 Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2018, at A1. “The special counsel investigating Russian
interference in the 2016 election issued an indictment of [twelve] Russian intelligence officers
on Friday in the hacking of the Democratic National Committee and the Clinton presidential
campaign.” Id.
104.
See Parker & Achenbach, supra note 9; Schallhorn, supra note 1.
105.
A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. O.L.C. at 237 n.14 (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 692 n.14 (1997)).
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believe the President is immune from criminal prosecution while in office. 106
Others believe the President is susceptible to a criminal indictment,
regardless of being in office, if the President committed a crime. 107
Nonetheless, the Constitution specifically lays out how the President
should be handled if he has committed egregious acts against the United
States. 108 Accordingly, pursuant to Section Four of Article II, “[t]he
President . . . shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.” 109
While the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit the indictment of
President Trump, there are several commentators that have supported
criminal immunity for President Trump. 110 For example, Justice Story came
to the conclusion that a President is immune from criminal prosecution
because a President is unable to be arrested, imprisoned, or detained while he
is President. 111 In addition to Justice Story’s belief, the Justice Department’s
Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) has issued two separate reports in 1973
and 2000, respectively, that reach the same conclusion. 112 Although no court
has decided the issue, President Trump has strong legal support of his
immunity from prosecution while in office. 113
This section will argue why President Trump is criminally immune
while in office—because a proper trial for President Trump is not held inside

106.
See id. at 222; King, supra note 13, at 422; Douglas W. Kmiec, Trump
Can’t Be Indicted. Can He Be Subpoenaed?, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (June 4, 2018),
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/opinion/trump-lawyers-indicted-subpoena.html.
“Indictment and criminal trial derails a presidency by the compromising stigmas harming
presidential ability to carry out foreign or domestic duties . . . .” Kmiec, supra.
107.
See King, supra note 13, at 417–18; Eisen & Holtzman, supra note 12;
Schallhorn, supra note 1.
108.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
109.
Id.
110.
See id.; King, supra note 13, at 418.
111.
King, supra note 13, at 418.
112.
A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. O.L.C. at 222; Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel, Amenability of the President, Vice President & Other Civil Officers to Fed.
Criminal Prosecution While in Office 1 (Sept. 24, 1973) (on file with Dep’t of Justice).
“[T]he indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would unconstitutionally
undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned
functions.” A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op.
O.L.C. at 222.
113.
See A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal
Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 260. “No court has addressed this question directly, but the
judicial precedents that bear on the continuing validity of our constitutional analysis are
consistent with both the analytic approach taken and the conclusions reached.” Id.
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a courtroom, but rather inside the Senate. 114 Further, this section will argue
that a criminal indictment against President Trump while in office would be
unconstitutional because the Framers stated impeachment proceedings
should come before the filing of a criminal indictment. 115
A.

Who Prosecutes the President?

The prosecution of President Trump while in office is problematic
because a state prosecutor would be unable to arrest the [e]xecutive branch,
and a federal prosecutor would be acting in a manner contrary to the
Constitution. 116 While a sitting President has never been indicted, a state
prosecutor would not likely become the first to indict the President as the
Supremacy Clause should prevent such action. 117 Further, a federal
prosecutor would not likely become the first to indict the President because
the Constitution specially bestows the power to try the President upon the
legislative branch through impeachment proceedings. 118
1.

State Prosecution

While President Trump could potentially be indicted by a state
prosecutor for committing a state crime, it is unlikely such indictment would
stand as constitutional. 119 According to Article VI Clause 2, 120 the
“Constitution and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby”
(“Supremacy Clause”). 121 As such, for a state prosecutor to impose state
jurisdiction and attempt to bind President Trump to a state judicial system
would be contrary to the Supremacy Clause because the state would be
acting contrary to the laws in the Constitution by putting state law over
federal law; by doing so, a state prosecutor would essentially be arrest[ing]
the [e]xecutive branch. 122
In addition to the apparent contradiction of the Supremacy Clause,
the Court has already decided who should prevail in a dispute between the

114.
See King, supra note 13, at 434.
115.
See id.
116.
Id. at 425.
117.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436
(1819); King, supra note 13, at 424–25.
118.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
119.
See King, supra note 13, at 424–25.
120.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
121.
Id.
122.
See King, supra note 13, at 425 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 432).
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state and federal government. 123 In McCulloch v. Maryland, 124 the Court
prevented Maryland from imposing a tax on a federal bank, overturned a
Maryland statute that prevented a bank from operating without state
approval, and held that the statute was a violation of the Supremacy
Clause. 125 The Court supported its holding by reasoning that Maryland
burdened the operation of a federal bank, which was to benefit all United
States citizens including the citizens of Maryland, by imposing a tax not just
on its Maryland constituents, but on the rest of the United States population,
as well. 126 Thus, Maryland was unconstitutionally interfering with the
operation of the federal government and levying a tax on United States
citizens not within Maryland’s jurisdiction. 127
While McCulloch was a dispute over a tax and not a criminal
indictment of a sitting President, the principles of federal supremacy still
carry. 128 For a state prosecutor to indict President Trump, that state would
unduly burden and interfere with the federal government that benefits all
United States citizens, not just that respective state’s citizens. 129 Further, the
Court expressly stated, “[t]he states have no power, by taxation or otherwise,
to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the
constitutional laws enacted.” 130 Thus, if a President is indicted, then the
indictment must come from a federal prosecutor because the Supremacy
Clause prohibits any state from burdening the operations of the federal
government. 131
2.

Federal Prosecution

Pursuant to Article I, Section Three, “[t]he Senate shall have the sole
[p]ower to try all [i]mpeachments . . . [w]hen the President of the United
States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside.” 132 Accordingly, a potential
separation of powers issue could arise if a federal prosecutor indicts a

123.
See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 435–36.
124.
17 U.S. 316 (1819).
125.
Id. at 436–37.
126.
Id. at 435–36.
127.
Id. at 435–37.
128.
King, supra note 13, at 425; see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 434–35. To
allow a state to prosecute the President while in office would be a direct contradiction of
McCulloch as it would be a single state interfering with the operation of the federal
government, which benefits all states. King, supra note 13, at 425.
129.
King, supra note 13, at 425.
130.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 317.
131.
See King, supra note 13, at 425.
132.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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President. 133 The Constitution expressly states the Senate shall have the
power to try the President for the alleged misconduct or crime, all while the
Chief Justice presides over the trial. 134 For a federal prosecutor to try a
President first—before any trial by the Senate—would be a circumvention of
the express language in the Constitution. 135 Further, a federal prosecutor, or
an agent of the executive branch, and a federal judge, or an agent of the
judicial branch, would be acting in place of the legislative branch and the
Chief Justice by trying a President for his alleged misconduct, which is a
direct contradiction of Article I, Section Three. 136
B.

Presidential Immunity from Indictment

While a separation of powers issue is apparent, OLC concluded
twice—in 1973 and 2000—that it believes it does not have the constitutional
authority to indict its boss, the President of the United States.137 Although
OLC is not a court, nor can it make law through its decisions, the 2000 OLC
report (“Report”) on indicting a sitting President sheds light on the Justice
Department’s interpretation of its ability to indict the President. 138 The
Report reaffirms its 1973 conclusion by stating “the Department . . . would
impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its
constitutionally assigned functions” by indicting a sitting President. 139
Although the Report states the Constitution does not expressly
prohibit an indictment and subsequent criminal proceeding to occur while the
President is in office, 140 the Report recognizes that the burden placed on the
President to defend himself from criminal prosecution would be so great that

133.
King, supra note 13, at 426; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. The
Constitution specifically states the legislative branch has the power to try and impeach the
President. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. A federal prosecutor is under the executive branch;
thus, it would be the executive branch trying the executive branch. King, supra note 13, at
426.
134.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
135.
See King, supra note 13, at 427.
136.
Id.
137.
A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. O.L.C. at 222.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
Id. at 223. “The memorandum concluded that the plain terms of the
[Impeachment] Clause [in Article I, Section 3 of the United States Constitution] do not impose
such a general bar to indictment or criminal trial prior to impeachment and therefore do not,
by themselves, preclude the criminal prosecution of a sitting President.” Id.
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it would impair his ability to carry out his constitutional duties. 141 The
Report states three burdens that President Trump would face if indicted:
Three types of burdens merit consideration: (a) [T]he
actual imposition of a criminal sentence of incarceration, which
would make it physically impossible for [President Trump] to
carry out his duties; (b) the public stigma and opprobrium
occasioned by the initiation of criminal proceedings, which could
compromise [President Trump’s] ability to fulfill his
constitutionally contemplated leadership role with respect to
foreign and domestic affairs; and (c) the mental and physical
burdens of assisting in the preparation of a defense for the various
stages of the criminal proceedings, which might severely hamper
[President Trump’s] performance of his official duties. 142

While the Twenty-fifth Amendment allows for a President to step
away if he cannot discharge his constitutional duties while preparing a
defense to his criminal indictment, the President’s potentially indefinite
absence if he is sentenced to prison for the remainder of his term was not the
intention of the Amendment and is in direct contradiction of the
Constitution’s process for removing the President from office. 143 Moreover,
the embarrassment of a criminal indictment would be detrimental to a
President in his role as the chief diplomat with foreign nations. 144
Ultimately, the Report balanced the omission of presidential criminal
immunity with the practicality of indicting a sitting President and concluded
that:
[T]he interests in facilitating immediate criminal prosecution of a
sitting President against the interests underlying temporary
immunity from such prosecution, considered in light of alternative
means of securing the rule of law, we adhere to our 1973
determination that the balance of competing interests requires
recognition of a presidential immunity from criminal process. 145

141.
A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. O.L.C. at 246.
142.
Id.
143.
U.S CONST. amend. XXV; A Sitting President’s Amenability to
Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 248. “None of the contingencies
discussed by the Framers of the Twenty-fifth Amendment even alluded to the possibility of a
criminal prosecution of a sitting President.” A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment
and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 248.
144.
See Kmiec, supra note 106.
145.
A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. O.L.C. at 255.
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Moreover, the Report’s conclusion is consistent with former United
States Assistant Attorney General Douglas Kmiec’s analysis of President
Trump’s ability to be indicted. 146 Kmiec stated “[i]ndictment and criminal
trial derails a presidency by the compromising stigma’s harming presidential
ability to carry out [his] . . . duties.” 147
Thus, should it be found that a President acted criminally on the
campaign trail or otherwise, then the only recourse should be
impeachment—as he should experience criminal immunity for his actions
while in office because initiating a federal prosecution before impeachment
proceedings would be inconsistent with the text of the Constitution and
would greatly impair a President’s ability to carry out his duties. 148
C.

Impeachment Instead of Indictment

The legislative branch has constitutional authority to preside over
impeachment proceedings, including the President’s impeachment. 149
According to Article I, the House of Representatives has the sole power to
impeach and the Senate has the sole power to try all impeachments. 150 If the
President is impeached, the Chief Justice of the Court shall preside over the
trial. 151 Moreover, Article I states:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend
further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold
and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United
States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according
to Law. 152

If an investigation concludes the President committed a crime while
on the campaign trail or otherwise, then the proper recourse would first be
the suggestion of impeachment. 153 Once impeachment proceedings are
finished, then a President would be susceptible to a criminal indictment—
regardless of whether removal occurs or not. 154
146.
Id. at 260; see also Kmiec, supra note 106.
147.
Kmiec, supra note 106.
148.
See A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal
Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 260; King, supra note 13, at 434; Kmiec, supra note 106.
149.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
150.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
151.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
152.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
153.
See King, supra note 13, at 429; Kmiec, supra note 106.
154.
King, supra note 13, at 428.
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Constitutional Authority

As discussed in the Presidential Immunity section, President Trump
should enjoy criminal immunity while in office.155 Despite having criminal
immunity, President Trump is nonetheless susceptible to impeachment and
removal should he be found to have committed “Treason, Bribery, . . . other
high crimes, and Misdemeanors.” 156 Such immunity falls in line with the
text of the Constitution, and is supported by various commentators, including
the Justice Department. 157
Impeachment and removal from office is the proper recourse for an
abusive President. 158 The constitutional mechanism for checking an abusive
President, or one that has committed a serious misconduct, is
impeachment. 159 To circumvent such a process by filing an indictment prior
to impeachment contradicts the express language of the Constitution. 160
Although impeachment proceedings will burden President Trump, similar to
a criminal prosecution, such proceedings are what the Constitution put in
place to check serious misconduct from the President. 161 Further, not one
United States President that was impeached had a criminal indictment filed
before impeachment. 162 Thus, a strong historical and constitutional argument
can be made by President Trump that it would be unprecedented for a
President to be indicted before undergoing impeachment proceedings. 163

155.
See supra section III.B.; A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment
and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 260.
156.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; King, supra note 13, at 428–30.
157.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; Rizzo, supra
note 6.
158.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 210; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7;
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4;
159.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 210; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7;
Kmiec, supra note 106.
160.
See King, supra note 13, at 427.
161.
A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. O.L.C. at 222, 257–58. “[W]e recognize that invoking the impeachment process itself
threatens to encumber a sitting President’s time and energy and to divert his attention from his
public duties. But the impeachment process is explicitly established by the Constitution.” Id.;
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6–7.
162.
Baker & Eilperin, supra note 16; The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson
(1868) President of the United States, supra note 16. Clinton was not indicted prior to
impeachment. Baker & Eilperin, supra note 16. Johnson was not indicted before
impeachment. The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson (1868) President of the United States,
supra note 16.
163.
King, supra note 13, at 418, 423.
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Prior Presidential Impeachments

Only two United States Presidents—former President Andrew
Johnson (“President Johnson”) and former President Bill Clinton (“President
Clinton”)—have been impeached by the House of Representatives.164
However, both Presidents were acquitted by the Senate. 165 President
Johnson was the first impeached President and he was impeached for
violating the Tenure of Office Act after he replaced Secretary of War Edwin
M. Stanton with Thaddeus Stevens. 166 President Johnson already had
disputes with Stanton and Senate Republicans during the reconstruction era
and, after replacing Stanton, congressional leaders drafted eleven articles of
impeachment, which included, among others, conspiracy to remove Stanton
from office. 167 Although Congress deemed President Johnson’s actions
criminal, he nonetheless finished out his presidency after being acquitted by
the Senate and, most importantly, President Johnson was not indicted for his
alleged criminal conduct before or after impeachment proceedings.168
The second impeached President was President Clinton. 169 President
Clinton was impeached for committing perjury before a grand jury and
obstructing justice. 170 President Clinton’s crimes stemmed from a sexual
scandal, in which President Clinton lied about having sexual relations with
Monica Lewinsky in front of a grand jury, and obstructed justice in a civil
suit by lying in a separate lawsuit and to Special Investigator Ken Starr.171
Ultimately, President Clinton was acquitted by the Senate after trial, and,
again most importantly, no criminal indictment was introduced after Ken
Starr finished his investigation into President Clinton’s criminal conduct. 172
Thus, President Trump had a strong historical argument in opposing
a Mueller indictment while in office, as no previously impeached President
had to face a criminal indictment for the crimes they committed.173 While
the previous impeached Presidents were not alleged to have used a foreign
164.
Baker & Eilperin, supra note 16; The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson
(1968) President of the United States, supra note 16.
165.
The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson (1868) President of the United
States, supra note 16.
166.
Id.
167.
Id.
168.
Id.
169.
Baker & Eilperin, supra note 16.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
See A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal
Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 237 n.14; Baker & Eilperin, supra note 16.
173.
See A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal
Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 237 n.14; Baker & Eilperin, supra note 16.
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rival’s power to win the Office, the allegation President Trump faced should
not affect the procedure in place in dealing with a President allegedly
committing high crimes and misdemeanors. 174
2.

Senate Acquittal and Double Jeopardy

Despite the apparent inability to indict a President while in office, a
President can still feel the effects of an investigation into alleged criminal
conduct by the President through the threat of impeachment—should the
investigation conclude the President committed a crime or serious
misconduct. 175 The constitutional mechanism for punishing an elected
official begins with impeachment, then removal from office, then
indictment. 176 However, as history has shown, impeachment proceedings are
partisan and Senators are pressured to vote in support of their political
party. 177 Thus, despite the serious or criminal misconduct of the President,
he can evade punishment and remain in power if his political party holds the
supermajority of Senate seats. 178 Even if President Trump had gotten
impeached and faced a Senate trial, the Republican party controls a majority
of Senate seats which means President Trump could have been acquitted and
remained in office. 179
However, even if President Trump got acquitted, he could still be
susceptible to criminal indictment once he relinquishes the Oval Office if
Mueller would have concluded President Trump acted criminally. 180 A
Senate acquittal should not bar a criminal indictment once the impeached

174.
See A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal
Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 237 n.14; Rizzo, supra note 6. “The constitutional mechanism
for addressing serious misconduct (treason or other high crimes) by a sitting president is
impeachment.” Kmiec, supra note 106.
175.
Kmiec, supra note 106; Schallhorn, supra note 1.
176.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6–7.
177.
See Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
Offenses for Which He Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op.
O.L.C. 110, 133–34 (2000); Baker & Eilperin, supra note 16. The Framers feared
impeachment proceedings could become partisan. Whether a Former President May Be
Indicted and Tried for the Same Offenses for Which He Was Impeached by the House and
Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 133–34.
178.
See Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
Offenses for Which He Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op.
O.L.C. at 133–34.
179.
Parker & Achenbach, supra note 9.
180.
See Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
Offenses for Which He Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op.
O.L.C. at 155.
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President leaves office. 181 While no court has addressed the issue directly,
OLC issued a memorandum in 2000 that analyzed the possibility of double
jeopardy attaching to a Senate trial. 182 Ultimately, OLC concluded that
double jeopardy should not attach because a Senate trial differs from a
criminal trial. 183
According to the Judgment Impeachment Clause, “the Party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.” 184 The Constitution provides
the possibility for criminal proceedings to subsequently occur if an
impeached official is removed from office. 185 However, the clause is silent
on the possibility of criminal indictment for an acquitted official.186 Thus,
President Trump could have made an argument that Senate acquittal bars
subsequent criminal prosecution. 187 Such argument falls on the “canon of
statutory construction, expressio unius est exlusio alterius, [or in other
words,] ‘the expression of one is the exclusion of others.’” 188 The clause’s
omission of parties acquitted from impeachment could imply a bar on
criminal prosecution of the same offenses. 189 Further, when the clause was
originally drafted by the Framers, it was modeled after various states’
impeachment provisions which stated “the party, whether convicted or
acquitted.” 190 So, the omission by the Framers to include language which
addressed parties acquitted, and not just impeached, is important. 191
Despite the omission of whether convicted or acquitted, double
jeopardy still should not attach to Senate trials, as double jeopardy is
intended to protect individuals from repeated trials for the same offenses that
threaten to take away life and liberty. 192 Only taking away an individual’s
elected position, and disqualifying an individual for future elected positions,
181.
Id.
182.
Id. at 110.
183.
Id. at 138, 155.
184.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
185.
Id.
186.
Id.; Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
Offenses for Which He Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op.
O.L.C. at 114.
187.
See Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
Offenses for Which He Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op.
O.L.C. at 114.
188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Id. at 114, 116.
191.
See id. at 116.
192.
See Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
Offenses for Which He Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op.
O.L.C. at 117.
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was an American innovation to impeachment. 193 In Britain, impeachment
and conviction could result in death. 194 The Framers intentionally avoided
such harsh penalties for impeached and convicted officials by only
subjecting such individuals to subsequent criminal prosecution for their
acts. 195 Impeachment trials were not designed to result in the taking away of
one’s life or liberty, which would invoke double jeopardy. 196
Moreover, the branch of government conducting the trial is an
important distinguishing factor. 197 The legislative branch conducts the trial
as opposed to the judicial branch, by design. 198 Hamilton addressed this
distinguishing factor by claiming the judicial branch could have two trials of
an impeached official for the same offenses, which is why the Senate
conducts the impeachment trial. 199 Additionally, Senators must play the role
of fact finder and interpreter of governing law—hence, judge and jury. 200
Lastly, double jeopardy should not attach to Senate acquittal because
impeachment proceedings are susceptible to partisan loyalties which can
affect the Senate’s decisions to convict or acquit. 201 As previously discussed,
partisan politics play a decisive role in Senators’ decisions, and going against
the Republican Party or President Trump could prove costly in reelection. 202
The Framers also feared impeachments were liable to partisan abuse, to
retain an abusive President, or to remove an unpopular President. 203
Therefore, while President Trump should enjoy criminal immunity while in
office, he nonetheless is liable to impeachment proceedings and should not
193.
Id. at 126–27.
194.
Id. at 120, 126.
195.
Id. at 126–27.
196.
Id. at 129.
197.
See Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
Offenses for Which He Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op.
O.L.C. at 132.
198.
See id.
199.
Id. at 123.
200.
Id. at 132.
201.
See Baker & Eilperin, supra note 16. Impeachment votes fall largely
along party lines. Id.
202.
See John Verhovek & Kendall Karson, Sanford Loss Magnifies Trump
Effect on GOP Primaries, ABC NEWS (June 13, 2018, 11:31 AM),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/sanford-loss-magnifies-trump-effect-gopprimaries/story?id=55862833 (discussing recent cases where incumbent Congressmen lost
reelection after opposing President Trump and his policies); Paul Waldman, In Today’s
Republican Party, You Worship Trump or You Get Out, WASH. POST: PLUM LINE (June 25,
2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2018/06/25/in-todays-republicanparty-you-worship-trump-or-you-get-out/?utm_term=.06bb211c4c7a.
203.
Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
Offenses for Which He was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op.
O.L.C. at 133–34.
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be barred from subsequent criminal proceedings if he was found to have
acted criminally—regardless of a Senate acquittal. 204
IV.

CONCLUSION

Taking a strict textual approach to the construction of the
Constitution, a self-pardon is not prohibited because the President,
historically and intentionally, enjoys plenary pardon power. 205 While such
plenary power seemingly is abusive, the Court has done little to limit the
President’s power to pardon individuals. 206 The power was designed to be an
act of mercy and similar to the King of England’s power to pardon those
guilty of committing a crime. 207 While the actual use of a self-pardon is
unprecedented, the idea of using a self-pardon is not. 208 Previous embattled
Presidents reached the conclusion that a self-pardon is not prohibited based
upon the text of the Constitution and the Court’s interpretation of the
power. 209 The sole exception to such power is in cases of impeachment. 210
Therefore, President Trump’s threat to Mueller to use a self-pardon has legal
support. 211 However, such an action would presumably indicate that
President Trump is in fact guilty of colluding with Russia to win the election,
which President Trump adamantly denies. 212
Furthermore, the way for Mueller to hold President Trump
responsible for any criminal or serious misconduct is not through use of an
indictment—rather a recommendation of impeachment—because an
indictment should be unconstitutional. 213 President Trump should enjoy
criminal immunity while he is in office, not because of partisan beliefs, but
in consideration of the instability a criminal indictment would produce.214
Moreover, the Constitution creates a mechanism for combatting serious or
204.
A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. O.L.C. at 224; Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
Offenses for Which He Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op.
O.L.C. at 155.
205.
See Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 216, 220–21.
206.
Id. at 220–21.
207.
Id. at 203–04.
208.
Id. at 220.
209.
See id. at 213, 216.
210.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 217.
211.
@realDonaldTrump, supra note 1; Parker & Achenbach, supra note 9; see
also Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 221.
212.
See Schallhorn, supra note 1; Schallhorn, supra note 2;
@realDonaldTrump, supra note 1.
213.
See A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal
Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 223.
214.
See id. at 230, 236.

Published by NSUWorks, 2019

81

Nova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 1

176

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

criminal misconduct from the President through impeachment and removal
from office. 215 Although removing a President from office is unprecedented,
an acquittal from the Senate should not absolve a President from criminal
prosecution once he is out of office. 216 Barring criminal prosecution after a
Senate acquittal would be inconsistent with fundamental principles of justice,
and inconsistent with the applied use of double jeopardy because a Senate
trial does not carry the same penalty a criminal trial carries. 217
Ultimately, although a self-pardon is not prohibited by the
Constitution, the danger in President Trump pardoning himself is the
seeming abuse of the executive pardon power, which itself could be grounds
for impeachment if President Trump obstructs justice through his selfpardon. 218 Thus, it would be this move by President Trump—rather than the
alleged misconduct Mueller investigated—that could have become the
impeachable and unpardonable offense committed. 219

215.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6, 7; see also A Sitting President’s Amenability
to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 258.
216.
See Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
Offenses for Which He Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op.
O.L.C. at 133–34; Rubin, supra note 54.
217.
Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
Offenses for Which He Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op.
O.L.C. at 136–38, 155.
218.
Parker & Achenbach, supra note 9; Rubin, supra note 54. “Exceptional
[pardon] cases like [successive pardons of the same offense] if to be imagined at all, would
suggest a resort to impeachment . . . .” Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925).
219.
Parker & Achenbach, supra note 9. “[Giuliani] went on to describe [selfpardoning as] unthinkable and said it would probably lead immediately to impeachment.” Id.
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INTRODUCTION

CRISPR is potentially science and medicine’s greatest invention of
our generation—it could redefine life as we know it today. 1 CRISPR could
be our secret weapon for curing and preventing genetically inherited diseases
such as cancer, Alzheimer’s disease, sickle cell anemia, Amyotrophic Lateral
Sclerosis (“ALS”), and many others. 2 While CRISPR has the potential to
eliminate these diseases, it also might have the potential to cause harm. 3
CRISPR stands for “Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short
Palindromic Repeats of genetic information.” 4 CRISPR Therapeutics
created a powerful gene-editing tool—known as CRISPR—that can be
harnessed to accurately “modify, delete, [and even] correct disease-causing
abnormalities at their genetic [foundation].” 5 Human “DNA is [basically] a
series of instructions” that controls, for example, our height, eye color, and
hair color. 6 These “instructions are written as a series of chemical letters in
our DNA,” and just like letters that make up a textual sentence, there can be
errors or mistakes. 7 An error in the DNA chain can have no effect at all in
one person, but in another, the error of just a single letter can cause a horrific
disease. 8 Specifically, CRISPR embodies the Cas9 enzyme, which acts as a
pair of molecular scissors. 9 The Cas9 enzyme is guided by ribonucleic acid
(“RNA”) which leads the Cas9 enzyme to a specific location where the
enzyme will then slice the DNA. 10 Once a cut has been made in the DNA,
the body’s own natural repair mechanism will trigger the repair of the cut.11

1.
Charles Crutchfield III, CRISPR:
Life-Changing, World-Changing
Science that Will Revolutionize Medicine, MINN. SPOKESMAN-RECORDER (June 1, 2018),
http://www.spokesman-recorder.com/2018/06/01/crispr-life-changing-world-changingscience-that-will-revolutionize-medicine/.
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
THERAPEUTICS:
GENE
EDITING,
4.
CRISPR/Cas9,
CRISPR
http://www.crisprtx.com/gene-editing/crispr-cas9 (last visited May 1, 2019).
5.
Hamza Abdullah, Is CRISPR Dead? A Breakthrough in Genetic
Engineering, MEDIUM (Jan. 9, 2018), http://www.medium.com/search/is-crispr-dead-abreakthrough-in-genetic-engineering-51574d6e6c0d. “Dr. Emmanuelle Charpentier, one of
[CRISPR Therapeutics’] scientific founders, co-invented [the application of] CRISPR/Cas9
[in] gene editing.” CRISPR/cas9, supra note 4.
6.
Crutchfield III, supra note 1.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
CRISPR/Cas9, supra note 4.
10.
Id.; Therapeutic Approach, CRISPR THERAPEUTICS: GENE EDITING,
http://www.crisprtx.com/gene-editing/therapeutic-approach (last visited May 1, 2019).
11.
CRISPR/Cas9, supra note 4.
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By utilizing the CRISPR-Cas9 technology, it will be possible to delete and
correct hereditary diseases. 12
CRISPR Therapeutics sought approval from the United States Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to begin human genomic editing trials. 13
However, in May of 2018, the FDA denied CRISPR Therapeutics’ request to
move forward with these human trials. 14 The FDA has stated their reasoning
for denying the company’s request involves “certain questions it wants [to
resolve] before it gives the go-ahead for the human CRISPR study.” 15
CRISPR has gone through numerous lab testing experiments
involving non-human trials. 16 These lab results have been promising enough
to suggest that CRISPR is ready to be tested on humans. 17 But until CRISPR
gets the green light to move forward with human trials, “we [cannot] know
for sure whether [CRISPR] will work as expected.” 18 It is important to
realize that these trials would not be the first human trials to ever take
place. 19 In 2016, China was the first country to test CRISPR’s effect on
humans. 20 While it is true that we are exploring uncharted territory and
should certainly proceed with caution, millions of people in the United States
suffer from—and will continue to suffer from—these terrible diseases every
day. 21 The sad truth is that many of those people have exhausted their
options for treatment and CRISPR could be their last hope for survival. 22
Accordingly, this Comment will first examine how the CRISPRCas9 technology works and how it differs from the technology that already
exists. 23 Following this, the many benefits and few legitimate concerns
involving CRISPR will be discussed. 24 In Part III, the analysis will address
12.
Id.; Crutchfield III, supra note 1.
13.
Kristin Houser, The FDA Puts the Brakes on a Major CRISPR Trial in
Humans, FUTURISM: HEALTH & MED. (May 31, 2018), http://www.futurism.com/humancrispr-trial-fda-stops/.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.; see also CRISPR Therapeutics and Vertex Provide Update on FDA
Review of Investigational New Drug Application for CTX001 for the Treatment of Sickle Cell
Disease, CRISPR THERAPEUTICS (May 30, 2018), http://ir.crisprtx.com/news-releases/newsrelease-details/crispr-therapeutics-and-vertex-provide-update-fda-review#.
16.
See Houser, supra note 13.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Houser, supra note 13; see also Crutchfield III, supra note 1.
22.
See Randi Nord, China Breaks Ground with World’s First CRISPR
Clinical Trials, SOC. UNDERGROUND, http://www.socialunderground.com/2018/04/chinacrispr-gene-editing-cancer/ (last visited May 1, 2019).
23.
See discussion infra Part II.A, II.B.
24.
See discussion infra Part II.C, II.D.
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the central questions of why the current FDA ban was placed on CRISPR
human trials and why CRISPR should get the green light. 25 This section
embarks on a journey into the regulatory framework of the FDA and why
other drugs and devices that have proven to be harmful to consumers—like
tobacco products and chemotherapy—are allowed. 26 Are they regulated by
the FDA? 27 If so, why are we continuing to allow those dangerous and
destructive products on the market, but not CRISPR? 28 Lastly, this
Comment introduces the concept of Big Pharma and addresses the question:
Is Big Pharma involved here? 29
In considering each of these moving parts, one thing stays the
same—CRISPR might offer life-changing cures that could change the future
of mankind. 30 “The catch is we [will not] know for sure until we try.” 31
II.

HOW DOES CRISPR WORK?

In order to understand why the FDA has halted CRISPR human trials
in the United States, we first have to understand how the technology works
and how it affects the human body. 32 After all, the purpose of the FDA is to
protect the general health of the public “by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and
security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical
devices.” 33
A.

Explanation of Genome Editing

Genome editing is a process by which scientists can genetically
engineer or alter the DNA of an organism—including bacteria, plants,
animals, and even humans. 34 Starting small, the first question becomes:

25.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
26.
See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
27.
See Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 237 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Christian Nordqvist, What You Need to Know About Chemotherapy, MED. NEWS
TODAY, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/158401.php (last updated Dec. 14, 2017);
What We Do, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do (last updated Mar. 28, 2018).
28.
See
Effects
of
Tobacco,
TOBACCO
FREE
FLA.,
http://www.tobaccofreeflorida.com/why-should-i-quit/effects-of-tobacco/ (last visited May 1,
2019); Houser, supra note 13; Nordqvist, supra note 27.
29.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
30.
Houser, supra note 13.
31.
Id.
32.
See id.; Crutchfield III, supra note 1.
33.
What We Do, supra note 27.
34.
Genome Editing: What Is Genome Editing?, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES.
INST. (Aug. 3, 2017), http://www.genome.gov/27569222/genome-editing/.
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What is DNA? 35 DNA stands for deoxyribonucleic acid and consists of four
different bases: Adenine (“A”), Cytosine (“C”), Guanine (“G”), and
Thymine (“T”). 36 DNA exists in the body as a double helix where A must
always pair with T, and, similarly, C must always pair with G. 37 This
chemical pattern is what makes up our hereditary material.38 Moving up to
the next molecule is the gene. 39 One single gene is made up of DNA. 40 One
gene is responsible for one characteristic; for instance, one gene carries the
hereditary information that dictates our eye color. 41 The gene responsible for
our eye color sits on the same part of the DNA chain in every person, but
contains a different make-up of genetic bases. 42 The genome is made up of
all of our genes put together. 43
Just like everything in this world, the human body can make
mistakes. 44 Sometimes a DNA mutation occurs where the nucleotide
sequence that makes up our DNA becomes altered.45 For example, during
the replication process, “the DNA polymerase could read an A instead of a C
and hence add a G instead of a T.” 46
The idea behind genome editing is to locate the DNA mutation or
broken gene, cut out the defect, and repair the DNA chain. 47 Ultimately, by
correcting a harmful mutation, scientists could change the activity of targeted
genes. 48
B.

How is CRISPR Technology Different?

“Scientists have had the knowledge and ability to edit genomes for
many years, but CRISPR technology has brought major improvements to the
35.
DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid), MYVMC (July 23, 2008),
http://www.myvmc.com/anatomy/dna-deoxyribonucleic-acid/.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid), supra note 35.
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid), supra note 35.
46.
Id.
47.
Ian Sample, Gene Editing — and What It Really Means to Rewrite the
Code of Life, GUARDIAN, Jan. 15, 2018 at 10. “Scientists liken it to the find and replace
feature used to correct misspellings in documents written on a computer. Instead of fixing
words, gene editing rewrites DNA, the biological code that makes up the instruction manuals
of living organisms.” Id.
48.
Id.
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speed, cost, accuracy, and efficiency of genome editing.” 49 The history of
the different methods utilized to perform genome editing shows the
remarkable progress scientists have been able to make in the field of genetic
engineering. 50
The earliest technique used for gene editing was a process called
homologous recombination. 51 This method involves “generat[ing] and
isolat[ing] DNA fragments bearing genome sequences similar to the portion
of the genome that is to be edited.” 52 Once these fragments are inside the
cell—typically, by injection—“these DNA fragments can then recombine
with the cell’s DNA to replace the targeted portion of the genome.” 53
However, this type of editing is severely limited in that it is not efficient in
most cell types. 54 Because of this, the success rate of homologous
recombination is extremely poor—it “can have as low as a one-in-a-million
probability of successful editing.” 55 Further, this type of editing is known to
have a high rate of error, as the injection of DNA fragments can be inserted
into “unintended part[s] of the genome.” 56
During the 1990s, scientists created zinc-finger nucleases (“ZFNs”),
which are engineered proteins that are programmed to bind to DNA
sequences. 57 Once binding of the protein to the targeted portion of the DNA
sequence occurs, the ZFNs cut the DNA. 58 This process allowed for two
new possibilities: To delete the faulty DNA or replace the faulty DNA with
a new sequence through homologous recombination. 59
More recently, in 2009, scientists created “a new class of proteins
called Transcription Activator-Like Effector Nucleases (“TALENs”).” 60
TALENs are similar to ZFNs in that they bind to specific sequences of
DNA. 61 The only difference between the two is that TALENs are easier to
engineer than ZFNs. 62
49.
Genome Editing: How Does Genome Editing Work?, NAT’L HUM.
GENOME RES. INST. (Aug. 3, 2017), http://www.genome.gov/27569223/how-does-genomeediting-work/.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
Genome Editing: How Does Genome Editing Work?, supra note 49.
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
Genome Editing: How Does Genome Editing Work?, supra note 49.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
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Now, scientists present the groundbreaking technology we call
CRISPR or more specifically, the CRISPR-Cas9 system. 63 So, how does it
work? 64
With CRISPR, researchers create a short RNA template that
matches a target DNA sequence in the genome. Creating synthetic
RNA sequences is much easier than engineering proteins . . .
required for ZFNs and TALENs. Strands of RNA and DNA can
bind to each other when they have matching sequences. The RNA
portion of the CRISPR, called a guide RNA, directs Cas9 enzyme
to the targeted DNA sequence. Cas9 cuts the genome at this
location to make the edit. CRISPR can make deletions in the
genome and/or be engineered to insert new DNA sequences. 65

C.

Benefits of CRISPR

CRISPR, unlike its predecessors, offers a vast array of improvements
to the genome editing world. 66 “One group of scientists found that CRISPR
is six times more efficient than ZFNs or TALENs in creating targeted
mutations to the genome.” 67 Of CRISPR’s many benefits, a few of the most
noteworthy include the elimination of genetic diseases, cutting down on
major health care costs, high rate of precision and accuracy, and an infinite
supply of organ donors. 68
1.

Elimination of Genetic Diseases

It is no secret that perhaps the most obvious benefit of CRISPR
would be the fact that it has the ability to literally wipe out deadly genetic
diseases. 69
“There are over 600 diseases—like cancer, sickle cell,
Alzheimer’s, Huntington’s, ALS, hemophilia, and many others—that are the
63.
Id.; Sample, supra note 47.
64.
Sample, supra note 47; Genome Editing: How Genome Editing Work?,
supra note 49.
65.
Genome Editing: How Does Genome Editing Work?, supra note 49.
66.
Id.; see also Crutchfield III, supra note 1.
67.
Genome Editing: How Does Genome Editing Work?, supra note 49.
68.
See Pam Belluck, Designer Babies Still Seem Unlikely, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
5, 2017, at A14; Crutchfield III, supra note 1; Cara MacDonald, CRISPR Could Cure Genetic
Diseases,
DAILY
UTAH
CHRON.
(Apr.
10,
2018),
http://www.dailyutahchronicle.com/2018/04/10/crispr-could-cure-genetic-disease/;
Thom
Patterson, Unproven Medical Technique Could Save Countless Lives, Billions of Dollars,
CNN: HEALTH (Oct. 30, 2015, 7:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/30/health/pioneerscrispr-dna-genome-editing/index.html.
69.
See Sample, supra note 47.
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result of defective DNA [and] CRISPR has the potential to prevent and/or
cure them all.” 70 For example, “5.7 million Americans are living with
Alzheimer’s. [And] [b]y 2050, this number is projected to rise to nearly 14
million.” 71 Stated another way, someone is diagnosed with Alzheimer’s
disease in the United States every sixty-five seconds. 72 That is just one of
the diseases that could be eliminated through the use of CRISPR. 73 Imagine
how many United States citizens could benefit from this ground-breaking
technology—the number could easily be in the millions. 74
Not only would CRISPR wipe out the disease from the suffering
individual, but it would also have the ability to stop the disease from being
inherited by future generations. 75 In addition to being able to modify
somatic cells—non-reproductive cells in the body—it would also be possible
to alter germline cells—egg/sperm cells—producing permanent changes
which will be passed down to all future generations.76 For instance, “sicklecell anemia is an autosomal recessive disease, which means that an affected
individual has inherited a defective hemoglobin gene from both parents, so
every one of his or her sets of chromosomes carries [the] defective gene.” 77
It is with scientific certainty then that all offspring of the two parents will be
plagued with the disease. 78 Repair of the germline would rid that family’s
DNA of sickle-cell anemia for good. 79
It is of the utmost importance that scientists use precaution with
germline editing, “but if we [do not] take the first small step—learning how
to modify embryos precisely and reproducibly and implanting them—[we
will] never reach the goal of ridding families of hideous genetic diseases.” 80
2.

Cutting Down on Health Care Expenses

Not only can CRISPR have an effect on individuals and their
families, but the entire nation—meaning even those not suffering from a
70.
Crutchfield III, supra note 1.
71.
Alzheimer’s and Dementia Facts and Figures, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N: FACTS
& FIGURES, http://www.alz.org/alzheimers-dementia/facts-figures (last visited May 1, 2019).
72.
Id.
73.
Crutchfield III, supra note 1.
74.
See id.
75.
Sample, supra note 47.
THERAPY
NET,
76.
Types
of
Gene
Therapy,
GENE
http://www.genetherapynet.com/types-of-gene-therapy (last visited May 1, 2019).
77.
Henry I. Miller, Modification of Embryos Will Someday Treat Hideous
REV.:
CULTURE
(Feb.
2,
2016,
7:34
PM),
Diseases,
NAT’L
http://www.nationalreview.com/2016/02/embryo-gene-modification-disease-treatment/.
78.
Id.
79.
See id.
80.
Id.
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genetic disease—could reap the benefits CRISPR has to offer. 81 It is not
surprising that the United States has become famous for its outrageous overspending on health care. 82 Once again, using Alzheimer’s disease as an
example, “[i]n 2018, Alzheimer’s and other dementias . . . cost the nation
$277 billion [and] by 2050, these costs could rise as high as $1.1 trillion.” 83
The math here is simple—if we eliminate the disease, we eliminate the costs
associated with that disease. 84
3.

High Rate of Precision and Accuracy

One of the obvious concerns with using new technology on humans
is whether the technology is going to be safe and actually function the way it
was intended to function. 85 CRISPR has been said to be the Microsoft Word
of the genetic editing world. 86
“‘Genome editing is a little bit like text editing’ . . . . ‘You place a
cursor where you want it and make local changes in the text [you have]
written. We can go in and place our cursor and make a break at one site in
the DNA—exactly where we want it.’” 87

81.
Sample, supra note 47.
82.
Yoni Blumberg, Here’s the Real Reason Health Care Costs So Much
More in the U.S., CNBC (Mar. 22, 2018, 11:37 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/22/thereal-reason-medical-care-costs-so-much-more-in-the-us.html.

Id.

The [United States] spent 17.8 percent of its GDP on health care in 2016.
Meanwhile, the average spending of [eleven] high-income countries assessed in a
new report published in the Journal of the American Medical Association—Canada,
Germany, Australia, the [United Kingdom], Japan, Sweden, France, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, and the [United States]—was only 11.5
percent.
Per capita, the [United States] spent $9,403. [That is] nearly double
what the others spent.
This finding offers a new explanation as to why America’s spending is
so excessive. According to researchers at the Harvard Chan School, what sets the
[United States] apart may be inflated prices across the board.
In the [United States], they point out, drugs are more expensive.
Doctors get paid more. Hospital services and diagnostic tests cost more. And a lot
more money goes to planning, regulating, and managing medical services at the
administrative level.

83.
Alzheimer’s and Dementia Facts and Figures, supra note 71.
84.
See id.; Crutchfield III, supra note 1.
85.
See Nord, supra note 22.
86.
MacDonald, supra note 68. “It would hypothetically scan the document,
highlight errors, and then correct them.” Id.
87.
Id.
CRISPR uses a natural mechanism in bacteria that functions like a
primitive immune system. It allows scientists to break parts of DNA on
predetermined points so that they can cut areas of DNA with mutations or viruses
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As with any new scientific technology, CRISPR has been tested on
mice and other animals before human testing and the results were nothing
short of astounding. 88 Scientists have treated mosquitos to disable them from
transmitting diseases, such as malaria, and have even treated mice and
monkeys who were once blind, but through CRISPR, are now able to see. 89
Further “[i]n 2017, testing was done to see if the CRISPR-Cas9 gene-editing
method could be used to eliminate [human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”)]
in infected rodents.” 90 After just one treatment, “all traces of infection
[disappeared] from the mouse’s organs and tissue.” 91
Of course, even though CRISPR is praised for its huge
improvements in accuracy and precision, it is not completely error free.92
One of the main worries is that CRISPR may mutate or edit “unintended
parts of the genome.” 93 However, Dr. Gaetan Burgio noted that “these
unintended mutation[s] are likely to have preexisted prior to the injection of
[the] CRISPR system.” 94
4.

Forget the Shortage of Organ Donors

“Currently in the [United States], an average of [twenty-two] people
die each day waiting for organ transplants because of donor shortages . . . .” 95
But with CRISPR, this is yet another statistic that could change drastically. 96
Instead of twenty-two people dying per day while awaiting an organ for
transplant, imagine if that number were zero.97

Id.

and then edit it. When CRISPR senses a virus invading, it can attack and cut up its
DNA.

88.
See Crutchfield III, supra note 1.
89.
Id.
90.
Alexandra Perry, The Billion-Dollar Industry I Found on YouTube,
ENERGY & CAP. (Jan. 25, 2018, 7:00 PM), http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/thebillion-dollar-industry-i-found-on-youtube.
91.
Id.
92.
Teodora Zareva, CRISPR May Cause Hundreds of Unintended Mutations
(June
4,
2017),
into
the
Genome,
New
Study
Finds,
BIG THINK
http://www.bigthink.com/design-for-good/new-study-finds-that-crispr-may-cause-hundredsof-unintended-mutations-into-the-genome.
93.
Id.
94.
Id. (quoting Paul Knoepfler, Journal Club Review of New CRISPR “Lots
(May
31,
2017),
of
Off-Target
Activity”
Mouse
Paper,
NICHE
http://www.ipscell.com/2017/05/journal-club-review-of-new-crispr-lots-of-off-target-activitymouse-paper/).
95.
Patterson, supra note 68.
96.
Id.
97.
See id.
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Researchers are now looking to pigs as the newest type of organ
donor. 98 They may not look like us but “their organs and ours are very much
alike.” 99 Specifically, the heart, liver, and kidneys have proven to function
similarly to that of humans and are roughly the same size. 100 A doctor in
Massachusetts has opined that pig organs are a real potential replacement for
almost all human internal organs. 101 “Theoretically, CRISPR-Cas9 could
manipulate the pig genes so human bodies [would not] reject them
[ultimately resulting in] no shortage of available donor organs.” 102
D.

Legitimate Concerns

With such advanced technology, there are inevitably going to be
concerns. 103 While there are legitimate concerns and risks associated with
CRISPR, there are logical ways to address them. 104 After all, sometimes
“[t]he biggest risk is not taking any risk [at all].” 105 The key is to take
intelligent risks. 106
1.

Freewheeling Biohackers

One of the concerns being voiced is that because CRISPR is easier
and cheaper to use than ZFNs or TALENs, it creates room for biohackers. 107
Biohackers are those who are not trained or educated in the field of science,
but who believe, nonetheless, that they can use highly advanced
98.
Pigs May Be Future Organ Donors, ABC NEWS (Aug. 23, 2001),
http://www.abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=130708&page=1.
99.
Id.
100.
Id.; Patterson, supra note 68.
101.
Pigs May Be Future Organ Donors, supra note 98. “‘The heart is very
similar, the kidneys are very similar, their function is very similar,’ says Dr. David Sachs of
Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston. ‘So it really is a potential donor for almost all of
the internal organs.’” Id.
102.
Patterson, supra note 68.
103.
See MacDonald, supra note 68.
104.
Id.
105.
Salim Ismail, 3 Ways Companies Can Encourage Smart Risk Taking,
GROWTH
STRATEGIES
(Oct.
16,
2014),
ENTREPRENEUR:
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/238543.
106.
Id. Overall, “we need to figure out how to balance the risks and potential
rewards of gene editing . . . a meticulous, professional scientist with freewheeling biohackers .
. . practical applications with wild theories; best case scenarios like ending malaria with
catastrophic prophesies of thirty-foot wolves.” Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Gene
Editing (HBO television broadcast July 1, 2018).
107.
See Carmen Russo, John Oliver Thinks We Need to Stop Freaking Out
CULTURE
(July
2,
2018,
1:44
PM),
About
Gene
Editing,
SLATE:
http://slate.com/culture/2018/07/last-week-tonights-john-oliver-on-gene-editing.html.
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technology. 108 CRISPR is so affordable that biohackers could begin
collecting the supplies needed to operate the CRISPR gene editing
technology and start selling these kits for large-scale public access. 109 In
fact, it is already happening. 110 One of these freewheeling biohackers, Josiah
Zayner, sells do-it-yourself CRISPR kits out of his garage in the state of
California. 111 Mr. Zayner has compared the use of this gene editing
technology to downloading an app. 112 Mr. Zayner then asks the following
hypothetical question: “Why [cannot] people use this technology without
necessarily completely knowing how it works?” 113 While most can easily
see the obvious problem with this convoluted line of thinking, there will
always be those who are metaphorically blind to the magnitude of the effects
that can come from reckless self-experimentation. 114
2.

Designer Babies

Another popular concern is that more and more people will begin to
use this technology to create designer babies. 115 “But there are good reasons
to think that these fears are closer to science fiction than they are to
science.” 116 Although it is possible to alter simple traits with CRISPR,
parents have had “the ability to select their child’s sex, eye color, hair color,
and skin complexion with preimplantation genetic diagnosis” for years; this
is nothing new. 117

note 106.

108.

Id.; see also Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Gene Editing, supra

109.
Russo, supra note 107; see also Last Week Tonight with John Oliver:
Gene Editing, supra note 106.
110.
Russo, supra note 107; see also Last Week Tonight with John Oliver:
Gene Editing, supra note 106.
111.
Russo, supra note 107; see also Last Week Tonight with John Oliver:
Gene Editing, supra note 106.
112.
Russo, supra note 107; see also Last Week Tonight with John Oliver:
Gene Editing, supra note 106.
113.
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Gene Editing, supra note 106. Mr.
Zayner went on to further say, “I want to live in a world where people get drunk and instead
of giving themselves tattoos, they’re like ‘I’m drunk, I’m going to CRISPR myself.’” Id.
Although a ludicrous and quite frankly scary statement, this should not inhibit us from moving
forward with technology that could save the lives of so many. See id.
114.
See id.
115.
Bailey Kirkpatrick, Cut Out the Hype: Gene Editing with CRISPR and the
Truth About Superhuman Designer Babies, WHATISEPIGENETICS.COM (Feb. 28, 2017),
http://www.whatisepigenetics.com/gene-editing-crispr-cas9-designer-babies/; see also Russo,
supra note 107; Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Gene Editing, supra note 106.
116.
Belluck, supra note 68.
117.
Kirkpatrick, supra note 115.
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The main fear then becomes whether we can control more “complex
traits such as intelligence, personality, or temperament.” 118 For example,
could parents custom-order a baby with Usain Bolt’s speed or Beyonce’s
vocal range? 119 The answer is simply no because the diseases which
CRISPR was made to cure are defects appearing on a single gene or
sometimes “an easily identifiable number of genes.” 120 Conversely, a
person’s intelligence, personality, or other special skill arises from an
incalculable number of genes. 121 Not only are traits such as personality and
temperament controlled by a myriad of genes, but in addition, these traits are
molded by our environments and by personal experiences. 122 Thus, scientists
are nowhere near being able to alter and predetermine such complex traits.123
3.

What Constitutes a Genetic Problem That Needs Fixing?

Lastly, there is another more complicated issue that is causing
growing concern. 124 CRISPR’s whole platform centers around the fact that,
with this new technology, we can fix and even eliminate genetic problems
that cause diseases. 125 But “who decides what constitutes a genetic problem
that needs to be fixed?” 126 For example, is deafness considered a disease? 127
Or dwarfism? 128 There are some people who might think so, but many with

118.
119.
120.

Id.

Id.
Belluck, supra note 68.
Id.

Here is what researchers did: [R]epair a single gene mutation on a
single gene, a defect known to cause—by its lonesome—a serious, sometimes fatal,
heart disease.
Here is what science is highly unlikely to be able to do: [G]enetically
predestine a child’s Ivy League acceptance letter, front-load a kid with Stephen
Colbert’s one-liners, or bake Beyonce’s vocal range into a baby.

121.
See id. “Even with an apparently straightforward physical characteristic
like height, genetic manipulation would be a tall order. Some scientists estimate height is
influenced by as many as 93,000 genetic variations.” Id.
122.
Kirkpatrick, supra note 115.
123.
See Belluck, supra note 68.
124.
See Russo, supra note 107; Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Gene
Editing, supra note 106.
125.
See CRISPR/Cas9, supra note 4.
126.
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Gene Editing, supra note 106.
127.
Russo, supra note 107; see also Last Week Tonight with John Oliver:
Gene Editing, supra note 106.
128.
Russo, supra note 107; see also Last Week Tonight with John Oliver:
Gene Editing, supra note 106.
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such conditions do not. 129 This is a subjective concept which creates a vast
gray area. 130
Consider the following factual scenario: A young boy named Martin
is an albino, meaning “his genes do not give the right instructions for his
body’s production of pigment, the dye that colors the skin, eyes, and hair.” 131
As a result, Martin was born with extremely pale skin and “is at high risk of
sunburn and skin cancer” when exposed to sunlight. 132 In addition, his light
eyes cause poor vision and harsh light can hurt his eyes. 133 Consider also the
fact that Martin’s mother is worried about him because he is bullied at school
by other children in his class for his skin color and hair color. 134 If genetic
treatment is made readily available to Martin to produce the average amount
of pigmentation in his skin, should he have the treatment? 135 “In other words
[is] . . . being albino . . . a medical problem that needs fixing? Or . . . is [it]
more along the lines of a nose job or face-lift—something nice, but not
necessary?” 136 And what about the choice Martin’s mother may have to
make? 137 “If she loves Martin the way he is, how does she explain a decision
to have him treated? But if he is unhappy with the way he is, how does she
explain a decision not to treat him?” 138 These are difficult questions because
there is technically no correct answer as everyone may have a different
opinion on the issue. 139
III.

THE CURRENT FDA BAN ON CRISPR HUMAN TRIALS IN THE
UNITED STATES

In December 2017, CRISPR Therapeutics officially announced their
merger with a biotech company called Vertex. 140 Through their partnership,
the two companies produced the CTX001—a special version of CRISPR—to
treat sickle-cell patients. 141 As with all forms of genetic treatment, CRISPR
129.
See Russo, supra note 107; Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Gene
Editing, supra note 106.
130.
See Russo, supra note 107; Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Gene
Editing, supra note 106.
131.
CATHERINE BAKER, YOUR GENES, YOUR CHOICES: EXPLORING THE ISSUES
RAISED BY GENETIC RESEARCH 12 (1999).
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Id. at 9.
135.
See id. at 12.
136.
BAKER, supra note 131, at 12.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
See id. at 13.
140.
Houser, supra note 13.
141.
Id.
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and Vertex collectively sought approval from the FDA to move forward with
human trials with consenting adult volunteers. 142 However, after review, the
FDA denied the request, “placing a clinical hold on the application.” 143
According to a recent press release held by CRISPR Therapeutics, the FDA
has expressed certain questions with regard to CRISPR technology and will
not permit the company to proceed with testing on humans. 144
A.

Has CRISPR Been Tested in Other Countries?

China has been conducting human trials for several years now—
making China the first country in the world to conduct human trials with
CRISPR technology. 145 Dr. Shixiu Wu, head of the Hangzhou Cancer
Hospital located in China, is perhaps one of the doctors most heavily
associated with the use of CRISPR. 146 Dr. Wu treats many patients with
advanced esophageal cancer—one of the most common forms of cancer in
China. 147 Typically, Dr. Wu treats his patients in the ways that most of us
are probably familiar with, such as chemotherapy and radiation treatments. 148
In one case, Dr. Wu treated a fifty-three year old man suffering from
advanced esophageal cancer through many rounds of chemotherapy and
radiation, but the cancer just kept spreading. 149 Upon the suggestion of
CRISPR, Dr. Wu’s patient expressed interest in this form of experimental
treatment. 150 Dr. Wu then explained that the process—called T-cell
infusion—would involve “using cells from [the patient’s] own immune
system, known as T-cells, after they ha[d] been taken out of his body and
genetically altered in a lab by the gene-editing tool called CRISPR.” 151 The
cells are modified “so that they zero in on and attack the cancer cells once
[they are] infused back into each patient”—basically instructing the immune

142.
Id.; What Is Gene Therapy?, FDA: VACCINES, BLOOD & BIOLOGICS (July
25, 2018), http://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/cellular-gene-therapy-products/whatgene-therapy.
143.
Houser, supra note 13.
144.
Id.
145.
Kristen V. Brown, China Has Already Gene-Edited 86 People with
CRISPR, GIZMODO: GENETICS (Jan. 22, 2018, 1:00 PM), http://www.gizmodo.com/china-hasalready-gene-edited-86-people-with-crispr-1822297524; Nord, supra note 22.
146.
See Rob Stein, Doctors in China Lead Race to Treat Cancer by Editing
Genes, NPR (Feb. 21, 2018, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/02/21/585336506/doctors-in-china-lead-race-to-treat-cancer-by-editing-genes.
147.
Id.; Nord, supra note 22.
148.
Nord, supra note 22.
149.
Stein, supra note 146.
150.
See id.
151.
Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2019

97

Nova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 1

192

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

system to attack the malignant cancerous cells.152 After preparation of the Tcells was complete, the patient was intravenously infused with “millions of
genetically modified immune system cells” which flowed into his veins for
about an hour. 153 After his very first infusion, the patient reported feeling a
bit weak initially, but feeling better and feeling very stable soon after. 154
Although Dr. Wu is still treating this patient, Dr. Wu remarked that another
one of his patients has been doing well after almost a full year of CRISPR
treatments. 155 Although one of Dr. Wu’s patients decided to discontinue
with CRISPR treatments after experiencing a high fever, “[t]he rest appear to
be stable or in partial remission [after] . . . undergoing monthly
treatments.” 156 Dr. Wu reports that a total of nine patients have died in the
study, “but Wu says that was from their cancer, not the [CRISPR]
treatment.” 157
“So far, [twenty-one] patients have participated in the trials [and]
[t]he efficiency was about [forty] percent.” 158 At first glance, forty percent
does not seem like a very high success rate, but the fact is that forty percent
is significantly better than zero percent.159
B.

Why the FDA Should Allow Human Trials in the United States

Although it is important to have a cautious gatekeeper in place,
“[t]he FDA is commonly viewed as a roadblock.” 160 “Patients are looking
for answers. Biotech is looking for big bucks. Both oppose regulation.” 161
While it is no doubt imperative to ensure medical technology is not harming
individuals, the question boils down to whether competent and informed
adults should be able to subject themselves to risk. 162

152.
Id.
153.
Id.
154.
Stein, supra note 146.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
Id.
158.
Nord, supra note 22.
159.
See id.
160.
Megan Molteni, China Used CRISPR to Fight Cancer in a Real, Live
Human, WIRED: SCI. (Nov. 18, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2016/11/china-usedcrispr-fight-cancer-real-live-human/.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
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Many of Those with Genetic Diseases Are Out of Options

“Clinical research attempts to address a relatively straightforward,
and extremely important challenge: [H]ow do we determine whether one
medical invention is better than another, whether it offers greater clinical
benefit and/or poses fewer risks?” 163 CRISPR is now at the stage where it
requires testing with real, live humans. 164 Human testing of any kind poses
some kind of risk to the patient “no matter how many laboratory and animal
tests have preceded them.” 165 Herein lies the ethical dilemma: When does it
become permissible to expose living, breathing human beings to a risk of
harm to further medical research? 166
With medical devices like CRISPR, scientists and medical providers
“should be permitted to conduct research and expose subjects to risks
provided they obtain [the] subjects’ ‘free, voluntary, and undeceived consent
and participation.’” 167 Yet, the FDA does not regard the notion of informed
consent as a sufficient basis for human testing. 168 Are the FDA’s limitations
“justified, or are they inappropriate infringements on the free actions of
competent individuals” who have otherwise run out of options? 169
Looking at the twenty-one patients who have undergone CRISPR
treatments in China, it is easy to see why the country allowed such treatment
and why patients were voluntarily subjecting themselves to serve as guinea
pigs of the new technology. 170 Every single one of those patients was
suffering from an advanced stage of cancer and had already tried surgery,
chemotherapy, and radiation to no avail. 171 After exhausting all other
methods of killing the cancer cells, these patients would ultimately be told
there is nothing further doctors can do. 172 If not for CRISPR, these patients
would be out of options and would live each day knowing it could be their
last. 173
The bottom line is that most of the ethical concerns that arise from
exposure of humans to CRISPR are shattered when the patient, if of age and
163.
David Wendler, The Ethics of Clinical Research, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (Feb. 27, 2017), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/clinical-research/.
164.
See Houser, supra note 13.
165.
Wendler, supra note 163.
166.
Id.
167.
Id. (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 16 (Currin V. Shields ed.,
The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1956) (1859)).
168.
See id.; What We Do, supra note 27.
169.
Wendler, supra note 163; What We Do, supra note 27.
170.
See Nord, supra note 22.
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
See id.
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standard mental competence, cannot be helped by any other form of
treatment. 174
2.

But What About These Products?
a.

Big Tobacco

Imagine if every product with harmful qualities were regulated in the
same way as CRISPR. 175 The United States is proceeding with the utmost
caution in allowing CRISPR human trials, yet we allow products like
cigarettes to be sold to the general public every day. 176 “Causing more than
480,000 deaths each year in the United States, smoking is the leading
preventable cause of death in the United States.” 177 Smoking damages
almost every organ in the human body and contributes to serious health
issues such as stroke, heart disease, and, of course, lung cancer. 178 Not only
is smoking responsible for causing lung cancer, but it can cause just about
any type of cancer imaginable. 179 “If nobody smoked, one in every three
cancer deaths in the United States would not occur.” 180
Perhaps even more troubling is the lengthy and frightening list of
chemicals found in cigarettes. 181 “[O]f the [ninety-three] known harmful . . .
chemicals [found] in cigarettes,” a few particularly troublesome chemicals
include: Nicotine, cadmium, lead, acetaldehyde, benzene, ammonia, and
carbon monoxide. 182 These chemicals—many of which are known to be
deadly—are contained in each and every cigarette. 183 This is what our
governmental regulatory agencies are allowing to be ingested by United
States citizens every day. 184

174.
See id.
175.
See Nord, supra note 22.
176.
See Houser, supra note 13; Effects of Tobacco, supra note 28.
177.
Effects of Tobacco, supra note 28.
178.
Id.
179.
Id. “Such areas include (but are not limited to): [T]he bladder,
bloodstream, cervix, colon, rectum, esophagus, kidney, ureter, larynx, liver, oropharynx,
pancreas, stomach, trachea, bronchus, and lung.” Id.
180.
Id.
181.
Chemicals in Cigarettes: From Plant to Product to Puff, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/products-ingredients-components/chemicals-cigarettesplant-product-puff (last visited May 1, 2019).
182.
Id.
183.
USFoodandDrugAdmin, Chemicals in Every Puff of Cigarette Smoke —
(Feb.
13,
2017),
Combustion
Stage,
YOUTUBE
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EXdxl0yH904.
184.
See What We Do, supra note 27.
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One of the common reservations with regard to tobacco litigation is:
Why should individuals be suing tobacco companies when they are
knowingly and willfully smoking cigarettes that have proven to be directly
linked to causing lung cancer—that was their choice, right? 185 In this day
and age, when all of this data has been made available to the public, that is
certainly a valid question. 186 And it is this very same logic that should be
used when we evaluate tools like CRISPR. 187 With genetic counseling, and
all that is known thus far about CRISPR, individuals can make informed
decisions about whether they wish to proceed with the new form of treatment
or keep exploring other options. 188
One of the reasons tobacco companies are able to continuously
market and sell their deadly product is because of how the FDA’s regulatory
framework is structured. 189 Interestingly, the intent of the manufacturer
determines whether the FDA will have jurisdiction over a given product. 190
Where a manufacturer intends for a product to affect the human body in
structure or function, it will be labeled a drug or device that is subject to
FDA regulation. 191 For example, CRISPR Therapeutics claims their product
can eliminate genetic diseases through the mutation or alteration of genes—
making it subject to FDA authority. 192 The FDA proclaims that their goal is
to protect the health and safety of the public by guaranteeing that drugs and
devices are safe and effective for their intended use. 193 While it is true that
tobacco companies generally do not make therapeutic claims regarding their
products, cigarettes certainly have an effect on the structure and function of
the human body—a largely negative one at that.194 Nicotine should certainly

185.
Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44
STAN. L. REV. 853, 871 (1992); Effects of Tobacco, supra note 28.
186.
See Effects of Tobacco, supra note 28. However, that is not a valid
question for plaintiffs who qualify for class certification and have standing in regard to the
Engle progeny cases. Engle v. Liggett Grp., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1267 (Fla. 2006).
187.
See Genome Editing: What Is Genome Editing?, supra note 34.
188.
See id.; Crutchfield III, supra note 1; Houser, supra note 13.
189.
See Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 238–39 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Daniel F. Hardin, Blowing Electronic Smoke: Electronic Cigarettes, Regulation,
and Protecting the Public Health, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 433, 439.
190.
Hardin, supra note 189, at 439; see also 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2012).
191.
Hardin, supra note 189, at 439; see also 21 U.S.C. § 321.
192.
CRISPR/Cas9, supra note 4; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000), superseded by statute, Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (quoting 21 U.S.C. §
321(g)–(h)).
193.
What We Do, supra note 27.
194.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 155; Effects of Tobacco,
supra note 28.
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qualify as a drug since it has been proven time and time again to have potent,
addictive qualities. 195
In 1996, however, the FDA did attempt to regulate cigarettes on the
grounds that cigarettes are both a drug and a device because they deliver
exact and controlled amounts of nicotine to the body to sustain addiction. 196
In the famous case, FDA v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., 197 the
Supreme Court of the United States found that the FDA was precluded from
regulating tobacco products. 198 The Supreme Court held that if the FDA
were to have jurisdiction over tobacco products, they would be banned from
the market as “no measures the agency could take would make tobacco
products safe for human use.” 199 “The Court reasoned Congress favored
informing consumers about adverse health risks of tobacco use over harming
the nation’s economy through an outright ban of tobacco.” 200
In applying this to CRISPR, there is no doubt that CRISPR makes a
therapeutic claim and, thus, constitutes a medical device subject to FDA
jurisdiction. 201 But what kind of message does it send to allow billions of
cigarettes to be sold every day with the knowledge that the FDA would ban
them in a heartbeat if they were in the driver’s seat of tobacco’s
marketability? 202 Perhaps the answer is that the blood of the United States
runs green with greed. 203 If there were as big a desire to help one another as

195.
The Top 5 Most Addictive Drugs in the World, RECOVERY FIRST,
http://www.recoveryfirst.org/drug-abuse/most-addictive-drugs/ (last updated June 6, 2016).
Ranking in at number three, “[n]icotine is considered one of the most addictive substances in
the world.” Id.

Id.

Part of the reason nicotine is so addictive is that this stimulant decreases
appetite, boosts mood, and increases heart rate, blood pressure, and alertness.
However, it has a very short life span in the bloodstream, with users typically
feeling cravings for nicotine after [two to three] hours. This craving often includes
psychological symptoms like anxiety [or] depression, along with headaches or
restlessness.

196.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 127.
197.
529 U.S. 120 (2000).
198.
Id. at 133.
199.
Hardin, supra note 189, at 440 (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. at 135–36) (discussing the FDA’s failed attempt to regulate traditional
tobacco).
200.
Id. at 440–41; see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at
138–39.
201.
See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)–(h); Crutchfield III, supra note 1; What We Do,
supra note 27.
202.
See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 135–36; Hardin,
supra note 189, at 440–41.
203.
See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 138–39; Hardin,
supra note 189, at 440–41.
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there is to make a profit, maybe CRISPR would already be doing away with
genetic diseases. 204
b.

Even the Widely Used Chemotherapy

Another harmful product used on a daily basis is chemotherapy—
conceivably the most commonly used and well-known cancer treatment
available. 205 “[C]hemotherapy refers to the drugs that prevent cancer cells
from dividing and growing. It does this by killing the dividing cells.” 206 In
essence, the combination of drugs used in chemotherapy will:
[I]mpair mitosis, or prevent cell division . . . ;
[T]arget the cancer cells’ food source, which consists of the
enzymes and hormones they need to grow;
[T]rigger the suicide of cancer cells, known medically as
apoptosis; [and]
[S]top the growth of new blood vessels that supply a tumor in
order to starve it. 207

Given this wide array of functions, it is not surprising that
chemotherapy comes with a long list of side effects and reaching the
remission stage is not always guaranteed. 208 Most are aware of the common
and almost inevitable side effects of chemotherapy—nausea, vomiting,
alopecia (hair loss), fatigue, and anemia. 209
But what about the effects of chemotherapy that are not so
common? 210 “Back in September 2004, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (“CDC”) and the National Institute for Occupational Safety &
Health (“NIOSH”) . . . warned that working with chemotherapy drugs and
other common pharmaceuticals can be a serious danger to your health.” 211
Ironically, “one of the effects of chemotherapy is that it actually [causes]
204.
See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 139; Crutchfield III,
supra note 1.
205.
See Nordqvist, supra note 27.
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
208.
See id.
209.
Id.
210.
See Ty Bollinger, The Truth About Chemotherapy — Toxic Poison or
ABOUT
CANCER
(May
5,
2015),
Cancer
Cure?,
TRUTH
http://www.thetruthaboutcancer.com/truth-about-chemotherapy/.
211.
Id.
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cancer!” 212 Further, numerous chemical specialists are of the opinion that in
reality, chemotherapy does much more harm than it does good. 213 “The truth
is that chemo is toxic, carcinogenic (causes cancer), destroys erythrocytes
(red blood cells), devastates the immune system, and destroys vital
organs.” 214
Chemotherapy, as we know, can have catastrophic side effects; in
comparison, CRISPR’s are minimal. 215 Looking at the human trials
performed in China, Dr. Wu has said “the only side effects have been mostly
minor—an occasional fever or rash.” 216 Just like chemotherapy has proven,
the mere fact that a drug produces side effects does not automatically bar it
from FDA approval. 217 “[E]very new therapy has some potential [for] side
effects—[the key is], we need to be aware of what they are.” 218
C.

Is This Big Pharma at Play?

Imagine if you had the power to change the world—to rid it of
disease, to save millions, to ease someone else’s pain and suffering—all
while earning a profit. 219 If you were to start up a pharmaceutical
conglomerate, this is likely what your end goal would look like. 220 Initially,
you plan to use your company for good and you truly desire to help the
212.
Id.
213.
Id. “Dr. Alan C. Nixon, past president of the American Chemical Society
writes, ‘As a chemist trained to interpret data, it is incomprehensible to me that physicians can
ignore the clear evidence that chemotherapy does much, much more harm than good.’” Id.
214.
Bollinger, supra note 210. “The serious toxic effects of chemotherapy
have long been ignored by virtually everyone in medicine and the federal government.
Chemotherapy drugs have always been assumed to be safe just because [they are] used to treat
cancer. This is an outright lie.” Id.
215.
See id.; Nord, supra note 22. Dr. Wu stated that “although [he has] only
used the technology on a small number of people, it appears much safer than traditional
chemotherapy.” Nord, supra note 22.
216.
Stein, supra note 146.
217.
See Bollinger, supra note 210; Nordqvist, supra note 27.
218.
Zareva, supra note 92.
Chemotherapy is an invasive treatment that can have severe adverse effects. This is
because the drugs often target not only cancerous cells but also healthy cells. The
adverse effects can be worrying, but given early, chemotherapy can in some cases
achieve a complete cure, making the side effects bearable for many patients. It is
important that patients know what to expect before starting treatment.

Nordqvist, supra note 27. Sound familiar?* This is the exact premise that should be used
when discussing the administration of CRISPR to human patients. See id.
219.
BIG PHARMA, http://www.bigpharmagame.com (last visited May 1, 2019).
Video game inventors even made an online game called Big Pharma with the slogan,
“Marketing and Malpractice is the brand new expansion for Big Pharma. . . . [You have]
created your wonder drug, now it is time to sell, sell, sell.” Id.
220.
See id.
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human race. 221 But the uncomfortable truth is that “illness is good for
business.” 222 This is the world of Big Pharma. 223
Big Pharma is often used to describe “massive pharmaceutical
companies that make literally billions of dollars every year to keep
Americans regularly supplied with a medicine cabinet’s worth of pills.” 224
So how do these pharmaceutical companies have an influence on
CRISPR? 225
Due to their extremely high profit margins, Big Pharma has some
pretty deep pockets and “[w]ith those pockets comes a strong hand of
political and legislative influence.” 226 Even though the FDA has been
instituting massive fines, Big Pharma companies are significant contributors
to the FDA’s budget, thus “leading to concerns of conflicts of interest and
outright bribery.” 227 For these reasons, the pharmaceutical industry is now
being referred to as America’s new mafia. 228
Big Pharma has raised a lot of eyebrows for the money it
can throw at doctors and legislators, but perhaps the most serious
effect it has had on American healthcare is the epidemic of the
overprescription of powerfully addictive drugs . . . The United
States makes up only [five] percent of the world’s population but
consumes [eighty] percent of the painkillers in the world. 229

Pharmaceutical companies, theoretically, are “meant to write
themselves out of the equation. True success—a world without disease—
would also mean a world without drugs and a world without
pharmaceuticals.” 230 But when pharmaceutical companies are successful in

DESERT
2016).

221.
See id.
222.
Id.
223.
BIG PHARMA, supra note 219.
224.
Who Are the Players in the Pharmaceutical Industry (Big Pharma)?,
HOPE, http://www.deserthopetreatment.com/big-pharma/ (last updated Nov. 28,

225.
See id.
226.
Id.
227.
Id.
228.
Id.
229.
Who Are the Players in the Pharmaceutical Industry (Big Pharma)?,
supra note 223. “A 2011 survey conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation revealed that
Americans aged [nineteen through sixty-four] were prescribed an average of 11.9
prescriptions, and Americans [sixty-five] and up received an average of [twenty-eight]
prescriptions.” Id.
230.
Elizabeth Balboa, Curing Disease Is Bad for Business: How Do Big
Pharma Companies Continue Their Growth?, BENZINGA (Feb. 14, 2017, 8:55 AM),
http://www.benzinga.com/general/biotech/17/02/9017199/curing-disease-is-bad-for-businesshow-do-big-pharma-companies-continu.
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actually curing patients, they no longer have a purpose, “and the market
responds to that lost purpose by withdrawing investments.” 231 Adam
Feuerstein, a national biotech columnist, made a Twitter post stating:
“Perhaps the awful, brutally honest lesson here is: Curing disease is great for
patients but sucks for business.” 232 This is the premise behind Big Pharma—
“[s]uccess is not always profitable in the pharmaceutical industry, and [it is]
this perspective [that has] fueled numerous conspiracy theories . . . about
drug companies intentionally missing their marks.” 233
Although CRISPR does not have the ability to cure every disease, it
could potentially cure some of health care’s most expensive treatments—
HIV, cancers, and Alzheimer’s. 234 As mentioned previously, Alzheimer’s
disease—along with other forms of dementia—“will cost the nation $277
billion [and] by 2050, these costs could rise as high as $1.1 trillion.” 235
“[That is] why Bloomberg is calling CRISPR-Cas9 ‘the discovery of the
century’ and Science magazine is calling it ‘the breakthrough of the
year.’” 236
On the one hand, CRISPR could shatter the conspiracy theory behind
Big Pharma. 237 Pharmaceutical companies may not be the biggest advocates
of CRISPR since CRISPR could have the potential to disrupt their trilliondollar industry; curing so many diseases might just be bad for business. 238
231.
Id.
232.
Adam Feuerstein (@adamfeuerstein), TWITTER (Feb. 7, 2017, 6:18 PM),
http://twitter.com/adamfeuerstein/status/829152296764395520; Adam Feuerstein, STAT,
http://statnews.com/staff/adam-feuerstein/ (last visited May 1, 2019). One stock market
trader, Dennis Dick, said “[t]he bottom line here is: [D]on’t make your drugs so effective . . . .
[That is] a sad world we live in when capitalism is going to punish a stock because their drugs
are too effective.” Balboa, supra note 230.
233.
Id. “Some wonder if pharmaceuticals announce just enough progress to
draw in funds while maintaining a safe distance from cure-driven obsolescence.” Id.
234.
Perry, supra note 90.
235.
Alzheimer’s and Dementia Facts and Figures, supra note 71.
In the United States, an average of $173 billion is spent every year on cancer
research. Heart disease treatment costs another $200 million annually. Then there
is diabetes, which is on the rise and costs Americans $245 billion annually. Those
are some big numbers, and they [are not] even the worst. Alzheimer’s, one of the
scariest diseases to any aging human—which is all of us—costs Americans $259
billion a year! When you do the math, that means just four diseases are raking up a
$1 trillion medical bill. And [that is] just the big boys. Imagine the costs that come
with genetic diseases that appear at birth—diseases that parents will pay for
throughout their child’s adolescence. Then when that child becomes an adult, they
will inherit the costs of a disease they never wanted and [could not] fight. But with
CRISPR-Cas9, that could end. In our current war against disease, [it is] Big
Pharma that rakes in the dough.

Perry, supra note 90.
236.
Id.
237.
See id.; Balboa, supra note 230.
238.
See Perry, supra note 90.
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On the other hand, CRISPR might open up a brand new realm of income that
Big Pharma might want in on. 239 The still young industry surrounding the
CRISPR-Cas9 system “could form the foundation of a billion-dollar geneediting industry.” 240
IV.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated throughout this Comment, CRISPR has massive
medicinal potential. 241 CRISPR has the ability to rid the world of deadly
genetic diseases, make real changes in the cost of healthcare in the United
States, make stellar improvements to the accuracy and precision of genetic
editing, and even eliminate the growing need for organ donors. 242 Although
the legitimate concerns expressed should not be taken lightly, many of those
concerns “are closer to science fiction than they are to science.” 243
Further, there is a lot to learn from the country that has been testing
CRISPR on humans for years now. 244 This is not to say that the FDA should
not keep doing its job; however, when looking at the drugs and devices that
are allowed on the market today, the fact that CRISPR is not allowed leaves
room for serious questions. 245 Is the FDA really the ethical gatekeeper it
presents itself to be? 246 Or is it actually persuaded by profit? 247 With
tobacco products and chemotherapy in heavy use in this country, and Big
Pharma’s influence, the latter seems to be the winning answer. 248
“Hopefully, CRISPR Therapeutics and Vertex are able to answer the
FDA’s questions in a way that promotes confidence in the treatment.” 249
While it is important to keep in mind that we are exploring uncharted
territory and certainly should proceed with caution, the truth is that millions
of people throughout the United States, as well as the rest of the world, suffer
from diseases that could be cured by CRISPR technology. 250
239.
See id.
240.
Id.
241.
Crutchfield III, supra note 1.
242.
Id.; MacDonald, supra note 68; Patterson, supra note 68.
243.
Belluck, supra note 68.
244.
See Molteni, supra note 160; Stein, supra note 146.
245.
See Hardin, supra note 189, at 439, 449; Molteni, supra note 160; Stein,
supra note 146.
246.
See Molteni, supra note 160.
247.
See Who Are the Players in the Pharmaceutical Industry (Big Pharma)?,
supra note 224.
248.
See id.; Balboa, supra note 230; Bollinger, supra note 210; Effects of
Tobacco, supra note 28.
249.
Houser, supra note 13.
250.
Id.; see also Crutchfield III, supra note 1.
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One thing is clear—CRISPR could change the world. 251 The only
question that remains is: When will the United States give it the chance? 252

251.
Crutchfield III, supra note 1; see also Houser, supra note 13.
252.
See Houser, supra note 13. Just one month after the submission of this
Comment, the United States made the decision to sponsor the first CRISPR human trial.
Catherine Offord, US Companies Launch CRISPR Clinical Trial, THESCIENTIST (Sept. 3,
2018), http://www.the-scientist.com/news-opinion/us-companies-launch-crispr-clinical-trial64746. “Although the study itself is to be carried out in a hospital in Germany, it marks the
first clinical trial of CRISPR genome-editing technology to be sponsored by [United States]
companies, Boston based Vertex Pharmaceuticals and CRISPR Therapeutics, a Swiss
biopharmaceutical [company] with labs in Cambridge, Massachusetts.” Id. These companies
will “jointly launch[] a trial of an experimental CRISPR-Cas9 therapy for the blood disorder
ß-thalassemia, according to [an] announcement posted Friday, August 31, [2018].” Id.
CRISPR Therapeutics [Chief Executive Officer], Samantha Kulkarni, stated, “Just three years
ago we were talking about CRISPR-based treatment as a sci-fi fantasy . . . But here we are.”
Id.
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INTRODUCTION

Nothing seems to sell a story more than a good scandal. 1 The siren
call of celebrity gossip manages to lure the everyday Joe Shmoe and Jane
Doe into clicking the latest TMZ article or video on their social media feed,
picking up a crumpled US Weekly at the doctor’s office, or for the more
open-minded, flipping through the National Enquirer to investigate the latest
appearance of Big Foot. 2 “Our appetite for celebrity gossip is . . . insatiable”
and we particularly crave two things: Fame and bad news. 3 That is why it is
no surprise that the bombshell of #MeToo took the world by storm in late
2017. 4 The #MeToo movement generated story after story of the careerending malfeasance committed by our most beloved celebrities and public
figures, in addition to reports of the steep financial consequences endured by
Hollywood’s studios, production companies, and distributors. 5 Soon, a mere
social media hashtag instilled fear into the hearts of prominent male
celebrities once thought to be untouchable. 6 The upper echelon of
Hollywood took notice and scrambled for a means to distance themselves
from toxic talent and terminate their existing contracts. 7 However, absent
breaching a contract illegally, many Hollywood companies did not have the
legal means to end these agreements and, subsequently, lost millions of
dollars. 8 As a solution to their woes, Hollywood is now considering the
morals clause, a heavily-negotiated provision in a talent agreement that
allows for the termination of said agreement under certain circumstances. 9
The consideration of morals clauses in the wake of the #MeToo
movement is not a surprise. 10 These contractual provisions have become
1.
Dana Dovey, Rumor Has It: The Science Behind Why We Love Celebrity
Gossip and Tabloid Magazines, MED. DAILY (Nov. 24, 2015, 9:00 AM),
http://www.medicaldaily.com/rumor-has-it-science-behind-why-we-love-celebrity-gossipand-tabloid-magazines-362710.
2.
See id.
3.
Id.
4.
See id.; Regan Morris, Is #MeToo Changing Hollywood?, BBC: NEWS
(Mar. 3, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43219531.
5.
See Tatiana Siegel, #MeToo Hits Movie Deals: Studios Race to Add
Morality Clauses to Contracts, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 7, 2018, 6:50 AM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/node/1082563.
6.
See Morris, supra note 4; Kyle Smith, A Male Backlash Against #MeToo
Is Brewing, N.Y POST (Feb. 3, 2018, 2:43 PM), http://www.nypost.com/2018/02/03/a-malebacklash-against-metoo-is-brewing/.
7.
See Siegel, supra note 5.
8.
See id.
9.
Id.
10.
See Stephen M. Gallagher, Note, Who’s Really Winning?: The Tension of
Morals Clauses in Film and Television, 16 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 88, 88 (2016) (discussing
the standard nature of morals clauses in the entertainment industry).
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standard practice in advertising, motion pictures, and television agreements
and are generally upheld by the courts. 11 “Morals clauses give [an] employer
. . . the right to terminate a talent [contract]” if the talent fails to conduct
himself according to the moral standards of society, thereby tarnishing his
own reputation and the reputation of his employer. 12 For example, a contract
could have a morals clause allowing for the termination of the agreement in
the event that the hired talent is convicted of a drug offense. 13 Upon the
talent’s conviction, the morals clause is triggered and the talent’s employer
has the right to terminate the contract. 14
In the midst of countless celebrity accusations of sexual impropriety,
morals clauses seem to be an effective tool Hollywood can use to combat
negative publicity generated by toxic talent who have lost their status and,
most importantly, their value. 15 In light of the recent wave of sexual assault
allegations that rocked Hollywood, studios and production companies plan to
use morals clauses more often and broaden their language to account for
possible accusations of sexual assault and violence committed by their
talent. 16 By including language that allows for the termination of a talent
agreement if allegations of sexual misconduct come to light, Hollywood
studios can effectively mitigate potential financial losses associated with
these accusations. 17 However, some fear that broader morals clauses that are
triggered upon mere accusations set a bad precedent for the industry because
they could be used unfairly or even be abused by studios and production
companies. 18
This Comment will address these concerns and others that arise out
of the use of broader and more expansive morals clauses.19 In addition to
defining the morals clauses and identifying its components, this Comment
will explore the historical evolution of morals clauses from the 1920s up to
the modern era. 20 This Comment will also provide useful background
11.
Id.; Noah B. Kressler, Note, Using the Morals Clause in Talent
Agreements: A Historical, Legal and Practical Guide, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235, 235
(2005).
12.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 88.
13.
Kressler, supra note 11, at 245–46.
14.
Id.
15.
See id. at 244 (discussing the value of morals clauses in the television and
motion picture industry); Gallagher, supra note 10, at 90.
16.
See Natalie Robehmed, The Morality Clause: How #MeToo Is Changing
(Mar.
29,
2018,
11:22
AM),
Hollywood
Dealmaking,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2018/03/29/the-morality-clause-how-metoo-ischanging-hollywood-dealmaking.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
See discussion infra Part II–IV.
20.
See discussion infra Part II.
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information of the #MeToo movement and its effects on Hollywood by
providing in-depth case studies on the Harvey Weinstein, Kevin Spacey, and
Louis C.K. allegations that led to their pariah status in the entertainment
industry and cost their employers millions of dollars. 21 Ultimately, this
Comment’s proposition is that we should have little concern over broader
morals clauses because they are in essence very similar to past morals
clauses that were upheld by the courts, will likely not be abused, and will
facilitate the necessary shift in cultural norms in Hollywood by shedding
light on the epidemic of workplace sexual harassment and assault.22
II.
A.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MORALS CLAUSES

Morals Clauses Defined

In contract law, morals clauses are contractual provisions that give
the employer the right to terminate the agreement in the event that the
employee behaves in a way that negatively impacts his or her own public
image and thereby damages the reputation of the employer by association. 23
Morals clauses are sought after by many contracting companies in an effort
to protect themselves from the immoral and reckless conduct of the
employee—commonly called the talent—and to ensure that the value of the
film or television program is not compromised. 24 Additionally, morals
clauses are used “to quickly disconnect the celebrity/product association in
the consumer’s mind.” 25 There are two elements of a morals clause: The
immoral behavior deemed to trigger the morals clause and the employer’s
options after the clause has been triggered. 26 The subjective nature of morals
is a point of frequent contention in entertainment contract negotiations and
consequently leads talent to seek legal recourse to deny being bound to its
language. 27
1.

Negotiating Morality

Morals clauses in contracts cover conduct that disregards public
morals and decency, shocks or insults the community, or casts a negative
21.
See discussion infra Part III–V.
22.
See discussion infra Part VI.
23.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 90.
24.
Id.; see also Kressler, supra note 11, at 244.
25.
Kressler, supra note 11, at 241.
26.
14 MICHAEL P. ZWEIG, BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN
FEDERAL COURTS 768 (4th ed. 2016).
27.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 90–91 (discussing how the subjective nature
of morals clauses leads to litigation).
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light on the talent themselves, “the financier, the producer, the employer, or
the distributor.” 28 However, due to the inherent subjectivity of the term
morality, it can be quite difficult to pinpoint what public morals or decency
actually refers to. 29 This ambiguity lies in the fact that the nature of morality
is rooted in community customs that vary from community to community
and from generation to generation. 30 In fact, yesterday’s societal taboos may
be socially accepted today. 31 For example, in the past, an employee’s
homosexuality might have been the triggering offense that terminated a
contract, while, in the present, an employee making homophobic statements
might be the trigger. 32 Thus, there is no uniformly accepted legal definition
of a moral standard nor can there truly be one single accepted definition due
to the constant evolution of moral standards in society. 33 Naturally,
Hollywood studios typically adopt an “I know it when I see it” approach
when evaluating their employees conduct. 34 In an attempt to deal with this
28.
2 THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW 3D:
AND BUSINESS PRACTICES § 9:107, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2018).

LEGAL CONCEPTS

29.
See Schuyler Moore, Morality Clauses in Hollywood: What You Need to
Know,
FORBES
(Mar.
12,
2018,
5:27
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/schuylermoore/2018/03/12/morality-clauses-in-hollywood/.
[I]t is rather difficult to discern a definition for morality or moral behavior
applicable in all circumstances. This is especially true when one considers the . . .
sensitivity of making such an evaluation. At the very least, moral behavior refers to
behavior that comports to an existing code of conduct put forward by a society.

Fernando M. Pinguelo & Timothy D. Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals? An
Examination of Morals Clauses in Talent Contracts and What Talent Needs to Know!, 19
SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 347, 352 (2009) (emphasis added).
30.
Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 29, at 352 (discussing how moral
standards change over time); see also Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 1061,
1096 (1982) (discussing how societal values change and will continue to change). “History
teaches us that systems of values evolve, and there is no reason to think that the process is at
an end.” Moore, supra.
31.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 91. “As everyone knows, moral standards
seem to ebb and flow with the times. In many cases what was thought to be improper in 1951
is deemed perfectly acceptable in 2016.” Id.
32.
Moore, supra note 29.
33.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 91; see also Moore, supra note 30, at 1096;
Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 29, at 352 (discussing the inherent subjectivity of morality).
“The skeptical conclusion is that our present system of values cannot be regarded as right or
objective because we know it will change in the future.” Moore, supra note 30, at 1096.
34.
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).

Id.

I have reached the conclusion, which I think is confirmed at least by negative
implication in the Court’s decisions since Roth and Alberts, that under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to
hard-core pornography. I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of
material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps
I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the
motion picture involved in this case is not that.
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moral conundrum, a test has been established to evaluate whether an
employee’s conduct meets the requirement of being immoral. 35 “The test is
‘not morality in the abstract, but whether taking the nature of the plaintiff’s
employment into account the acts complained of rendered the plaintiff unfit
to perform the duties which he had undertaken.’” 36 Thus, an employee’s
actions showing dishonesty and untrustworthiness justifies the employee’s
dismissal because the employer “can no longer place faith and trust in the
employee . . . or, as a result of the employee’s behavior, the public would be
disposed to curtail business relations with the employer.” 37 Therefore, the
triggering offense that gives the employer the right to terminate the contract
is usually conduct that is likely to damage the employer’s reputation and
potentially hurt the company financially. 38
During the negotiation process, talent typically seek to have morals
clauses narrowly tailored to be triggered only in the event of specific
reprehensible conduct, such as conviction of a felony, making it more
difficult to trigger the morals clause.39 On the other hand, the employer
seeks to draft broader clauses that allows for the termination of the contract
for various offenses such as accusations, arrests, and public indecency. 40
Broader language gives the employer greater discretion over when the
morals clause is invoked and thus when the contract is terminated. 41
2.

Termination and Defenses

Invoking a morals clause in an entertainment contract is a complex
business decision that must consider whether the employee’s actions are
sufficiently likely to damage the employer-employee relationship so that a
continued relationship would cause harm to the employer or their
investment. 42 Employers typically consider the severity of the employee’s
conduct and the overall investment in the project. 43 However, “[a] morals
clause [can] also be [triggered by] the perception of wrongdoing, rather than

35.
19 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 632–33,
(4th ed. 2016) (quoting Child v. Boyd & Corey Boot & Shoe Mfg. Co., 56 N.E. 608, 609
(Mass. 1900)).
36.
Id.
37.
Id. at 633.
38.
See Gallagher, supra note 10, at 90, 104.
39.
ZWEIG, supra note 26, at 768.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
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actual” evidence of wrongdoing. 44 Past misconduct that becomes public can
also trigger a clause. 45 While it can be argued that morals clauses give the
contracting company immense power over the agreement, the talent is not
without legal recourse. 46 “[L]itigation often comes in the form of a suit for
wrongful termination or in a breach of an employment contract claim
because the talent believes that his or her behavior did not trigger the clause
due to either ambiguity in the clause itself or a lack of required notice.” 47
B.

A Brief History of the Morals Clause

“[M]orals clauses have [appeared] in . . . contracts for nearly a
century.” 48 Introduced in the early 1920s, morals clauses have been
prevalent in entertainment contracts and have been “generally upheld by the
courts.” 49 However, the type of immoral conduct these clauses targeted have
changed over the years. 50 Initially, morals clauses were used to aid in the
pre-World War II era crusade against celebrity sin. 51 Then, studios
attempted to stamp out the alleged Communist invasion in Hollywood during
the McCarthy era by invoking morals clauses. 52 Finally, today, morals
clauses are primarily used to uphold the ethical standards that contracting
companies are expected to live up to by the public. 53 Today, there is a shift
in application of morals clauses where studios and production companies
now seek to target Hollywood’s prevalent problem of rampant sexual assault
accusations against prominent male celebrities. 54 Nevertheless, throughout
the course of history, there has a been a consistent theme regarding the
addition of morals clauses: Protecting the company’s image in the public
eye. 55

44.
Lauren Rosenbaum, Comment, 140 Characters or Less: A Look at
Morals Clauses in Athlete Endorsement Agreements, 11 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 129, 133 (2015).
45.
Id.
46.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 90–91.
47.
Id.
48.
Robehmed, supra note 16.
49.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 88; Robehmed, supra note 16.
50.
Caroline Epstein, Note, Morals Clauses: Past, Present, and Future, 5
N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 72, 78 (2015) (discussing the evolution of morals clauses).
51.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 92.
52.
Epstein, supra note 50, at 76.
53.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 92.
54.
See Robehmed, supra note 16.
55.
Epstein, supra note 50, at 75. “Businesses spend considerable sums of
money to cultivate the ideal image, and negative associations can wreak havoc upon their
efforts.” Id.
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The Origin of the Morals Clause

In the early 1920s, Hollywood was frequently at odds with the
religious sentiment of the rest of the United States, which viewed Hollywood
as a cesspool of celebrity sin. 56 Many theorized that this perception led to a
dip in movie ticket sales which stagnated the motion picture industry. 57 This
slump in sales was further exacerbated by the “Fatty” Arbuckle incident—
Hollywood’s first celebrity scandal. 58 In 1921, beloved comedian Roscoe
“Fatty” Arbuckle signed a multi-year, “[$3,000,000] contract with
Paramount Pictures.” 59 That year, the popular comedian hosted a Labor Day
party in his San Francisco hotel suite where actress Virginia Rappe was later
found to be severely injured and subsequently died of her injuries. 60 After
Rappe’s death, Arbuckle was charged with her murder and accused of rape.61
Arbuckle was ultimately acquitted of this charge but could not free himself
from the shackles of the negative public perception that lingered. 62 Learning
at the expense of Paramount Pictures, Universal Film Company executives
enacted a new company policy stating “that morals clauses would be added
to all existing and new actor agreements.” 63 These new clauses permitted the
contracting company to discontinue talents’ salaries if they “forfeit[ed] the
respect of the public.” 64 The provision stated:
The actor—actress—agrees to conduct himself—
herself—with due regard to public conventions and morals and
agrees that he—she—will not do or commit anything tending to
degrade him—her—in society or bring him—her—into public
hatred, contempt, scorn, or ridicule, or tending to shock, insult or
56.
2 THOMAS D.
AND BUSINESS PRACTICES § 9:106,

SELZ ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW 3D: LEGAL CONCEPTS
Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2018).

57.
Id.
58.
See Jude Sheerin, Fatty Arbuckle and Hollywood’s First Scandal, BBC:
NEWS (Sept. 4, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-14640719. “Los Angeles-based
film historian Cari Beauchanp says: ‘This was the first scandal in Hollywood with box office
implications.’” Id.
59.
Epstein, supra note 50, at 76.
60.
Sheerin, supra note 58. “The star, thought to have weighed about [two
hundred and sixty pounds] . . . was portrayed as a fat brute who had pinned down his prey,
rupturing her bladder.” Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Tom Moran, Review — Books: Sorting Through a Sordid Tale, WALL
STREET J. (Oct. 5, 2013), at C14. Two trials ended with hung juries, and the third jury not
only acquitted Arbuckle, but went out of its way to issue a statement declaring him “entirely
innocent and free from all blame.” Id.; Sheerin, supra note 58.
63.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 93.
64.
Morality Clause for Films: Universal Will Cancel Engagements of Actors
Who Forfeit Respect., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1921, at 8.
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offend the community or outrage public morals or decency, or
tending to the prejudice of the Universal Film and Manufacturing
Company or the motion picture industry. 65

Universal Studios sought to use morals clauses to achieve three
specific goals to mitigate the public admonishment of Hollywood. 66 First,
the new provisions were thought to remedy the perceived morally decrepit
celebrity lifestyle by acting as a restraining influence on actors and
actresses. 67 Second, the clauses were intended to reassure the public that
their screen idols were exemplary moral figures.68 Third, the morals clauses
were drafted to protect Universal Studios’ investment worth hundreds of
thousands of dollars at the time. 69 The morals clauses of today still mirror
the language used by Universal Studios in 1921 and are used in essentially
the same manner. 70
2.

The Clauses Confront Communism

Beginning in late 1947 to the 1950s, morals clauses expanded to
brand new territory—the political arena. 71 This era marked the evolution of
the morals clause where they were employed as tools to stifle political
ideology and affiliation, rather than to target actual immoral conduct. 72
During this era of United States history, Americans were deeply concerned
with the spread of Communist ideas to the United States. 73 In response to
this Red Scare, the House Committee on Un-American Activities (“HUAC”)
was created and tasked with investigating private citizens, employees, and
organizations for potential ties to Communism. 74 In addition to targeting
government officials and labor unions, HUAC eventually turned its suspicion
to Hollywood. 75 HUAC served forty-three subpoenas upon studio directors,
65.
Id.
66.
See id.
67.
Id.
68.
See id. The exact quote reads: “[I]t will reassure the public, who for the
moment may be inclined to fear . . . their screen idols have feet of clay . . . .” Morality Clause
for Films: Universal Will Cancel Engagements of Actors Who Forfeit Respect., supra note
64.
69.
Id.
70.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 97.
71.
SELZ ET AL., supra note 56, at § 9:106.
72.
Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 29, at 355.
73.
See House Un-American Activities Committee, ELEANOR ROOSEVELT
PAPERS PROJECT, http://www2.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teachinger/glossary/huac.cfm (last visited
May 1, 2019).
74.
Kressler, supra note 11, at 238; House Un-American Activities Committee,
supra note 73.
75.
Kressler, supra note 11, at 238.
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writers, and actors seeking to uncover an alleged Communist infiltration of
Hollywood. 76 Ten of these individuals were deemed unfriendly by the
HUAC for their failure to testify about their political affiliation.77 These ten
later came to be known as the Hollywood Ten. 78 This notoriety caused three
of the ten writers, Lester Cole, Ring Lardner, and Robert Scott, to be
terminated from employment by their respective studios due to their morals
clauses being triggered. 79
The McCarthy era marked the first time morals clauses had been
litigated in court which ultimately ensured that morals clauses would gain
enough judicial acceptance to endure into the modern age. 80 In Loew’s, Inc.
v. Cole, 81 Lester Cole brought suit against his former employer, Loew’s
(under the trade-name MGM), for the termination of his contract after he
refused to testify in front of the HUAC. 82 Cole brought an action against
MGM seeking a declaratory judgement that MGM did not have the right to
terminate the contract. 83 MGM contends that Cole’s failure to testify to the
HUAC brought him under public disrepute and invoked his morals clause. 84
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
note 29, at 356.
81.
82.

Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 29, at 355.
Id.; Kressler, supra note 11, at 238.
Kressler, supra note 11, at 238.
Id.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 94–96; see also Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra
185 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950).
Id. at 645.

Id. at 647.
83.

Id. at 645.

Id. at 645.
84.

See Cole, 185 F.2d at 645.

There is no room for doubt as to just what Cole did before the
Committee. A transcript of his testimony is a part of the pre-trial order. This
discloses that the Committee sought to elicit from him answers to two questions:
“Are you a member of the Screen Writers’ Guild?” and “Are you now or have you
ever been a member of the Communist Party?” All that need be said is that
although Cole stated he would be very happy to answer these questions, the
Committee did not succeed in getting an answer from him to either one.
Cole’s employment contract contained a [morals clause in] paragraph 5
which read: “The employee agrees to conduct himself with due regard to public
conventions and morals, and agrees that he will not do or commit any act or thing
that will tend to degrade him in society or bring him into public hatred, contempt,
scorn or ridicule, or that will tend to shock, insult or offend the community or
ridicule public morals or decency, or prejudice the producer or the motion picture,
theatrical or radio industry in general.”
On December 2, . . . [Cole] was sent a notice of suspension reading as follows:
“Dear Mr. Cole: At a recent hearing of a committee of the House of
Representatives, you refused to answer certain questions put to you by such
committee. By your failure to answer these questions, and by your statements and
conduct before the committee and otherwise in connection with the hearings, you
have shocked and offended the community, brought yourself into public scorn and
contempt, substantially lessened your value to us as an employee, and prejudiced us
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Cole argued that his conduct did not invoke the morals clause because his
failure to testify was political conduct rather than immoral conduct. 85
Nonetheless, the court found that failure to testify to a congressional
committee was sufficiently immoral to invoke the morals clause since Cole
did not conduct himself with due regard [for] public conventions. 86 Thus, in
upholding the clause within the contract, the court legitimized the existence
of morals clauses and acknowledged their value in curbing immoral
conduct. 87
Similarly, in RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Jarrico, 88 motion picture
screen writer Paul Jarrico, refused to testify before the HUAC about his
alleged Communist ties. 89 RKO brought a declaratory judgement action,
seeking a determination that the company had no obligation to give Jarrico
screen credit based on the invocation of the morals clause in their contract. 90
RKO alleged that the morals clause was triggered because Jarrico had
“brought himself into public disrepute” by invoking the Fifth Amendment
during the HUAC proceedings. 91 The court held that Jarrico violated the
morals clause and thus he was not entitled to screen credit because his refusal
to testify in front of the HUAC qualified as immoral conduct.92 Thus, the
California Second District Court of Appeal upheld the clause in the contract
and further legitimized morals clauses in the Hollywood entertainment
industry. 93

Id.

as your employer and the motion picture industry in general. By so doing you have
violated your obligations under your contract of employment with us and your legal
obligations to us as our employee.”

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 647.
Id. at 648–49.
See id.
274 P.2d 928 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
Id. at 929.
See id.

The written contract between appellant and respondent recited in part
that an essential consideration of the contract was the popularity and good
reputation of appellant with the public. Further, appellant agreed that during the
production and distribution of the motion picture he would conduct himself with
due regard to public conventions and morals and would not do anything which
would tend to degrade him or bring him into public disgrace, obloquy, ill will or
ridicule.

Id. at 928–29.
91.
274 P.2d at 929.
92.
93.
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Consistent with the holdings of Loew’s and RKO, the Ninth Circuit
also upheld morals clauses in similar entertainment contracts.94 Even after
Americans’ fear of a looming communist invasion dwindled, these clauses
continued to be used against ostracized celebrities due to increased judicial
acceptance.95
3.

The Modern Morals Clause

Morals clauses, once created to improve the low public perception of
Hollywood and out concealed communists, are now standard provisions in
motion picture and television talent agreements thanks to the judicial
legitimacy afforded to them in the 1950s. 96 This newfound judicial
acceptance helped fashion morals clauses to be efficient tools in the modern
age; tools used to terminate an agreement after public perception of talent
took a turn for the worst. 97 However, the changing moral landscape has not
only changed the way morals clauses are used but also how frequently they
are used. 98 Today, these types of clauses are widely upheld but now focus on
battling deviations from modern ethical standards. 99 By examining this
morphology, this Comment will discuss how the modern use of morals
clauses will be used to fight an emerging ethical dilemma—rampant sexual
misconduct in Hollywood. 100 In order to understand how morals clauses will
be used in the future, it is prudent to have background information on the
catalyst for this change, the #MeToo movement—its inception, its influence,
and its impending change to Hollywood entertainment contracts. 101
III.

THE #METOO MOVEMENT

Hollywood has had its fair share of celebrity scandals, 102 but it has
never experienced anything like the #MeToo movement. 103 “The phrase and
hashtag [#MeToo] has been one of the most viral and powerful [trends] in
94.
See id. at 930; Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d
844, 847–48 (9th Cir. 1954); Loew’s, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 658 (9th Cir. 1950).
95.
See Gallagher, supra note 10, at 94, 96.
96.
See id. at 94–96; Kressler, supra note 11, at 250.
97.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 98–99.
98.
See Robehmed, supra note 16.
99.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 96.
100.
See Robehmed, supra note 16.
101.
See Gallagher, supra note 10, at 98; Robehmed, supra note 16.
102.
Laura Martisiute, 5 Vintage Hollywood Scandals That First Showed
THAT’S
INTERESTING
(Aug.
8,
2018),
Tinseltown’s
Ugly
Side,
ALL
http://www.allthatsinteresting.com/vintage-hollywood-scandals.
103.
See Morris, supra note 4.
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social media history.” 104 The movement, started by activist Tarana Burke
nearly a decade ago, was catapulted from a small grassroots organization
into an international powerhouse in a matter of months. 105 Since its
inception, the movement has sought to advocate for the survivors of sexual
violence in low income communities and promote a more substantive
discussion on sexual violence in the workplace. 106 In less than six months,
Hollywood’s rampant sexual harassment epidemic was thrust into the
national and international discourse by victims, their allies, and supporters. 107
The unprecedented maelstrom that is the #MeToo movement began
when actress Ashley Judd came forward about her experience with
Hollywood producer and film mogul Harvey Weinstein in which she
divulged that Weinstein made sexual advances towards her in exchange for a
boost in her career. 108 Since Judd’s revelation, eighty-seven women have
come forward accusing Weinstein of sexual impropriety, including rape, over
a span of two decades. 109 These allegations led to Weinstein’s termination as
chief executive officer (“CEO”) of the Weinstein Company, 110 the Weinstein

104.
JR Thorpe, This Is How Many People Have Posted Me Too Since
October, According to New Data, BUSTLE (Dec. 1, 2017), http://www.bustle.com/p/this-ishow-many-people-have-posted-me-too-since-october-according-to-new-data-6753697.
105.
Jocelyn Frye, From Politics to Policy: Turning the Corner on Sexual
AM.
PROGRESS
(Jan.
31,
2018,
2:59
PM),
Harassment,
CTR.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2018/01/31/445669/politics-policyturning-corner-sexual-harassment/; Alix Langone, #MeToo and Time’s Up Founders Explain
the Difference Between the 2 Movements — and How They’re Alike, TIME: LIVING (Mar. 22,
2018, 5:21 PM), http://www.time.com/5189945/whats-the-difference-between-the-metoo-andtimes-up-movements/; Vision, ME TOO, http://www.metoomvmt.org/about/#history (last
visited May 1, 2019).
#MeToo was started by activist Tarana Burke after she had a
conversation with a [thirteen]-year-old girl who opened up to her about the sexual
abuse she was experiencing at the hands of her mother’s boyfriend, according to the
New York Times. A decade later, in 2006, Burke founded the non-profit Just Be,
Inc., an organization that supports victims of sexual misconduct, with a focus on
young girls of color.

Langone, supra.
106.
See Vision, supra note 105.
107.
See id.
108.
See Stephanie Zacharek et al., The Silence Breakers, TIME, Dec. 18, 2017,
at 34, 36.
109.
Sara M. Moniuszko & Cara Kelly, Harvey Weinstein Scandal: A
Complete List of the 87 Accusers, USA TODAY: LIFE (June 1, 2018, 4:51 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2017/10/27/weinstein-scandal-complete-listaccusers/804663001/.
110.
Thuy Ong, The Weinstein Company Files for Bankruptcy and Ends
(Mar.
20,
2018,
10:50
AM),
Prohibitive
NDAs,
VERGE
http://www.theverge.com/2018/3/20/17142570/weinstein-company-bankruptcy-protectionnda.
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Company’s subsequent bankruptcy, 111 and the filing of formal charges
against Weinstein. 112 In June 2018, Weinstein pleaded not guilty to two
counts of rape and one count of first degree criminal sex act in the Supreme
Court of New York. 113
The #MeToo movement truly became an international phenomenon
when, in the aftermath of the Weinstein scandal, actress Alyssa Milano
encouraged her Facebook and Twitter followers to share their experiences by
replying me too to her post. 114 “The hashtag was [retweeted] nearly a million
times in [forty-eight] hours . . . .” 115 On Facebook, there were approximately
twelve million posts and comments about #MeToo in less than twenty-four
hours. 116 Internationally, more than eighty-five countries registered tweets
exceeding one thousand, with the hashtag totaling approximately 1.7 million
tweets world-wide. 117 But the movement did not stop with Harvey
Weinstein. 118 Since the hashtag went viral, more than eighty celebrities and
other public figures have been accused of sexual misconduct, harassment, or
assault, 119 including Kevin Spacey, 120 Louis C.K., 121 Bill O’Reilly, 122 Bill
111.
Jonathan Randles, Weinstein Co. Files for Bankruptcy as Part of Deal
with
Lantern
Capital,
WALL ST. J.
(Mar.
20,
2018,
12:35
AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/weinstein-co-to-file-for-bankruptcy-as-part-of-deal-with-lanterncapital-1521513365.
112.
Emanuella Grinberg & Elizabeth Joseph, Harvey Weinstein Pleads Not
Guilty to Rape Charges in Court, CNN (June 5, 2018, 10:55 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2018/06/05/us/harvey-weinstein-arraignment/index.html.
113.
Id.
114.
Sintia Radu, How #MeToo Has Awoken Women Around the World, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 25, 2017, 3:39 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/bestcountries/articles/2017-10-25/how-metoo-has-awoken-women-around-the-world;
Alyssa
(Oct.
15,
2017,
1:21
PM),
Milano
(@Alyssa_Milano),
TWITTER
http://www.twitter.com/alyssa_milano/status/919659438700670976. “If you’ve been sexually
harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’ as a reply to this tweet.” @Alyssa_Milano, supra.
115.
More Than 12M Me Too Facebook Posts, Comments, Reactions in 24
Hours, CBS NEWS (Oct. 17, 2017, 6:26 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/metoo-morethan-12-million-facebook-posts-comments-reactions-24-hours/.
116.
Id.
117.
Radu, supra note 114.
118.
Samantha Cooney et al., Here Are All the Public Figures Who’ve Been
Accused of Sexual Misconduct After Harvey Weinstein, TIME (Oct. 4, 2018, 12:01 PM),
http://www.time.com/5015204/harvey-weinstein-scandal/.
119.
Id.
120.
Adam B. Vary, Actor Anthony Rapp: Kevin Spacey Made a Sexual
Advance Toward Me When I Was 14, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 30, 2017, 12:37 AM),
http://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/adambvary/anthony-rapp-kevin-spacey-made-sexualadvance-when-i-was-14. TMZ was the first to break the story of this accusation. Alanna
Vagianos, Kevin Spacey Accused of Sexual Assault By 3 More Men, HUFFPOST: ENT. (July 3,
2018, 5:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/kevin-spacey-accused-sexual-assault3-more-men_us_5b3bd9fae4b07b827cbbb2c8.
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Cosby, 123 and Morgan Freeman. 124 The movement, in fact, gained so much
attention that it even expanded out of Hollywood and into politics, 125
academia, 126 and other industries. 127 Due to the all-encompassing scope of
the movement, it is not surprising that #MeToo has had an effect on

121.
Melena Ryzik et al., Detailing Lewd Acts, 5 Women Accuse a Comic of
Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2017, at A1.
122.
William Cummings, Bill O’Reilly Is Mad at God for Sexual Harassment
TODAY
(Oct.
24,
2017,
5:39
PM),
Scandal,
USA
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2017/10/24/bill-oreilly-mad-god-sexualharassment-report/795331001/.
123.
Carly Mallenbaum et al., A Complete List of the 60 Bill Cosby Accusers
and Their Reactions to the Guilty Verdict, USA TODAY: LIFE (Apr. 27, 2018, 4:32 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2018/04/27/bill-cosby-full-listaccusers/555144002/.
124.
An Phung & Chloe Melas, Women Accuse Morgan Freeman of
Inappropriate Behavior, Harassment, CNN: ENT. (May 28, 2018, 11:56 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2018/05/24/entertainment/morgan-freeman-accusations/index.html.
125.
Dan Corey, Here’s a List of Political Figures Accused of Sexual
NEWS
(Dec.
16,
2017,
5:08
PM),
Misconduct,
NBC
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual-misconduct/here-s-list-political-figures-accusedsexual-misconduct-n827821.

Id.

In recent months alone, at least [twenty-nine] powerful men in
entertainment, business, and the news media have been publicly condemned for
their alleged sexual misconduct and many have lost their jobs as a result. The
backlash and national conversation have spurred a chorus of voices joining the
#MeToo movement. That focus has lately turned to national politics. The
allegations, reactions, and consequences span a wide range. Al Franken resigned as
a U.S. senator for Minnesota, while Alabama Senate candidate Roy Moore
continued to campaign, even garnering the support from President Donald Trump,
himself the target of at least [sixteen] sexual misconduct allegations.

126.
See Peter Aldhous et al., He Became a Celebrity for Putting Science
Before God. Now Lawrence Krauss Faces Allegations of Sexual Misconduct, BUZZFEED
NEWS (Feb. 22, 2018, 11:33 AM), http://www.buzzfeednews.com/peteraldhous/lawrencekrauss-sexual-harassment-allegations (discussing accusations against Lawrence Krauss,
theoretical physicist and cosmologist).
127.
See Tom Gjelten, Amid #MeToo, Evangelicals Grapple with Misconduct
in Their Own Churches, NPR: NATIONAL (Jan. 24, 2018, 11:42 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2018/01/24/580193284/amid-metoo-evangelicals-grapple-withmisconduct-in-churchtoo (discussing #MeToo’s effect on the church); Tara Murtha,
Farmhands, Maids and Domestic Workers Say #MeToo, WASH. POST, June 10, 2018, at B6
(discussing #MeToo’s effect on domestic workers); Davia Temin, How the Reputation Risk of
#MeToo Is Forcing Businesses to Reevaluate Their Corporate Culture, FORBES (May 14,
2018, 12:56 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/daviatemin/2018/05/14/how-the-reputationrisk-of-metoo-is-forcing-businesses-to-re-evaluate-their-corporate-culture/
(discussing
#MeToo’s effect on the corporate realm); Samantha Wood, 8 Days Later, #MeToo Movement
Expands Well Beyond Entertainment Industry, PR NEWS (Oct. 23, 2017),
http://www.prnewsonline.com/8-days-later-metoo-movement-expands-well-beyondentertainment-industry/ (discussing #MeToo’s effect on other industries).
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Hollywood’s talent and finances. 128 Since the inception of morals clauses,
Hollywood studios and production companies have always paid close
attention to how the public perceives the celebrities they contract with and, in
turn, their own reputation. 129 The shift in norms pertaining to reporting
sexual harassment and assault have put Hollywood film and television
companies in a difficult situation as many of the celebrities they contracted
with have become toxic. 130 This Comment will address this issue and
explain how the #MeToo movement has affected Hollywood film and
television companies and the ramification it has had for the celebrities
accused of sexual impropriety. 131
IV.

#METOO’S EFFECT ON HOLLYWOOD’S TALENT AND FINANCES

The accusations of sexual assault against popular celebrities have hit
Hollywood studios right where it hurts—their pockets. 132 In the wake of the
#MeToo movement, several celebrities have had their careers ended or have
had their future projects terminated. 133 This section will address the effect of
the #MeToo movement on Hollywood and talent to better understand why
Hollywood studios are looking to expand the use of morals clauses, and draft
them in a way that allows for termination of the contract in light of serious
accusations of sexual misconduct or assault, instead of just charges or
convictions of these offenses. 134 Case studies on the Harvey Weinstein,
Kevin Spacey, and Louis C.K. accusations will be used to illustrate this
expansion of the morals clause. 135 As this Comment addresses, some of
these celebrities did not have a morals clause inserted into their talent
agreements—an issue Hollywood now plans to remedy. 136
A.

Weinstein’s Termination

In the incident that catapulted the #MeToo movement, the Weinstein
case shows just how much a Hollywood company can lose in the face of
128.
Siegel, supra note 5; Wood, supra note 127.
129.
See Epstein, supra note 50, at 75–76.
130.
See Siegel, supra note 5.
131.
See id.
132.
See id.
133.
Id.
134.
Robehmed, supra note 16.
135.
See Ryzik et al., supra note 121; Seigel, supra note 5.
136.
Siegel, supra note 5; see also Bryan Sullivan, Kevin Spacey and Harvey
Weinstein Employment Agreements Say a Lot About Hollywood, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2017, 2:39
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/legalentertainment/2017/11/15/kevin-spacey-and-harveyweinstein-employment-agreements-say-a-lot-about-hollywood/.
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sexual harassment allegations made against an employee. 137 Weinstein was
terminated as chairman of the Weinstein Company after more than eight
women accused him of sexual misconduct, including rape. 138 The film
producer had a loose morals clause in his contract with the Weinstein
Company that could only have been triggered if he failed to pay fines and
any costs incurred by the company due to his behavior. 139 This behavior
allegedly included sexual harassment and other misconduct, giving the film
producer a contractual loophole to avoid termination of the contract if he was
accused. 140 However, Weinstein was still able to be terminated by the
company who forced him out in late 2017. 141 Following Weinstein’s
termination, the company planned to undergo an internal investigation of the
allegations which could cost the company approximately twenty million to
forty million dollars.142 Additionally, New York Attorney General Eric
Schneiderman filed charges against Harvey Weinstein and Bob Weinstein,
his brother and co-chairman of the company, alleging that “the company
failed to respond” to sexual harassment allegations in the past and even
contractually shielded Harvey from termination. 143 As the allegations
137.
See Mia Galuppo & Pamela McClintock, Harvey Weinstein Terminated
from Weinstein Company, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 8, 2017, 4:15 PM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/harvey-weinstein-at-weinstein-1046874.
138.
Id.; Jessica DiNapoli, The Weinstein Company Files for Bankruptcy, BUS.
INSIDER (Mar. 19, 2018, 10:33 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-weinstein-companyfiles-for-bankruptcy-2018-3.
“In light of new information about misconduct by Harvey Weinstein that
has emerged in the past few days, the directors of The Weinstein Company—
Robert Weinstein, Lance Maerov, Richard Koenigsberg and Tarak Ben Ammar—
have determined, and have informed Harvey Weinstein, that his employment with
The Weinstein Company is terminated, effective immediately,” read a statement
from the TWC board.

Galuppo & McClintock, supra note 137.
139.
Sullivan, supra note 136.
140.
Richard Morgan, Board Approval Harvey’s Contract Suggests TWC
Complicity, N.Y. POST, June 7, 2018, at 29. “According to the contract, which Weinstein
signed in 2015, a first offense would cost him $250,000, a second $500,000 and a third
$750,000. For each additional instance, the contract continued, the cost to Weinstein would
level out at [one] million [dollars].” Id.
141.
Galuppo & McClintock, supra note 137.
142.
Natalie Robehmed & Madeline Berg, With Harvey Weinstein Out, the
Weinstein Company Faces Serious Challenges, FORBES: CONSUMER (Oct. 8, 2017, 3:01 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2017/10/08/sexual-harassment-scandal-posesserious-business-challenges-for-the-weinstein-company/.

Id.

“These investigations, if done thoroughly, can be extremely expensive,
in the range of [twenty] million to [forty] million [dollars], given that the
allegations span three decades, two continents, and involve potentially dozens of
individuals,” said Debra Katz, a partner with Katz, Marshall & Banks, who has
worked on similar cases.

143.
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against Weinstein increased, the reputation and value of his former company
decreased. 144 After months of legal and financial troubles, the Weinstein
Company filed for bankruptcy in March 2018. 145
B.

Spacey’s Termination

In the case of Kevin Spacey, the Oscar winning actor and House of
Cards star was accused by over thirty men of sexual assault. 146 On October
30, 2017, actor Anthony Rapp was the first to make an accusation against
Spacey, claiming that he was fourteen and Spacey was twenty-six when
Spacey made a sexual advance towards him in 1986. 147 Rapp alleged that
“Spacey laid on top of him” and tried to seduce him at Spacey’s
apartment. 148 The next day, “Netflix, the network behind Spacey’s House of
Cards drama, [stated that it was] deeply troubled by the [allegations].” 149 On
November 3, 2017, Netflix severed ties with Spacey while House of Cards
was in production in its sixth season. 150 The streaming service publicly
announced that it will “not be involved with any further production of House
of Cards that includes Kevin Spacey.” 151
This severance of the
Netflix/Spacey relationship included the decision to not release the film
Gore, the Gore Vidal biopic, which was in postproduction at the time. 152
Spacey contested his termination and claimed that “Netflix [could not]
legally fire him because his contract did not contain a moral[s] clause.” 153
According to Spacey’s contract, he can only be suspended or terminated “if
he becomes unavailable or incapacitated.” 154 However, Spacey was neither
144.
See id.
145.
Id.
146.
Kevin Spacey Timeline: How the Story Unfolded, BBC: ENT. & ARTS,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-41884878 (last updated Jan. 7, 2019); see also
House of Cards (Media Rights Capital 2013).
147.
Kevin Spacey Timeline: How the Story Unfolded, supra note 146.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.; see also House of Cards, supra note 146.
150.
Kevin Spacey Timeline: How the Story Unfolded, supra note 146;
Kristine Phillips, Netflix Drops House of Cards Star Kevin Spacey After New Allegations
Arise, WASH. POST: ARTS & ENT. (Nov. 4, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/artsand-entertainment/wp/2017/11/04/netflix-is-dropping-kevin-spacey-from-house-of-cards/; see
also House of Cards, supra note 146.
151.
Kevin Spacey Timeline: How the Story Unfolded, supra note 146;
Phillips, supra note 150; see also House of Cards, supra note 146.
152.
See Kevin Spacey Timeline: How the Story Unfolded, supra note 146;
Phillips, supra note 150.
153.
Sullivan, supra note 136.
154.
The Blast Staff, Kevin Spacey Can’t Be Ousted from House of Cards Over
Allegations; No Morals Clause in Contract, BLAST (Nov. 11, 2017, 12:10 AM),
http://www.theblast.com/kevin-spacey-morals-clause-contract-house-of-cards/.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol43/iss2/1

126

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 43, Issue 2

2019]

PUNISHING BAD ACTORS

221

unavailable or incapacitated since “he voluntarily checked himself into
treatment in Arizona” after the accusations against him surfaced. 155 Netflix
and the production company, Media Rights Capital, were able to circumvent
this issue by suspending the actor based on a sexual harassment policy. 156
Nonetheless, the decision to remove Spacey from Cards and not release the
feature film Gore reportedly cost Netflix $39,000,000. 157 Additionally,
Spacey was also set to star in the Ridley Scott-directed film All the Money in
the World, but was ultimately cut due to the allegations and the role was
recast to another actor, Christopher Plummer. 158 The decision to cut Spacey
out of a film that had already wrapped and replace him with another actor
was unprecedented, since the film was due to be released just six weeks after
the decision. 159 Imperative Entertainment, which produced the film,
reportedly spent $10,000,000—a quarter of the movie’s original budget—to
reshoot Spacey’s scenes. 160
C.

Louis C.K.’s Termination

On November 9, 2017, approximately a month after the Weinstein
accusations and a week after Spacey’s, the New York Times published a
story regarding sexual misconduct accusations made by five women against
famed comedian and actor, Louis C.K. 161 Dana Min Goodman and Julia
Wolov, a Chicago comedy duo, alleged that during a 2002 visit to C.K.’s
hotel room, he got completely undressed and masturbated in front of them. 162
Similarly, comedian Rebecca Corey was asked by C.K. if he could
masturbate in front of her. 163 A day after these accusations surfaced, the
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
Seth Fiegerman, Kevin Spacey Cost Netflix $39 Million, CNN: MEDIA
(Jan. 22, 2018, 8:45 PM), http://www.money.cnn.com/2018/01/22/media/netflix-kevinspacey-cost/.
158.
Brent Lang & Justin Kroll, Replacing Kevin Spacey on All the Money in
the World Will Cost Millions, VARIETY: FILM: NEWS (Nov. 10, 2017, 1:34 PM),
http://www.variety.com/2017/film/news/kevin-spacey-christopher-plummer-all-the-money-inthe-world-1202611975/; ALL THE MONEY IN THE WORLD (Imperative Entertainment 2017).
159.
Lang & Kroll, supra note 158.
160.
Id.; Rachel Withers, Replacing Spacey: Ridley Scott Speaks Out on the
All the Money in the World Reshoot, SLATE’S CULTURE BLOG (Nov. 29, 2017, 4:19 PM),
http://slate.com/culture/2017/11/ridley-scott-on-the-urgent-reshoot-to-replace-kevinspacey.html.
161.
Ryzik et al., supra note 121; see also Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey,
Sexual Misconduct Claims Trail a Hollywood Mogul, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2017, at A1; Kevin
Spacey Timeline: How the Story Unfolded, supra note 146.
162.
Ryzik et al., supra note 121.
163.
Id.
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comedian came forward and admitted to his sexual misconduct. 164 FX
Productions subsequently cut ties with Louis C.K. and will no longer credit
him as executive producer; he will also no longer receive compensation for
the four shows the comedian was producing for the FX network, including
the critically acclaimed series Louie. 165 HBO cancelled C.K.’s appearance
on Night of Too Many Stars: America Unites for Autism Program and
refused to show his past projects on its on-demand services. 166 Additionally,
C.K.’s film I Love You, Daddy, initially slated for release the week the
allegations surfaced, had its premiere cancelled and was not released
domestically 167 or internationally. 168 Following a setback, the Orchard, who
initially bought the right to the film for $5,000,000, pressed Louis C.K.’s
attorneys for a return deal. 169 Netflix also cancelled a standup special deal
with the comic, estimated to have been worth nearly $30,000,000. 170
However, because the agreement contained a morals clause, the service
provider only paid the comic for the special that was filmed, saving the
company millions. 171
D.

Analysis

The Weinstein, Spacey, and C.K. incidents shed light on the
motivations of Hollywood studios and executives in their push to include
broader morals clauses in future entertainment contracts.172 In Weinstein’s
164.
Elahe Izadi, Louis C.K. Responds to Sexual Misconduct Allegations:
These
Stories
Are
True,
WASH. POST: LIFESTYLE
(Nov.
10,
2017),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2017/11/10/louis-c-k-thesestories-are-true/.
165.
Id.; Madeline Berg, Louis C.K.’s Losses: How Much the Sexual
Misconduct Scandal May Cost the Comedian, FORBES: MEDIA & ENT. (Nov. 10, 2017, 1:21
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maddieberg/2017/11/10/louis-c-k-s-losses-how-much-thesexual-misconduct-scandal-may-cost-the-comedian/; see also Louie (3 Arts Entertainment
2015).
166.
Berg, supra note 165; see also Night of Too Many Stars: America Comes
Together for Autism Programs (Comedy Central broadcast Mar. 8, 2015).
167.
Izadi, supra note 164; I LOVE YOU, DADDY (Circus King Productions).
168.
Elsa Keslassy & Nick Vivarelli, Louis C.K.’s I Love You, Daddy Dropped
by International Distributors, VARIETY: FILM (Nov. 14, 2017, 4:32 AM),
http://www.variety.com/2017/film/news/louis-ck-i-love-you-daddy-dropped-by-internationaldistributors-1202614383/.
169.
Anthony D’Alessandro, Louis C.K. Buying Back I Love You, Daddy
(Dec.
8,
2017,
12:27
PM),
Following
Scandal,
DEADLINE
http://www.deadline.com/2017/12/louis-c-k-buying-i-love-you-daddy-back-from-the-orchardsexual-misconduct-scandal-1202222771/.
170.
Berg, supra note 165.
171.
Id.
172.
Robehmed, supra note 16.
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case, the accusations leveled against him led to his fall from grace in
Hollywood and the filing of criminal charges against him. 173 Additionally,
the accusations led to a well-established and profitable company like the
Weinstein Company to fall in a matter of mere months. 174 Just a few weeks
later, Kevin Spacey, a critically acclaimed and Oscar award winning actor,
went from one of the most highly paid celebrities in 2016 to a social pariah
in a matter of days. 175 Additionally, Spacey was paid for the entire final
season of House of Cards, even though he does not appear in a single
episode. 176 Similarly, Louis C.K., beloved comic and powerhouse of the
comedy industry, lost nearly every means of his former income in the span of
days, however, he was still paid for the first Netflix stand up special which
has never been released. 177 Although the indie film company, The Orchard,
managed to recoup the cost of the film by buying and reselling I Love You,
Daddy back to C.K, the company could not recoup the revenue the film
would have generated if the film had been released. 178 Thus, in light of these
financial pitfalls, Hollywood is ready to turn to morals clauses once more.179
V.
#METOO MAKES A CHANGE: HOW THE MOVEMENT IS CHANGING
HOLLYWOOD DEAL-MAKING BY BROADENING THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS
CLAUSES
From high-ranking movie executives to movie stars, rampant sexual
harassment and rape are now altering how business in Hollywood is
conducted. 180 The fear of financial loss and declining public perception has
led some Hollywood studios and executives to consider the addition of broad
morals clauses in entertainment contracts as a solution to their woes. 181
These broad morals clauses will be drafted in such a way as to account for
accusations of sexual harassment or rape, not just formal charges and
convictions for these offenses. 182 Fox is one studios that is attempting to
insert broad morals clauses into talent agreements. 183 The Fox provisions
173.
See id.
174.
See DiNapoli, supra note 138.
175.
See Madeline Berg, Here’s How Much Money Kevin Spacey Could Lose
Following His Sexual Harassment Scandal, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2017, 2:20 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/maddieberg/2017/11/03/how-much-money-kevin-spacey-couldlose-following-sexual-harassment-scandal/#2b4746efd786.
176.
Siegel, supra note 5.
177.
See Berg, supra note 165.
178.
See D’Alessandro, supra note 169.
179.
Siegel, supra note 5.
180.
Robehmed, supra note 16.
181.
See id.
182.
Id.
183.
Siegel, supra note 5.
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would allow for the termination of the talent agreement “if the talent engages
in conduct that results in adverse publicity or notoriety or risks bringing the
talent into public disrepute, contempt, scandal, or ridicule.” 184 Paramount
Pictures is another studio eyeing the inclusion of broad morals clauses in
entertainment contracts with talent. 185 Further, several smaller distributors
have already started to include them in their contracts. 186 An example of a
broad morals clause already added to a talent agreement by one film
distributor is:
In the event Distributor becomes aware of a violation or
alleged violation of Distributor’s policy by any key individual
whether or not such violations occurred prior to, during, or after
such services were provided, or Distributor becomes aware that a
Key Element has committed or has been charged with an act
considered under state or federal laws to be a felony or crime of
moral turpitude, then Distributor shall have the right to: (i) cease
distribution of the Picture; (ii) delete any credit given to such Key
Element in connection with the picture; and/or (iii) modify, edit,
and/or reshoot the Picture to the extent necessary to remove the
Key Element from the Picture. 187

However, these clauses will not just affect talent. 188 Morals clauses
will also be added to cover Hollywood executives too, since directors and
talent can also be detrimentally affected by the actions of high-ranking
executives, like Harvey Weinstein, especially if those figures become
associated with sexual impropriety. 189
The inclusion of these morals clauses in Hollywood contracts is
already under fire. 190 The Directors Guild of America and the Writers Guild
of America are labor unions that have long banned morals clauses in member
agreements and are especially wary of the incoming wave of broader morals
clauses. 191 Many others hypothesize that broader morals clauses in contracts
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Siegel, supra note 5.
Id.
See id.
Robehmed, supra note 16.

We are also hearing reports as well of more widespread use of
increasingly onerous morality clauses, and that is obviously a significant concern
for us . . . . While we do not have contract language directly prohibiting these
clauses, we will be taking a close look at this issue to ensure that the union is taking
all appropriate measures to protect our members.
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are bad precedent because they allow for an agreement’s termination in the
event that the talent or executive is merely accused of sexual misconduct or
rape and not formally charged with any crime. 192 Additionally, some argue
that broad morals clauses can once again be used to target innocent
individuals, like the Hollywood Ten scandal of the McCarthy era, and lead to
unfair termination. 193 This Comment will address these concerns and opine
that this new era of broader morals clauses are here to stay. 194
VI.

THE NEW MORALS CLAUSES ARE HERE TO STAY

Hollywood’s push for broader morals clauses in the wake of the
#MeToo movement may strike some as a truly unprecedented move. 195
While it is true that the #MeToo movement has reverberated throughout the
entertainment industry in a way no other movement has, broad morals
clauses are nothing new and remain consistent with the morals clauses of the
past. 196 The new morals clauses are here to stay for three reasons: first, they
are very similar to the morals clauses of the early and mid-1900s and will be
used in consistence with the morals clauses of the past. 197 Second, like the
morals clauses of the twentieth century, the new wave of broader and more
expansive morals clauses will be upheld by the courts since previous courts
have upheld similar provisions. 198 Third, public policy calls for the inclusion
of broader morals clauses to help remedy the epidemic of rampant sexual
misconduct in Hollywood. 199
A.

Broad Morals Clauses Are Nothing New

Since the inception of the morals clause, morals clauses have
typically been drafted broadly giving the contracting employer the power to
terminate the contract in the event that the talent commits an offense that

192.
See id.
193.
Id.; see also Epstein, supra note 50, at 76–78.
194.
See discussion infra Part VI.
195.
Siegel, supra note 5. Lawyer Linda Lichter said, “[t]his is a whole new
territory.” Id.
196.
See Gallagher, supra note 10, at 92–93.
197.
Id.
198.
Id. at 96; see also Epstein, supra note 50, at 77; Kressler, supra note 11, at
245–46.
199.
See John Dorsey, #MeToo: Use a Morals Clause in Contracts to Deter
and Quash Perpetrators of Misconduct, EXHIBIT 10 (Feb. 28, 2018),
http://www.exhibit10.com/2018/02/28/metoo-use-a-morals-clause-in-agreements-to-deterand-quash-misconduct/.
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brings them or the company in public disrepute. 200 The Universal Film
Company’s first morals clause in 1921 did not include the exact conduct that
would trigger the provision, such as a conviction of a specific type of
felony. 201 Instead, the clause conveyed broad sweeping language that
allowed for the termination of the contract for a variety of reasons.202 For
example, the 1921 Universal morals clause was drafted in a manner that
allowed for the termination of the contract if the talent did not “conduct
himself—herself—with due regard to public conventions and morals.” 203
Further, the clause also gave the employer the right to terminate the contract
if the talent engaged in conduct that tended to “shock, insult, or offend the
community or outrage [the] public morals [and] decency.” 204 The recently
proposed Fox morals clause is similarly drafted in an all-encompassing
manner, allowing for the termination of the agreement if the talent’s behavior
results in “adverse publicity or notoriety or risks bringing the talent into
public disrepute, contempt, scandal or ridicule.” 205 Thus, the new broader
morals clauses are not a novel phenomenon in the entertainment industry and
are consistent with the broadly tailored morals clauses of the past. 206
B.

Broader Morals Clauses Will Be Used as Originally Intended

The new wave of broad morals clauses will also be used as originally
intended—as a tool the contracting employer equips against negative public
perception of the talent or, by association, the company. 207 Much like the
aftermath of the Fatty Arbuckle scandal of 1921, contracting employers of
today see morals clauses as a method to protect themselves from financial
ruin. 208 As the #MeToo movement has shown Hollywood, sexual assault and
rape accusations made against talent hurt their employers financially because
of the talent’s negative perception in society. 209 Thus, these broader morals
200.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 92–97. “[T]he language of morals clauses
has only been slightly altered over time . . . .” Id. at 92. “[M]orals clauses today are not all
that different from the original one instituted by Universal Film Company in 1921.” Id. at 97.
201.
Id. at 93.
202.
Id.
203.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 93; Morality Clause for Films: Universal
Will Cancel Engagements of Actors Who Forfeit Respect., supra note 64.
204.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 93; Morality Clause for Films: Universal
Will Cancel Engagements of Actors Who Forfeit Respect., supra note 64.
205.
Siegel, supra note 5; see also Gallagher, supra note 10, at 93.
206.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 93–94 (discussing that the language of morals
clauses has remained largely unchanged since the 1920s).
207.
Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 29, at 352; Gallagher, supra note 10, at
88, 97.
208.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 88, 93.
209.
Fiegerman, supra note 157; Robehmed, supra note 16.
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clauses are merely tools to stymie the probability of financial loss in the
event of an accusation of sexual ignominy. 210
However, there are those who fear that broader morals clauses set a
bad precedent because they could be used inappropriately. 211 Those who
share this opinion about broad morals clauses assert that they can be used in
malicious ways to target innocent people and refuse them pay. 212 These
individuals allude to the inappropriate usage of the morals clause in the late
1940s and 1950s, when morals clauses were used to target suspected
communists. 213 However, the comparison between the #MeToo and the Red
Scare is a false dichotomy because where #MeToo sought to help the victims
of an industry infected by the epidemic of sexual harassment and rape, the
McCarthy era was wrought with the malicious targeting of individuals
merely due to political intolerance. 214 Further, it is unlikely that targeting
those accused of sexual misconduct will lead to a witch hunt and the
unnecessary termination of talent contracts because this would be a
counterintuitive business venture of the employer. 215 An employer would
likely only use the morals clause to terminate an agreement if there is a
substantial reason to do so, including multiple allegations of sexual assault or
rape or a single allegation with valid and unequivocal evidence.216
C.

Broader Morals Clauses Will Be Upheld in Court

Like the morals clauses of yesterday, it is likely that the new wave of
broader morals clauses will similarly be upheld by courts. 217 In fact, litigants
typically allege that morals clauses are broadly or ambiguously drafted to
such a degree that they did not have knowledge of what conduct would
trigger the clause. 218 These allegations are commonly dismissed as without
merit. 219 For example, in Nader v. ABC Television, Inc., 220 a United States
210.
211.
212.

Robehmed, supra note 16.
Siegel, supra note 5.
See Robehmed, supra note 16.

“[I am] all for [#MeToo]. I totally support it. But I think [broad
morality clauses] create a bad precedent,” says attorney Linda Lichter. “[It is] one
thing to say someone is a criminal. [It is] another thing to say someone has been
accused by someone and you can fire them and not pay them.”

Siegel, supra note 5.
213.
Kressler, supra note 11, at 238, 242.
214.
Richard Beck, #MeToo Is Not a Witch Hunt, VOX (Jan. 11, 2018, 9:41
AM), http://www.vox.com/identities/2017/12/21/16803206/metoo-not-sex-moral-panic.
215.
See id.; Robehmed, supra note 16.
216.
See Gallagher, supra note 10, at 88; Robehmed, supra note 16.
217.
See Nader v. ABC Television, Inc., No. 04-5034, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS
19536, at **5–7 (2d Cir. 2005); Gallagher, supra note 10, at 88, 96.
218.
See Nader, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19536, at **5–7.
219.
See id. at **2, **5–7.
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Court of Appeals upheld a morals clause in a talent agreement between
Michael Nader, an actor on soap opera All My Children, and his employer,
American Broadcasting Company (“ABC”). 221 After Nader was arrested for
“one count of criminal sale of a controlled substance . . . and one count of
resisting arrest,” ABC subsequently terminated him from employment and
Nader was written out of the show for violation of his morals clause. 222
Nader filed a lawsuit against ABC alleging the morals clause was
ambiguous, overly broad, and vague on its face. 223 The trial court granted
summary judgement for ABC holding that Nader’s arrest was a proper
trigger for the clause. 224 On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the trial
court’s decision that morals clauses have long been upheld as valid and
enforceable. 225 Further, the court held that Nader’s actions were a proper
trigger for the morals clause because his conduct generated negative media
attention upon ABC. 226 It is implied in the court’s reasoning that the
assertion that the clause was overbroad was meritless because, although there
wasn’t specific language in the contract that stated that the agreement could
be terminated in the event of an arrest, the language did specifically state that
any conduct that damages the reputation of the employer could trigger the
clause. 227 Thus, regardless of any formal charges, a morals clause will be
upheld if the employee’s behavior adversely affects the employer’s
reputation. 228
Similarly, in Galaviz v. Post-Newsweek Stations, 229 the Fifth Circuit
upheld a morals clause in an employment contract holding that a plaintiff’s
behavior that adversely affects the employer’s reputation is a sufficient
trigger for a morals clause. 230 In this case, Virginia Galaviz, a television

2004).

220.
221.
222.

No. 04-5034, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19536 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id. at **1.
Nader v. ABC Television, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 345, 346–47 (S.D.N.Y.

223.

Id. at 348. Nader’s morals clause read:

If, in the opinion of ABC, Artist shall commit any act or do anything
which might tend to bring Artist into public disrepute, contempt, scandal, or
ridicule, or which might tend to reflect unfavorably on ABC, any sponsor of a
program, any such sponsor’s advertising agency, any stations broadcasting or
scheduled to broadcast a program, or any licensee of ABC, or to injure the success
of any use of the Series or any program, ABC may, upon written notice to Artist,
immediately terminate the Term and Artist’s employment hereunder.

Id. at 346.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 349.
Nader, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19536, at **5.
Id. at **6.
See id.
See id.
No. 09-50730, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11790, at **1 (5th Cir. 2010).
Id. at **5.
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news reporter, was terminated by her employer, Post-Newsweek Stations, for
triggering her morals clause after a domestic dispute led to her arrest.231 The
morals clause did not specifically include language that stated that an arrest
would trigger the morals clause. 232 Galaviz filed a lawsuit against her former
employer and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of PostNewsweek. 233 On appeal, Galaviz claimed that her morals clause was broad
and ambiguous. 234 Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit held that her conduct was a
sufficient trigger for the morals clause and that it was not broad nor
ambiguous. 235 The court reasoned that since her morals clause included
language allowing for the termination of the agreement if the employee’s
behavior “adversely affects the reputation or business of [the station] or the
standing of [the station]” and Galaviz’s conduct did result in the negative
publicity of the company, then the termination of Galaviz was wholly
justified. 236 Thus, regardless of an arrest, an employee’s conduct that
negatively impacts the reputation of the employer will be sufficient to trigger
a morals clause. 237
Regarding the new wave of broader morals clauses after the #MeToo
movement, the clauses will allow for the termination of the agreement even
if the talent is merely accused of sexual harassment or rape. 238 It is the
employer’s discretion to determine whether the accusations warrant the
termination of the agreement. 239 However, unlike Nader and Galaviz, the
new wave of morals clauses will include language that specifically states that
accusations of sexual harassment or rape could ultimately trigger the morals
clauses. 240 It is worth noting that the contracts in both Nader and Galaviz did
not include specific language that arrests would trigger their respective
231.
232.

Id.

Id. at **2.
Id.

If at any time Employee fails to conduct himself or herself with due
regard to public morals and decency, or if Employee commits any act or becomes
involved in any situation or occurrence tending to degrade Employee in the
community or which brings Employee into public disrepute, contempt, or scandal,
or which materially and adversely affects the reputation or business of [the station]
or the standing of [the station] as a broadcast licensee, whether or not information
in regard thereto becomes public, [the station] shall have the right to terminate the
Agreement on twenty-four . . . hours notice to employee.

233.
Galaviz, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11790, at **4.
234.
Id.
235.
Id. at **5.
236.
Id. at **2, **5 (alteration in original).
237.
See id.
238.
Siegel, supra note 5.
239.
Gallagher, supra note 10, at 91.
240.
Siegel, supra note 5; see also Galaviz, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11790, at
**2; Nader v. ABC Television, Inc., No. 04-5034, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19536, at **6 (2d
Cir. 2005).
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morals clauses and yet the courts still upheld these clauses, reasoning that
any action that adversely affects the employer is sufficient to trigger the
moral clauses and terminate the agreement. 241 It is likely that since modern
entertainment agreements will specifically state that accusations are enough
to trigger a clause, future talent cannot successfully claim that the new
morals clauses in their contracts are overly broad and ambiguous since they
will receive ample notice of these triggers. 242 Thus, it logically follows that
if the broad morals clauses of the past have been upheld by the courts, then it
is likely that the new wave of broader morals clauses that account for sexual
misconduct and rape allegations will similarly be upheld by the courts, so
long as the conduct adversely impacts the employers reputation. 243
D.

Broader Morals Clauses Make Sense

Given the significant implications sexual assault and rape have on
victims, it is prudent that Hollywood, and other companies, adopt broader
morals clauses in entertainment contracts that can be terminated by
legitimate allegations of sexual misconduct or assault. 244 Broader morals
clauses will better serve public policy because they can help shed light on the
sexual harassment and assault culture in Hollywood and serve as a
restraining influence on talent to prevent future sexual misconduct. 245
#MeToo’s modus operandi is to help victims of sexual assault and violence
by shedding light on workplace misconduct and broader morals clauses in
Hollywood contracts can help assist in this endeavor. 246 Hollywood has
already seen an unprecedented shift in culture in the wake of #MeToo. 247
Influential organizations have updated their codes of conduct and are
implementing new rules to curb talent’s misbehavior.248 Additionally,
Hollywood’s culture of silence on sexual violence has been breached and
handed legal artillery in the war against sexual violence in the form of Time’s
Up. 249 The Time’s Up Legal Defense Fund offers legal and financial support
241.
See Galaviz, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11790, at **1–2; Nader, 2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19536, at **5–6.
242.
See Robehmed, supra note 16; Siegel, supra note 5.
243.
See Gallagher, supra note 10, at 88; Sullivan, supra note 136.
244.
See Dorsey, supra note 199.
245.
See id.
246.
See Siegel, supra note 5.
247.
Claire Atkinson, From Coffee Shops to Boardrooms, Talk in Hollywood Is
on Change After #MeToo, NBC NEWS (Mar. 3, 2018, 4:10 AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual-misconduct/coffee-shops-boardrooms-talkhollywood-change-after-metoo-n852766.
248.
Id.
249.
See Langone, supra note 105.
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for men and women who desire to fight sexual misconduct by use of the
justice system. 250 Legal and financial support coupled with a broader morals
clause can help victims of sexual misconduct find justice in the courtroom. 251
Additionally, these types of morals clauses can serve as a deterrent
to misbehavior by providing an incentive for talent to conduct themselves in
a manner that would not trigger the clause.252 Morals clauses have always
been intended to serve as a restraining influence on talent conduct and
broader morals clauses are consistent with this intention. 253 In the midst of
the #MeToo era, the effects that sexual assault and rape allegations have on a
celebrity’s career are apparent. 254 The #MeToo effect on workplace culture
is, in part, due to celebrities acknowledging the career ending implications of
these allegations. 255 Specifically inserting language into a provision of a
contract further provides an incentive not to engage in these frowned upon
behaviors by solidifying the exact type of behaviors that would ultimately
trigger a morals clause. 256
VII.

CONCLUSION

Morals clauses have been around for nearly one hundred years and
have been sought out by employers as a means to protect their reputation in
the public eye. 257 For this reason, it is no surprise that in the wake of the
#MeToo movement, Hollywood studios and executives turned their attention
once again to morals clauses in an attempt to distance themselves away from
toxic talent who were being tried in the court of public opinion. 258 Whether
these Hollywood companies are genuine in their sentiments against
workplace sexual misconduct is beside the point. 259 These companies are
businesses like any other whose primary focus is to be as profitable as
possible and aim to avoid financial ruin. 260 Showing solidarity with the
recent cultural trend of breaking the silence on workplace harassment is but a
means of avoiding financial ruin. 261 However, some feel uneasy about the
prospect of terminating an agreement solely on the basis of mere allegations
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
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of misconduct. 262 While these arguments mean well, they fail to take into
account the nature of businesses as rational entities that would not terminate
an agreement solely on the basis of a single unsubstantiated allegation with
little public condemnation. 263 A blog post on babe.net 264 accusing comedian
and actor Aziz Ansari of sexual misconduct failed to lead to Ansari’s
termination from Netflix.265 It is likely that Netflix, the streamer of Ansari’s
show Master of None, acknowledged that the allegations made against him
were unsupported and did not cause the public to turn against him. 266 It is
even more likely that the streaming service took note of the public
conversation that followed the accusation and determined that it did not rise
to level of the allegations made against Kevin Spacey and Louis C.K.267 As
of July 2018, Master of None is available for streaming on Netflix. 268
This Comment has not attempted to tout what these actors do or do
not deserve in light of these allegations.269 Nor has this Comment opined on
the fairness of punishing these stars by terminating their contracts. 270 This
Comment has simply attempted to address the way in which societal shifts in
norms and values affect talent contracts and the manner in which deals are
made in Hollywood. 271 The coming wave of broader morals clauses in
Hollywood entertainment contracts in the wake of #MeToo is but an example
of this phenomenon. 272 The #MeToo movement is an illustration of how
societal norms and values shape the law, but also serves as an example of
how the law shapes society by including morals clauses in contracts, which
may deter conduct and shed light on the phenomenon of workplace sexual
misconduct. 273 Therefore, the arguments made herein—that broader morals
262.
See Robehmed, supra note 16; Siegel, supra note 5.
263.
See ZWEIG, supra note 26, at 768.
264.
See Katie Way, I Went on a Date with Aziz Ansari. It Turned into the
Worst Night of My Life, BABE (Jan. 13, 2018), http://www.babe.net/2018/01/13/aziz-ansari28355.
265.
See Lisa Bonos, Here’s How Aziz Ansari Could Use Master of None’s
Next Season to Rebuild His Image, WASH. POST: SOLO-ISH (Jan. 24, 2018),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/soloish/wp/2018/01/24/heres-how-aziz-ansari-coulduse-master-of-nones-next-season-to-rebuild-his-image/?utm_term=.095d644c740f;
Way,
supra note 264.
266.
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clauses are not a new phenomenon—will not be abused, will be upheld in
court, are consistent with public policy, and serve to alleviate several
concerns about the broadening of morals clauses to account for allegations
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